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INTRODUCrION.
'A Soldier of Fortune'.
Clarendon, iii.130.
The outbreak of armed hostilities against Scotland
prompted hundreds of English soldiers to return from the Thirty
Years War and to enlist in the King's cause.1 Amongst them was
Edward Massey, who, like many of his comrades, had chosen to
become a professional soldier. The political instability of
his times was to enable him to rise far above his socially
modest origins as the fourth son of a minor Cheshire gentleman.
It has often been asserted that Edward Massey was born in
1619.2 This is clearly mistaken. Edward was the fourth of
eighteen children, of which the eldest, John, was born in 1601
3, and the youngest not later than 1618, when their mother is
known to have died. This confirms the accuracy of the earlier
birthdate, between 1604 and 1606, suggested by F.A.Hyett in
1891.4
In a portrait of Edward Massey painted by Sir Peter Lely
in 1647 a mature man stares from the canvas with solemn,
penetrating eyes.5 Massey is tall and lean, his demeanor of a
man no longer young: he was described in that year as 'of a
middle age',6 and may be assi.nied to have reached his late
thirties at the outbreak of the Civil War in 1642.
(1) I.Roy, 'England Turned Germany', TRHS (1978), pp.130-1.
(2) DNB, xiii.2.
(3) G.Ornierod, ed., Ormerod's Cheshire (1819), ii.399.
(4) F.A.Hyett, Gloucester and Her Governor During the Civil War
(1891), p.37.
(5) See frontispiece.
(6) E 401(20): A Speedy Hue and Cry..., Aug 10 1647.
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&Iward Massey was not born great, and it is small wonder
that his early life is but sketchily recorded. John Massey of
Coddington, his father, belonged to the minor gentry comunity
of cheshire. A man of very little influence outside his own
manor, John Massey did succeed in marrying into a longer
established and more powerful county family, the Grosvenors
of Eaton. Anne Grosvenor had been born in 1582, and must have
been eighteen years of age at her marriage around the turn of
the century.1
As the fourth son, Edward Massey stood little chance of
inheriting the Coddington estate. The ever increasing size of
the family must have been a factor in his early departure from
the parental home. He was a man of little depth or
soptiistication and had no academic ability or inclination.
Oxbridge and the Inns of Court, traditionally the routes along
which gentlemen might escape from provincial obscurity, were
thus closed to him.
Massey was apprenticed, probably when still in his early
teens, to a London leatherseller, Mr Edward Ford.2 In 1647,
when Massey was at the height of his prestige, John Vicars
penned a brief life, in which he confirmed that Massey had
'heretofore been an apprentice of London'.3 A hostile propaganda
tract written later that year, when Massey's circunstances had
changed for the worse, claimed that he was 'sometime an
apprentice of London bridge, but gave his master the bag, and
took [to] Holland' .4
(1) BL, Harleian tlss.1,535, f.208b; Sir G.J.Armytage
andJ.P.Rylands ed. Pedigrees Made at the Visitation
of Cheshire 1613, The Records For the Publication of
OriginalDocurnents Relating to Lancashire and Cheshire
v.lviii(1909), p.179.
(2) Gentleman's Magazine, v.ciii Pt.2 (1833), p.304.
(3) J.Vicars, England's Worthies (1845), p.60.
(4) E 401(20).
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It was coninon for less academically gifted younger Sons
of gentlemen to take up apprenticeships in London.1 Several
future Parliamentary coninanders, including Massey's political
and military ally Major General Richard Browne, were also
apprenticed in the capital.2 Massey's experience in the leather
selling trade does not seem to have been happy. Perhaps Mr Ford
was a harsh or uninspiring master, or perhaps Massey's willful
nature manifested itself in impatience, or disillusionment with
his prospects. The charge may be true that he absconded from his
indentured obligations by fleeing to Holland. Certainly it was
here that he began his military apprenticeship.3
The Dutch Republic was still engaged in its Eighty Years
War of Independence against Spain. Little is known about the
details of this part of Massey's early career, but it seems that
it was in Holland that he came to acquire specialist knowledge
in the complexities of military engineering and ordnance. John
Vicars wrote that thanks to his 'studious dexterity' Massey
became 'a most expert engineer and valierit soldier and comander
in foreign parts'.4 Many years later, in 1661, Samuel Pepys, a
shrewd judge of character and ability, met Massey in London,
finding him to be 'a very ingenious man, and among other
things a great master in the secrecys of powder and fireworks'.5
Massey may not have had the inclination or aptitude to have
become a good leatherseller or scholar but in the Dutch Republic
(1) P.Laslet,	 The World We Have Lost (1979),
	 p.5O;
C.V.Wedgwood, The King's Peace (1971), p.49.
(2) Vicars, pp.6O-l.
(3) E 401(20); Vicars, pp.60-i.
(4) Vicars, p.61.
(5) R.C.Latham, ed. The Diary of Samuel Pepys (1970-6),
ii.219.
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of the 1620's and 1630's he discovered in the military art a
vocation which fitted his abilities, and resolved to become
proficient in it.
Lack of professional soldiers had been one of the major
weaknesses of Charles I's army in the suniier of 1639. By 1640,
with war against the Scots looming again, the Royal cause once
more offered generous opportunities to skilled English soldiers
serving abroad.1 Edward Massey was certainly one of the more
obscure English professional officers who returned in 1640 in
response to the urgent needs of the crown. In 1648, a hostile
coninentator recalled some details about his return. 'For after
he came from the voyage against the Scots (when the Scots first
invaded England...) in which expedition the said Massey was made
Captain of pioneers by Nicholas Davenant, poet Davenants
brother; I say after which voyage he had not 12d some time
in his pocket to pay for his dinner' .2
Massey may well have arrived impoverished from Holland but
he soon found employment for his talents. Clarendon recorded
that he was an officer in the northern expedition against the
Scots under the coninand of Colonel William Legge.3 Colonel
Legge had been trained in the Swedish and Dutch schools of war.
He had returned to England before Massey in 1638 and soon
undertook special military engineering responsibilities. In
that year Legge was appointed to supervise the fortification of
Newcastle and Hull.4 By 1640 he had been made Master of the
Armoury and Lieutenant of the Ordnance.5
(1) I. Roy, TRHS (1978), pp.130-i; Wedgewood, The King's Peace,
p.280.
(2) CP, ii.159.
(3) W.D.Macray, ed. The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars
in England by Edward, Earl of Clarendon (1888), iii.130.
(4) CSPD, 1637-38, p.590.
(5) Ibid, 1639-40, pp.134,167; DNB, xxxii.414.
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It is not surprising that it was as a Captain of pioneers
that Massey was enrolled under Colonel Legge: his grounding in
the arts of engineering and ordnance could best be utilised in
such a position. Promotion to what was probably his first
coirinissioned rank was certainly a major advance for the aspiring
professional soldier. In 1647, a news-sheet speculated that
Massey thought 'himself highly advanced in being Captain of
pioneers for 5's per diem' .2 His rise was not based solely on
talent. The Davenants were crucial, though it is not known
whether their contribution to Massey's advancement was directly
the work of Nicholas, or whether his brother was also involved.
William Davenant was a poet, playwright arid military engineer
of much distinction, who, during the Civil War, became
General of the Ordnance in the Royalist army of the North under
the Duke of Newcastle.1 Perhaps William played a role in
introducing or reconinending the relatively unknown Massey to
Legge.
But there is another factor which may have contributed to
his advance. As a Captain of pioneers, Massey would have been in
coninand of locally impressed civilians, a position demanding
diplomatic skill. Men had to be persuaded to carry out menial
work, such as the construction of earthworks, fortifications and
gun emplacements, tasks often considered by soldiers to be
extremely degrading.3 Infantrymen were often punished by being
compelled to be a pioneer.4 Dislike of the work might have
created a dearth of qualified officers prepared to take on the
responsibility of coninanding a pioneer company. Considerations
of military status may well help to explain Massey's valuable
(1) M.Edmond, Rare Sir William Davenant (1987), p.9l; O.Dick,
ed. Aubrey's Brief Lives (1982), p.l78; DNB, xiv.104.
(2) E unni.vnbered tract 	 after E 1947(16) ,
	 entitled
Micro-Chronicon, March 1647, reference under 6 July 1646.
(3) C.Duffy, Siege Warfare (1979), p.147.
(4) C.Firth, Cromwell's Army (1967), p.l76.
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promotion at what proved to be a decisive moment.
Men like Edward Massey were the means by which the latest
continental developments 	 in military	 engineering were
introduced in to
	 Britain. The innovations of the Dutch
school of fortification, more than any other, were adopted
during the Civil War. This reflected the popularity amongst
Englishmen of the Republic's political cause, as well as its
place as a major innovator in the field of military technique.1
The campaign of 1640 culminated in the rout at Newburn,
and spelled political disaster for King Charles.2 Under his
leadership, England appeared totally incapable of organizing and
sustaining a campaign to subdue her backward northern
neighbour.3 As the focus of events shifted southwards to the
newly assembled Parliament at Westminster, the sad remnants
of the English army were left to fend for themselves while the
Scots came to dominate the northern counties.
Many amongst Massey's fellow soldiers must have regretted
their decision to abandon regular employment in Europe for a
short lived and demoralising campaign on the northern frontier
of their native land. Throughout the spring and sumer of 1641
the army's morale was eroded further by a chronic shortage of
pay.4 But these soldiers were soon to gain employment in
circumstances impossible to predict in the suniner of 1641.
(1) Lt.Col.W.Ross, Military Engineering During the Great Civil
War (1984), pp.9-10,16.
(2) S.Gardiner, The Fall of the Monarchy (1882), ii.43.
(3) I.Roy, 'The English Civil War and English Society' W&S
(1975), p.27.
(4) Gardiner, Fall of the Monarchy, ii.43.
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cHA1'rER 1.
STAMFORD'S LIEJXEEANT COLONEL 1641-42.
Massey had been associated with certain Royal officers who
had plotted to use the army to overawe the increasingly refractory
Parliament at Westminster. When the plot was discovered by Pym
many of these conspirators managed to escape abroad but one of
Massey's powerful acquaintances, William Davenant, was arrested.1
In June 1641, however, there was a second army plot in which
Massey's other patron, Colonel William Legge, attempted to collect
officers' signatures in support of an advance on London.2 Both
Davenant and Legge, therefore, were among the most active members
of the emerging Royalist faction.
Many English officers travelled south to London in the hope
of securing their arrears of pay. Some hoped to gain employment in
the new expedition planned to subdue the rebellion in Ireland
which had broken out in October 1641.3 But many of these
unemployed ref orrnados soon became involved in pro-Royalist
demonstrations in the capital, and a large niinber helped tharles
in his attempt to arrest the five members.4 Massey's role in all
this, if any, is not known.
The King's removal to York in March 1642 brought about the
physical separation of the two opposing factions which made the
Civil War a practical possibility.It offered, to professional
soldiers such as Massey, an unexpected opportunity for further
employment in England. His choice of sides seemed obvious because
his patrons and friends were among the crown's most loyal
supporters. Legge certainly attended upon the King at York
(1) Edmond, p.87; Gardiner, ii.164,167.
(2) Gardiner, ii.211-13; DNB, xxxii.414.
(3) A.Fletcher, The Outbreak of the English Civil War (1981),
p.85; Gardiner, ii.268.
(4) C.V.Wedgwood, The King's War (1971), pp.48-9; Fletcher,
pp.l78-9.
(5) R.Hutton, The Royalist War Effort (1982), p.3.
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Chapter 1
and was soon engaged in Royalist operations around Hull.1 Massey
could well have been in attendance.
Q-arles experienced great difficulty in raising troops,
especially infantry forces, in the North.2 What little military
strength he possessed seemed to consist almost entirely of horse.3
Some began to doubt whether the King could ever engage in an
offensive war against his Parliarnent.4 Still, throughout the
spring and siiriier of 1642 a steady stream of prominent gentry and
nobles converged upon York to enlist in the service of their
troubled monarch. The capital of the North soon became crowded,
almost to overflowing, with the King's richest and most
influential supporters.5 But, not for the first or last time, the
Royalists had too many officers and too few troops for them to
coninand.6
In such a situation, Massey's professional prospects looked
bleak, especially since there was no shortage of aspiring Royal
officers far better connected than himself. Massey lacked the
social pedigree and field experience to become an officer of
horse; and the Royal infantry, which might have offered better
openings for a man of his talents, was almost non-existent.7 Is it
therefore possible to conclude that Massey's impending desertion
of the Royalist cause was the cynical act of a career soldier on
the make?
In 1649, in an effort to explain his escape from army
(1) Clarendon, ii.3; U, v.27.
(2) J.L.Malcolm, 'A King in Search of Soldiers' EU (1978),
pp.251i-9; Fletcher, pp.228-9,231-3,315-6; Hutton, pp.3-4;
SP. 16/490, f.131.
(3) SP.16/490, ff.13,171.
(4) SP.16/491, f.59; Clarendon, ii.313.
(5) Bodl., Tanner Mss. 63, ff.30,35; SP.16/491, f.77; Clarendon,
ii.86; W.Scott, ed. Somers Tracts (1810-11), iv.463.





custody, Massey tried to justify his conduct during these early
months of the war. He related how in 1642 he had carefully studied
the declarations of King and Parliament, and found himself, like
so many others, equally contented with both.1 In 1660 he claimed
to have taken at face value the Parliament's stated intention only
to maintain the Protestant religion, the King's just prerogatives
and the laws of the land.2 He claimed to have believed that the
King had listened to those 'about him (who only aimed at their own
advantage and design) [and allowed himself] to be misled, and
drawn aside, to the danger of the Kingdom and his own prejudice' .3
Such claims may well have reflected Massey's need in both
1649 and 1660 to project his motives in terms which the Royalists
to whom he was explaining them might regard as honourable, or at
least excusable. His 1649 version of his earlier standpoint
contained beliefs comnonpiace in mid-1642, whether or not Massey
was sincere in reporting that he had held them then. Many agreed
with the notion, assiduously circulated by Pym and his supporters
in the Comons, that there existed a conspiracy amongst the King's
advisers to pursue their own interests at the expense of those of
the state. This is certainly consistent with Massey's view that
Parliament was the King's 'greatest council, the collective body
and trustees of the people, and by his majesty's own free act
confirmed to be a Parliament proper', and that Pym and his
followers were men of integrity 'supposing none of them could have
any thought or aim beyond the public good' .4 The acquisition of
such views makes his transfer of allegiance to the Parliament
perfectly logical.
There is abundant evidence however that Massey's behaviour
in the suniner of 1642 was guided by considerations more
(1) E 541(7); A Short Declaration	 Colonel Edward Massey, p.3.
(2) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Ms.f.30.




pragmatic than a sudden conversion to the ideological merits of
the Parliamentary cause. His desertion of the King, and later
prominence in the enemy camp, make it especially understandable
that the leading Royalists with whom he had been closely
connected should have hated him, as a traitor to their cause.1
Nevertheless, their accounts of Massey and his motives ring true.
Clarendon believed that in 1642. Massey was nothing more
than a soldier of fortune.2 Certainly, Massey's past conduct had
been that of a professional soldier seeking to make the most of
his chosen career. And, as Clarendon observed, Massey 'in the
beginning of these troubles had been at York with inclination to
serve the King; but finding himself not enough known there, and
that there would be little gotten but the comfort of a good
conscience, he went to London, where there was more money and
fewer of ficers'.3 In 1643, another Royalist said that Massey had
initially decided to serve the King 'but that he was refused the
employment he desired' .4
Massey's tendency to inflate the value of his own services
was important in shaping his destiny, in 1642 and later. 1-Lad he
been offered a coninissioned rank of sufficient prestige, there can
be little doubt that he would have stayed loyal to the King's
cause. But there were few opportunities in the Royalist camp for
those such as nimseif who were not well connected. Parliament, by
contrast, offered more scope to obscure but ambitious men. There
was an acute shortage of skilled professional officers in London,
and Scottish veteran officers were often employed to fill the gaps
in Parliament's ranks.5
(1) Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, ff.281-2.
(2) Clarendon, iii.130.
(3) Ibid.
(4) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.104.
(5) SP.16/492, f.92; Clarendon, iii.130.
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Chapter 1
From the very outset, therefore, Massey's allegiance to the
Parliament arose not out of conviction, as he declared, but out of
personal ambition. He was not alone in choosing the side which
seemed to offer the best prospect of advancement.1 The invaluable
experience offered by professional soldiers such as himself was
sought and welcomed by both sides, though the loyalties of such
men could prove to be very fickle.2
Henry Grey, Earl of Stamford, became one of the Parliament's
most eminent active supporters. His estates lay predominantly in
the counties of Leicester and Rutland. The outbreak of the Civil
War in Leicestershire largely revolved around the traditional
county rivalry of the Hastings and Grey families each of which
supported opposing sides.3 Stamford was the first to oppose the
King's Coninissioners of Array in Leicestershire, and so became an
early hero of the Parliamentary cause.4
Although Massey tried to show in 1649 that he had remained
loyal to Qarles until the raising of the Royal standard in August
1642 there is firm evidence that he had deserted the Royal
headquarters at York by late May.5 In early June Parliament
discussed a plan to send a force of 5,000 foot and 500 horse to
the relief of Ireland. This projected army, to be deployed under
the coninand of thrd Wharton as Colonel General,6 was never sent,
since Parliament was soon to have need of all the troops it could
muster. In a list of officers, dated 11 June , Edward Massey was
mentioned as a Captain in coninand of Wharton's own foot company.7
(1) H.Dirkes, The Life, Times and Scientific Labours of the
Second Marquis of Worcester (1865), p.330.
(2) I.Roy, TRHS (1978), pp.132-3.
(3) HHC, Hastings Mss.(1930), ii.84-5; Fletcher, p.351.
(4) BL, Add.Ms.37,343, f.250b.
(5) E 541(7) A Short Declaration..., p.3.
(6) G.B.Cockayne, ed. The Complete Peerage (1910), xii(2).603;
Clarendon, ii.70.




Clearly Massey had arrived in London from the North by early
June, and must have made impressed Lord Wharton to be offered such
a cotrinand. Indeed, Massey seems to have gained ininediate access to
the social and political elite which dominated circles the
Parliamentary high coirinand, in sharp contrast to his lack of
similar success at York.
By mid-July, as Massey must have appreciated, it became
clear that the proposed Irish expedition would come to nothing.
The Parliament now began, as a matter of priority, to set about
raising an army for its own defence in England.1 On 10 July, the
Earl of Essex was named as Lord General of an army for which
10,000 infantry were to be recruited.2 As one door closed for
Massey, another opened. The new and ambitious plans must have
raised the hopes of many aspiring professional officers in the
capital at that time. Massey, like so many others, was not to be
disappointed.
In late July Stamford was back in London after his series of
reverses in Leicestershire. Both he and Essex visited the new
artillery garden to review those who had volunteered to fight for
the Parliament.3 It seems probable that Stamford had already
conmnitted himself to the raising of an infantry regiment, and that
he was on the look out for able officer recruits while in the
capital. Anyway, on 30 July Massey was coninissioned as the
Lieutenant Colonel of foot under the Earl of Stamford.4 Years
later he recalled that the coninission was 'under the hand and seal
of his Excellency the Lord General, the Earl of Essex, in the name
of King and Parliament'.5 Stamford was a novice in military
affairs and must have consulted Essex about the most important
officer appointments to his own regiment.
(1) CJ, ii.667; Fletcher, pp.338-9.
(2) V.F.Snow, Essex the Rebel (1970), pp.307-8.
(3) E 202(26): A Perfect Diurnall, no. 7, July 25-Aug 3, p.4.




Already, Massey had impressed Davenant, Legge and Lord
Wharton. It may have been Wharton, a religious and political
confidant of Stamford, who introduced Massey to him. The ex-
Captain of pioneers had been schooled in the Dutch service, where
Essex had acquired his own limited military experience, and this
may have helped to convince both Essex and Stamford of his
suitability as an officer. Massey had too few connections in the
Parliamentary camp to rise far by means of patronage or nepotism.
The fact that he was awarded a Lieutenant Colonel's coninission
testifies to his ability to impress senior cormianders with his
military expertise and leadership qualities. When hostilities
coarnenced both Stamford and Essex were to reaffirm their
confidence in Massey's martial abilities.
By 14 September, Massey was Lieutenant Colonel of Stamford's
regirnent.1 By this date, even Lord Wharton's regiment had been
diverted from the Irish service to serve in Essex's main field
army.2 It is unclear when Stamford's regiment was actually
recruited, ixit its officers were all named by September 14, so the
process was then nearing completion. It is likely that the
regiment was raised predominantly on the Earl's estates in
Leicestershire and Rutland. The Royalists had effectively
withdrawn from these areas by late August and were now
concentrating their recruitment campaign in the Welsh marches.
Thomas May related that Parliamentary infantry regiments,
like their Royalist counterparts, were usually raised in areas
where their Colonel, who was usually a peer or a prominent
landowner, had local influence.3 Each Parliamentary Colonel was
granted levy money to recruit his regiment, and passed on
(1) E 117(3); Peacock, p.29.
(2) P.Young, Edgehill 1642, pp.248-9.




a proportion to his Captain, who was expected to raise his company
individually.1 The system clearly offered the opportunity for
profits, and Massey, a man of limited means, may well have
benefited considerably as a result.
The house of Coninons ordered that all regiments, including
Stamford's, should be equipped with 'coats, shoes, shirts and
caps, in all to the value of 17 shillings for every rnan'.2 The
Earl had previously armed some of his tenants and servants to
defend his mansion at Brodgate.3 Such men must now have formed
the backbone of his regiment. By late September Stamford and his
forces were at thtterworth in Leicestershire 'to secure that part
of the country'.3 Finally, also in late September, at a general
rendezvous of the Parliamentary forces at Dunsmore Heath near
Coventry, Stamford marched his regiment into Essex's main field
army .4
Like all other foot regiments of the Lord General's army
Stamford's possessed particular strengths and weaknesses. Firstly
the Earl was himself relatively inexperienced. His only
involvement with military affairs before 1642 was during the
Bishops Wars of 1638-40, in which he seems to have been entirely
passive, displaying great sympathy and understanding towards the
Scots at Berwick.5 This hardly amounted to a grounding in the arts
of war. Massey's appointment as Stamford's second in corrinand was
thus very important: he was, in effect, to assume the role of
military adviser to the Earl and to oversee the day to day
(1) G.Davies, 'The Parliamentary Army Under the Earl of Essex'
FAIR (1934), p.33.
(2) SP, 16/491, f.233.
(3) E 154(4): Execution of the Militia in ... Leicester.
(4) SP, 16/492, f.68.




running of the regiment. The influence in the Civil War of
professional soldiers, with foreign experience, was not always
reflected in promotion to the highest rank. But they often played a
more important role in the practical administration of forces
raised and comanded by their wealthier and more prestigious
superior officers .1
The vital importance of such experience, especially when the
comander was a novice in military matters, helped to ensure that
the appointment of a Lieutenant Colonel was not determined on the
basis of social eminence or nepotism. Such considerations did not
apply to all coninissioned ranks however. Stamford could and did
exert personnel preferences in his choice of officers. Edward Grey,
a close relative of his, was appointed a Captain of foot in the
regiment.2
There is evidence that Massey was eager to recruit other
officers with experience of military operations. The Sergeant Major
of his regiment, Constance Ferrer,3 was another veteran of the 1640
campaign against the Scots.4 Ferrer's comnission became effective
from 4 August 1642, a mere five days after Massey had been granted
his.5 A man of obvious ability, he was to become Massey's acting
deputy at Gloucester. Another of Stamford's foot Captains was Peter
thrisp, who may have accompanied the Cadiz expedition of 1625. 1\o
Lieutenants, John Clifton and Robert Hampson, were reformados.6
But by far the greatest number of officers and certainly
(1) I.Roy, TRHS (1978), p.131.
(2) SP, 28/129, pt.5, f.98b.
(3) E 117(3); Peacock, p.29.
(4) Rushworth, iii.1249.
(5) SP, 28/33, pt.3, f.351.
(6) Young, Edgehill 1642, p.247.
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the rank and file were, like Stamford and his kin, enthusiastic
amateurs. The Earl's raw and inexperienced foot regiment, with its
sprinkling of professional military advisors, was typical of
Essex's army. The testimony of Robert Kyrle shows that there were
other comon features.
Kyrle, a native of Herefordshire, had also fought with
Stamford's regiment in 1642.1 He had raised a troop of horse and
was assigned to occupy Hereford along with the Earl's foot regiment
in October of that year.2 By spring 1643, however, Kyrle had
changed sides, and wrote a pamphlet justifying his abandoniient of
the Parliamentary cause. Although this was clearly designed for
Royalist consiinption, Kyrle's observations on Stamford's men were
probably correct. He was especially appalled by the puritan
chaplain of the regiment, John Sedgwick, who spoke out against the
Bishops and advocated religious Independency. Kyrle considered
Stamford's regiment 'a perfect model of the whole army; and most
certain I am, that all the officers of one company were all of the
same opinion what religion they fought for ... some liked the
chapline of the regiment, another thought his corporal preached
better ... and one would think that every company had been raised
out of the several congregations of Amsterdam, who wanted not
scripture for every mutiny, who plunder and call it Cod's
providence'.3 Religious connitment and gross indiscipLine did co-
exist in Essex's army: Kyrle's evidence suggests that this was no
less true of Stamford's regiment.
In the Welsh marches, the King had begun to succeed in
recruiting dramatically increased. nunbers to his army at
Shrewsbury.4 Essex received intelligence that Sir John Byron
(1) Rev.J.Webb,	 Memorials	 of	 the	 Civil	 War	 in
Herefordshire (1879), i.157,161-2.
(2) SP, 28/261, pt.2, ff.76-7,80,82; Webb, i.157.
(3) E 246(35): A Copy of a Letter Writ From Sergeant Major Kyrle,
pp.2-3.




had occupied Worcester for the King, and resolved to draw his
army towards that city and deny it to the Royalists.1 This
manouevre was disastrous for the King's supporters, in both
Worcestershire and Herefordshire.2 It also strengthened the
security of the strategically vital county of Gloucestershire,
which coninanded the Severn estuary, and was surrounded by no less
than eight other counties.
Gloucestershire had been tentatively secured for the
Parliament through the efforts of the Gloucester corporation and
dissenting families such as the Stephenses.3 The central location
of Gloucester, the cohesion of the Parliamentary activists, and
widespread indifference to the Royalist party among the ordinary
inhabitants, had largely frustrated the King's attempts to
establish a presence in the county.4 By early September, the
Parliamentarians had managed to implement the militia ordinance and
mobilise the county's trained bands.5 Soon after Essex's arrival at
Worcester, prominent Gloucester aldermen, Thomas Pury and Lawrance
Singleton, visited the Lord General at his new headquarters.6 The
Earl's arrival must have greatly reassured them, given the exposure
of their shire to attack from the strong Royalist forces in the
West.7
(1) SF, 16/492, ff.68-8b; Hutton, p.27.
(2) Bodi., Tanner Mss.303, f.113b; Hutton, p.27.
(3) GRO, D 2510, ff.15,20-1; HMC 5 Report, p.346; GRO, B 3/2,
ff.220-2; HMC 12 Report, p.462; CJ, ii.719,727-8; U, v.219;
Corbet, pp.7-9; E 116(15): Sixteen Propositions.
(4) E 113(6): A Letter Sent ... Concerning the Lord Chandos;
B.Manning, The English People and the English Revolution
(1978), p.188; Rushworth, v.130; U, v.214,306; CJ, ii.673;
GRO, B 3/2, ff.220-2; HHC 12 Report, p.462; Corbet, pp.6-lO.
(5) Bodi., Nalson Mss.2(72), f.138; HMC 13 Report, p.61.
(6) CR0, B 3/2, f.226; F 4/5, f.189.
(7) CJ, ii.766-7; Bodi., Nalson Ms.2(77), f.148; HMC 13 Report,
p.62; E 240(5): A Perfect Diurnall no.14, Sept 12-19, p.6.
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Since his entry into Worcester, Essex had become acutely
aware of the importance of Hereford. The town lay along the most
direct route between Glamorgan, where, as he knew, the Royalists
were raising large numbers of foot-soldiers,1 and the King at
Shrewslxiry.2 Possession of Hereford offered to the Parliamentarian
coninand the prospect of a useful satellite garrison to the West of
Essex's headquarters that could warn of a surprise attack. On 30
September a group of Herefordshire gentlemen visited the Lord
General at Worcester and asked for a detachment of his army to be
dispatched to their county capital.3 The advance guard was to
consist of '15 men out of every company', amounting to some 900
infantry. This motley collection of foot was to be supported by '3
troops of horse and two pieces of ordnance'.4
There can be no doubt that Massey was chosen by both Essex
and Stamford to lead the initial expedition against Hereford.
Nehemiah Wharton, a Sergeant attached to this 'forlorn hope',
stated that it was cofilnanded by 'the Earl of Stamford's Lieutenant
Colonel'.5 A news-sheet later claimed that Hereford was first
seized for the Parliament by a 'Captain Massey'.6 That Essex and
Stamford should entrust a relatively unknown soldier like Massey
with an expedition into enemy territory told of their confidence in
his abilities.
Clearly not all of the inhabitants of Hereford were ardent
Royalists.7 But Massey could not be sure what degree of
(1) J.R.Philips, The Civil War in Wales and the Marches (1874),
i.121-3; ii.23-4.
(2) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.257; Webb, i.155.
(3) HMC 14 Report, p.99.
(4) 5j), 16/492, f.87. The CSPD, 1641-43, p.398, gives the
misleading impression that the Earl of Stamford coa%nanded the
force as its Lieutenant Colonel.
(5) Ibid.
(6) E 121(34): Weekly Intelligencer, no.1, Oct 7, p.2.




cooperation or opposition he could expect to find when he appeared
before the gates of the city, and there was a real danger of
running into Welsh detachments bound for the Royal headquarters at
Shrewsbury. Massey's first independent coimnand was clearly fraught
with danger and uncertainty. Wharton has left a vivid account of
its advance into Herefordshire. 'After we marched 10 miles we came
to Bromyard, the weather wet, and the way very foul, here we got a
little refreshment and from hence marched 10 miles further to
Hereford. But very late before we got thither, and by reason of the
rain and snow and extremity of cold one of our soldiers died by the
way' .1
The city's medieval defences were not to be underestimated
especially with the small force at Massey's disposal.2 Massey was
initially refused entry, but the mayor allowed himself to become
convinced that Essex's entire army was close by, and finally
admitted Massey's bedraggled troops.3 The mayor's panic was quite
unjustified: Hereford was capable of prolonged resistance, and
large Royalist contingents were rumoured to be in the area. Massey
posted guards on Hereford's walls throughout a wet and blustery
night.4 He had performed a difficult task successfully. Perhaps his
one cause for regret was the escape of all the local Royalist
leaders before his entry into the city.5
It had probably been decided already, before Massey's
expeditionary force had left Worcester, that Stamford's foot
regiment should act as the permanent Parliamentary garrison at
(1) SP, 16/492, f.87.
(2)Webb, i.158-9.
(3) SP, 16/492, f.87.
(4) Ibid.
(5)Bodi., Tanner Mss.303, f.113b; Webb, i.163.
- 19 -
Qiapter 1
Hereford. Essex did not not consider it an integral part of his
army, since it was only a few days earlier that Stamford's troops
had joined his London and South eastern regiments at Dunsmore
Heath. Having been one of the last regiments to join the Lord
General's army, it was now one of the first to be detached from it.
A few days after Massey's entry, Wharton, who was still at
Hereford, noted 'the Earl of Stamford (who is made Governor) of
Hereford entered the city, with a regiment of foot, and some troops
of horse: and took up the Bishop's palace for his quarter, and is
resolved there to abide'.l
The Earl of Stamford's regiment now replaced the scratch
forces with which Massey had initially occupied the city, and which
now returned to their quarters in Worcestershire. With the arrival
of the Earl himself, Massey's brief period in control in Hereford
came to an end, and he reverted to the role of Stamford's trusted
second in coninand. Presumably he took up residence with the Earl in
the Bishop's palace, which lay just South of the cathedral close,
by the river Wye. Essex provided Stamford with cavalry support, in
the form of his 68th troop under Captain Robert Kyrle, a veteran
of the wars in Germany. Kyrle's father's estates lay at Waif ord
Court near Ross, and his local knowledge would clearly be
invaluable to both Stamford and Massey. The Earl was also allowed
to retain his own troop of cavalry,2 since strong cavalry support
was seen as essential to such an exposed frontier garrison.
As well as garrisoning Hereford, Stamford had to try and
pacify the surrounding countryside. Here, popular Royalism was
strong, and it is small wonder that the Earl and his forces
began to treat the county like conquered territory.3 By early
October Stamford's foraging parties were making their presence
felt to the West of Hereford. One house at Garnons was
(1) SP, 16/492, ff.87-7b.
(2) Webb, i.157.




thoroughly ransacked by a detachnent of Parliamentary troops.1
Sometimes Stamford's men became violent during such operations, and
once a man was killed.2 It seems that Catholics especially were
objects of the Earl's displeasure. He sincerely shared the coninon
belief that there existed a papist conspiracy to subvert the state
and overturn England's Protestant Church.3 But it seems that
Stamford did exercise some control over his men because Hereford
cathedral, unlike Worcester's, did not suffer at the hands of
Parliamentary troops during their short occupation in 1642.4
Much detailed information about Stamford's Governorship of
Hereford survives in regular dispatches which he sent to the
Speaker of the house of Lords. By 21 October, when the first of
these was written, Essex himself was already racing towards London,
which resulted in his collision with the King's forces at
Edgehill.5 The Lord General had left Worcester in the hands of two
regiments of foot under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Essex.6
Meanwhile, also on 21 October, the first regular Parliamentary
troops entered Gloucester. 7 By 1 November Thomas Essex and his
1,500 foot had also arrived. This must reassured Gloucester's
civic leaders, who had earlier reported that 'many dangers are
threatened unto us upon the West part by the Welsh and also upon
the East part by the cavalier' .8
(1) J.Webb, ed.
	 'Mrs Joyce Jefferies Account Book',
Archaeologia xxxvii(1) (1857), p.206.
(2) Ibid, p.207.
(3) E 154(25): The Earl of Stamford's Resolution; U, v.415.
(4) Webb, i.163.
(5) Young, Edgehill 1642, p.73.
(6) E 124(32): Eight Speeches Spoken in Guild Hall, Oct 29; SP,
16/492, f.80b.




Thomas Essex's evacuation of Worcester reflected his belief
that, standing as it did in a strongly Royalist region, the city
could not be consolidated as a Parliamentary stronghold. On 10
November, Sir William Russell entered Worcester with a conniission
from the King to become its Goverrior.1 In Gloucester, Thomas Essex,
who had been promoted to Colonel, became temporary Governor, 'but
as yet the deputy lieutenants had the sole coarnand of the county'.2
Despite the ominous withdrawal of the Parliamentary garrison at
Worcester, Stamford and his forces at Hereford continued their
operations. In late October the Earl's scouts informed him of a
meeting of Royalist comissioners for Radnorshire at Presteigne.3 A
body of horse under a Weishman, Mr Fleming, was dispatched from
Hereford. Mistaken for a Royalist cavalry troop, this force
succeeded in capturing all of the conrnissioners.4
In order to contain the Royalists of South Wales, Stamford
established a satellite garrison at Goodrich castle in early
October. This thirteenth century stronghold stood high on a cliff a
mere four miles from Monmouth and coninanded a crossing over the
Wye.5 The installation of a new garrison here might have been
expected to discourage the Marquess of 1-Iertford and Lord Herbert,
with their 900 foot and a troop of horse at Monmouth, from
offensive action against Hereford. The Earl chose Kyrle to be his
Governor at Goodrich. His father's estates lay just across the
river at Waif ord Court near Ross.6 Hertford may have launched
some half hearted attacks against the castle in mid-October but
(1) J.W.tJ.Bund, The Civil War in Worcestershire 1642-51 (1979),
pp.60-i; P.Styles, 'The City of Worcester During the Civil
War', pp.223-4, in P.Styles, ed., Studies in Seventeenth
Century West Midlands History (1978).
(2) Corbet, p.14.
(3) LI, v.425.







without success .1 Like his comnander at Hereford Kyrle soon began
to intimidate and punish known Royalist sympathisers living in the
irrinediate vicinity of his garrison.2 The presence of Stamford's
garrisons at Hereford and Goodrich must have diverted the South
Wales Royalists attention away from the Forest of Dean and
Gloucester.
Slowly however, Stamford began to lose the initiative in
Herefordshire, reporting on 11 November that he felt 'much
threatened since I brought away those men of power' .3 Cut off from
the main field army, Stamford's regiment had probably received no
wages since it left Worcester in late September. He was
constrained to suhnit a request that his men be paid as regularly
as before, and also asked for 'powder, match and other materials
of war, from Bristol' .4 But resupplying the garrison at Hereford
was difficult now that Worcester had been abandoned and the
Royalists had established control over all the South Wales ports.
Massey's name does not feature prominently in the operations
conducted under Stamford's coninand at Hereford; raids were often
entrusted to local men with knowledge of the area, such as Kyrle
and Fleming. For the most part, Massey seems to have remained in
the city and supervised the day to day running of the garrison
there. During his Governorship of Hereford, the Earl moved from
the Bishop's palace to the (probably more comfortable) home of a
Mrs Wardin, which lay close by.5 It is possible that Massey
was entrusted with military administrative functions which
(1) E 202(46): A Perfect Diurnall, Oct 10-17, p.6; E 121(43): A
Continuation, no.14, Oct 8-12, p.4.




(5) J.Webb, ed. Archaeologia xxxvii(1), p.209.
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required him to remain in the palace.
1\o fraudulent pamphlets appeared, which attrilxited to
Stamford spectacular victories over the Marquess of E-Iertford at
Tewkesbury and Hereford in October and November 1642.1 These
never took place: the truth was less dramatic. On 4 November,
Hertford's newly raised forces left Cardiff, with drtins beating
and colours flying.2 During the first fortnight of November his
troops pushed up the valley of the Worm through Kilpeck towards
Hereford, finally establishing an advance post at Aconbury four
miles South of the city.3 On 12 November, Stamford held a Council
of War at Hereford, where it was decided that his garrison should
issue out with some foot to try and drive the Royalists off. When
the Parliamentarians reached Aconbury however, they discovered
that the King's forces had withdrawn to Ewyas Harold, a further
six miles to the South West.4 In a skirmish at that village a
small detacIent of Hertford's men were defeated, though it seems
that both forces then broke off hostilities,5 and that the
Royalists withdrew southward towards Abergavenny and Raglan.
Before this inconclusive encounter, a local Royalist had
feared that Stamford would launch an offensive from Hereford
against Abergavenny.6 His forces may have appeared too formidable
for the King's ill-equipped Welsh conscripts. Equally, however,
Hertford and Herbert were too firmly entrenched in Monmouthshire
(1) E 124(4): Exceeding Joyful News From the Earl of Stamford,
Oct 22; E 127(28): True News Out of E-Ierefordshire,.Nov 19.
(2) Philips, i.132.
(3) U, v.444; Webb, i.194.
(4) Ibid, v.453.
( 5 > Ibid; E 124(33): Special News From the Army, Oct 29.
(6) HMC 7 Report, p.689.
- 25 -
Chapter 1
for Stamford even to attempt to dislodge them.1 By mid-November
the situation was largely one of strategic stalemate.
Stamford did what he could to win local gentry opinion for
the Parliamentary cause.2 He must have valued especially the
efforts of Sir Robert Harley, the most prominent of
Herefordshire's small Parliamentarian coniminity, who had
accompanied him to Hereford. Sir Robert's advice and local
knowledge and influence must have been invaluable to Stamford and
Massey, both strangers in the area. The Earl described Harley as a
'mighty operator in any good' .3 But by late November, Stamford was
finding his position at Hereford increasingly untenable. He
complained that his men had not been paid for two months, which
clearly indicates that his earlier requests for supplies and
munitions had not been met.4 Meanwhile, Royalist strength and
organisation in South Wales, under the Marquess of Hertford, was
giving rise to concern. The Harleys feared that Hertford intended
'to force a passage towards Prince Rupert's army'.5
The growing confidence of the surrounding Royalists was
reflected in their attempts to persuade Stamford's Sergeant Major,
Constance Ferrer, to change sides .6 Stamford himself was becoming
increasingly pessimistic about his position. His regiment did not
lack courage, he reported, 'but we have neither monies nor credit





(5) BL, Loan 29/174, f.334.




as I can find any means of subsistence, I shall remain here'.l But
increasingly, the Earl began to despair of the city and the
shire, wnich were both, he complained 'so base and malignant' that
they preferred to be abused by the Royalists 'than to be rescued
and relieved' by his troops.2
It is clear that the King's supporters had regained the
initiative after the minor reverses inflicted upon them in
November. Stamford complained that they had recently re-
established a garrison within five miles of Hereford. Reminding
the house of Lords of his urgent need of ready money to pay his
men, the Earl ended pessimistically: 'an honourable retreat will
not be dispised; how soon I know not'.3
The Parliamentarian abandonment of Worcester must have left
Stamford feeling more isolated than ever. The final decision to
evacuate Hereford, however, was taken by Lord General Essex
himself. In late November Colonel Thomas Essex and his two
regiments were ordered to leave Gloucester to secure Bristol for
the Parliament.4 This left a military vacuum at Gloucester which
Stamford's regiment was well positioned to fill. The Earl's force
was relatively close, and was anyway coming under growing pressure
in its isolated redoubt of Hereford, especially after 3 December,
when Kyrle's garrison was withdrawn from Goodrich castle. On 13
December, the Earl of Essex granted Stamford a coninission to the
coninand of four Welsh Marcher counties.5 But it was too late. The
very next day, ironically, Stamford brought to a close his ten









Ininediately after Stamford's appointment as coauander for
the Welsh marches, the Lord General ordered him to take up comand
of a new Parliamentary Western Association. This decision
signalled the sacrifice of Hereford and Worcester in order to
secure the Parliament's strategic hold ever Gloucester and Bristol
which comarided the approaches to Parliamentarian Somerset and
Devon.
In mid-December, probably on the 15th, the day after his
evacuation of Hereford, Stamford wrote from Mordiford to Sir
Robert Harley, who was then at Gloucester, complaining of a 'slow
and tedious march, and even there' (ie Mordiford) 'I received his
Excellency's conniand to march away to my Goverance of Gloucester
and Bristol'.l Stamford assured Harley that his evacuation was
most necessary. 'I marched out I thank God in an honourable way my
drums beating alarm all night, my colours flying and trumpets
sounding'.2 The Earl thought his march to Gloucester would take
three days because of the impediment of his baggage train. But the
evacuation was not as orderly as Stamford portrayed it. Several
wounded soldiers had to be left behind and quickly became
prisoners of the Royalists.3
So ended Stamford's occupation of Hereford.4 The Earl's
failure to win the local coninunity over to his cause had rendered
his position untenable.5 Herefordshire's spontaneous Royalism and
Stamford's rigid Parliamentarianism were not compatible. His
soldiers behaviour was unlikely to reconinend to many the benefits
of Parliamentary rule. Rumours of a full scale Royalist assault
on the city by a hostile county coninunity was probably the final
(1) BL, Loan 29/174, f.38.
(2) Ibid.
(3) SP, 28/228, pt.4, f.686.
(4) BL, Add.Mss.18,777, f.96.




spur which convinced Stamford and Essex, of the prudence of an
ininediate evacuation. 1
Stamford's reputation for competently handling a difficult
comand depended largely upon able subordinates such as Kyrle,
Fleming and Massey. Massey's career at Hereford, after his initial
seizure of the city, was unspectacular, but he is likely to have
played a central role in running the garrison. Ultimately,
Stamford owed his elevation to the position of Parliamentary
comander in the West to the efforts of such men. His inflated
opinion of his own military prowess was no substitute for their
good advice, as disasters in Cornwall and Devon were soon to
prove.2
The Royalists wasted little time in profiting from his
departure. On 16 December, a mere two days after Stamford's
evacuation Fitz-William Coningsby was informed that he had been
chosen by Hertford and Herbert to be the new Royalist Governor of
Hereford.3 By 20 December, Hertford himself was at Hereford and
there he granted Coningsby his camission as Governor.4
Herefordshire had returned to its natural allegiance.
On 5 December, before the arrival of Stamford and Massey in
Gloucestershire, Royalist troops stormed Marlborough in
neighbouring Wiltshire, and plundered the town, the war violently
intruding upon the borders of Gloucestershire for the first time.5
Marlborough was one of the first garrisons to be assaulted by
either side, and its loss reverberated around the entire West.6 In
Gloucestershire, panic gripped the Parliamentary deputy
lieutenants, and they frantically set about fortifying
(1) E 244(11): A Continuation, no. 23, Dec 12-15, p.5.
(2) Webb, i.216; Clarendon, iii.71.
(3) Bodl., Tanner Mss.303, f.113b.
(4) BL, Harleian Mss.6851, f.243.
(5) J.Waylen, A History ... of Marlborough (1854), pp.l6l-4,
Rushworth, v.82-3.




From their frontier garrison, the Gloucestershire deputy
lieutenants had been able to launch raids into Royalist-held
Oxfordshire. Two attacks on Burford and Witney were especially
successful.2 During the first months of the war Gloucester had
been 'open to a free comerce with the world' .3 But the Royalists
were now astride the Cotswolds, and the county's direct line of
coninunications with London cut. The disruption of trade by war was
quickly understood by the city's ruling elite, which learned as
early as November that Rupert, on his advance towards London, had
'seized upon whole cart loads and waggons full of cloth coming to
the city out of Gloucestershire'.4 Other similar reports soon
followed.5
On 16 or 17 December, Stamford and his regiment entered
Gloucester. The city had survived for several days without a
garrison. To its inhabitants, mindful of Marlborough's recent
shocking ordeal, the Earl' s blue coats must have been a very
welcome sigi-it as they marched through the city's gates.6
Gloucester was now also vulnerable to attack from the South Wales
Royalists, there being no garrisons at Hereford, Worcester or
Goodrich to divert them.7 'The city of Gloucester was again left
naked' recalled Corbet, 'till the Earl of Stamford marched thither
with his regiment of foot, and two troops of horse from
Hereford' .8 But Massey's coninanding officer stayed only two days
(1) GRO, D 2510, f.11; G.A.Harrison, 'Royalist Organization in
Wiltshire 1642-46', unpublished London PhD thesis (1963),
p.132.
(2) J.Warburton, ed. Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers
(1849), ii.70; E 244(9): Englands Memorable Accidents, Dec
5-12, p.lO7.
(3) Corbet, p.12.
(4) E 127(4): The Last News From the Kings Army, Nov 11, p.3.
(5) E 127(6): An Extract of Several Letters, Nov 12, p.2.
(6) Webb, i.206.




at most in the city. It was imediately upon his arrival that
Stamford received the news of his promotion to the cormiand of
Parliament's forces in the West, where the counties were to be
linked by a Western Association, created at Westminster on 23
December .1
Stamford was required to leave-for Bristol, but before his
departure from Gloucester, it seems that his troops sacked Bishop
Goodman's palace, the Vineyard at Over, Just outside the city.2
Goodman ' s Catholic sympathies would have made him particularly
obnoxious to Stamford, and his property inside Gloucester was
also plundered soon after, by one of Stamford's Captains.3 By 19
December, Stamford was at Bristol settling the garrison there
under Colonel Thomas Essex.4 The initial reluctance of the Bristol
corporation to admit Parliamentary regulars stood in sharp
contrast to that of Gloucester, which had, apparently, admitted
Colonel Essex and Stamford without incident.5 Parliament's
possession of Bristol had important implications for the security
of Gloucester. The city's South western approaches were now
secured by a garrison in the Kingdom's second largest city and sea
port.
Stamford's new corrinission involved leaving his own foot
regiment at Gloucester.6 This ad hoc arrangement was no doubt seen
as temporary. Most peers preferred to keep troops raised from
their own estates, as were most of Stamford's, under their
(1) cJ, ii.900.




(5) P.ftGrath, Bristol and the Civil War (1981), pp.l2-3;
J.Latixner, The Annals of Bristol in the Seventeenth Century
(1900), pp.l&.-6; Corbet, pp.11e-5; CJ, ii.869; U, v.511;





ininediate comand, or at least close to hand.
The Earl's absence made Massey the effective comander of
his regiment and the most high ranking regular Parliamentary
officer at Gloucester. But, by simply making Massey 'deputy
Governor' under himself, Stamford showed that he thought this
situation was only temporary.1 Massey and the Earl's regiment
were to rnain at Gloucester for the greater part of the war. Both
were to earn fame and great distinction there. The ambitious
career soldier had by chance been given the independent coninand
that he so much desired. As a result, he was to play a central




ThE DEPUTY GOVERNOR, DECEMBER 1642 TO JUNE 1643.
Massey's background and reputation were not such as to
inspire automatic recognition of his authority at Gloucester.
Unlike Stamford, he lacked the social pedigree and high status to
impress the city's corporation. Gloucester's leading citizens knew
only that he was the fourth son of a minor Cheshire gentleman,
with no previous connection with either the county or its capital.
The lack of principle which had governed his choice of sides was
also recognised. The citizens looked upon him 'as the professed
servant of fortune'.l
Neither the deputy lieutenants nor the corporation would
find it easy to relate to or trust an outsider who, they
suspected, had little interest in, or responsibility for, the city
or the shire. The possiblity that Massey, like Colonel Thomas
Essex, might at any time be ordered away on more pressing
Parliamentary business must also have weighed against him. A
further problem for the new military chief was the confused tangle
of the coninand structures and jurisdictions of regular. and local
forces.2 What, for example, was the proper relationship between
the professional officers of a regular Parliamentary foot
regiment, cut off from the main field army, and locally raised
forces under the coninand of amateur civilian deputy lieutenants?
The Parliament had not sought to clarify such matters because in
the surriner of 1642 it had envisaged a short campaign. The
prolongation of the war made it essential to reconcile potentially
conflicting sources of local authority.
Massey and his forces were not indispensable. Naturally, his
regiment was important to the security of Gloucester, but the
seizure of Bristol and the garrisoning of Cirencester
(1) Corbet, p.25.




removed the irrniediate threat to the city. Massey's authority was
also weakened by his status as a deputy Governor: in theory,
Stamford might at any time return to resume comand of his
regiment. These factors worked against any sudden transfer of
military decision making away from the civilian deputy lieutenants
to the Parliamentarian regular army.
But the deputy Governor's mind must have been preoccupied
with the sad state of the city's defences. The old medieval walls
were intact only in the East and, partly, in the South, though
those sections of the walls that did remain still presented a
formidable obstacle. They were about two stories high and had
battlements and walk ways on the top.1 The Norman castle, however,
was largely a ruin.2 To the West the city was shielded by the fast
flowing Severn. But in the North, North-East, and South,
Gloucester's pre-war prosperity had led to the growth of
unprotected suburbs along the main roads which converged on the
city's high cross. Shanty dwellings, farms, orchards, ribbon
developments and substantial houses jostled beyond the medieval
walls which had once marked the limit of the corporation's
jurisdiction.3
Massey must have appreciated that Gloucester would not be
easy to defend against attack or siege. But there were reasons to
postpone the construction of earthworks to close the gaps in the
city's defences: the task was time consuming, labour intensive,
and above all, very expensive.4 Massey's arrival no doubt gave
impetus to the implementation of such a comprehensive scheme. In
February 1643 Corbet described the works as not being half
completed.5 But this does seem to suggest that a good start had
been made on them during the winter of 1642-3. The storming of
(1) Washbourne, pp.58-9; BG, p.373; Corbet, p.42.
(2) W.B.Willcox, Gloucestershire 1590-1640 (1940), p.5.
(3) GNQ, iii.366; Corbet, p.11; Willcox, p.5.





Marlborough and the various threats posed from South Wales,
Worcester, Hereford and Oxford probably propelled the civic
authorities towards undertaking the task.
While Massey consolidated his position at Gloucester the
civilian deputy lieutenants were still responsible for the
strategic defence of the county. All their efeorts were
concentrated on the fortification of Cirencester, a town which
lacked those medieval fortifications which, in the case of other
centres such as Gloucester, provided a ready made skeleton around
which further defensive works might be constructed. Such
difficulties were outweighed, in the minds of deputy lieutenants
Sir Robert Cooke, Nathaniel Stephens and Thomas Hodges, by
Cirencester's importance as a frontier , town. All county men, they
instinctively thought in terms of county defence, even when it
conflicted with considerations of practicality or overall
strategic purpose.
John Fettiplace, a Parliamentary moderate of no previous
military experience, was chosen to coirznand the garrison at
Cirencester. He had estates at Coln St Andrews, about eigIt miles
North West of the town, near the Oxfordshire border. Fettiplace
must have been chosen because of his standing among the local
gentry coninunity.2 It was doubtless hoped that he could better
secure the cooperation of the local coninunities in the supply of
the garrison. The Royalists regarded the garrison at Cirencester
in the same way as they had that of Marlborough - as a threat to
their domination of the region around Oxford.3 Hertforcj, who had
finally reached the Royal capital with a few thousand men from
South Wales, told Charles that he could not adequately supply his
(1) Corbet, pp.16,20.
(2) M.F.Keeler, The Long Parliament (1954), p.l76; YQI, vii.47;




forces so long as Cirencester remained in enemy hands.1
On 7 January, Rupert and Hertford launched an attempt to
seize the garrison, which was unsuccessful.2 This alerted the
deputy lieutenants to the threat to their position on the
frontiers of Gloucestershire, especially from Stxleley castle, home
of the thandos family, twenty miles North of Cirencester. The
occupation of this fortified mansion by a small Royalist garrison
might encourage further demonstrations of support for the King
thrcnigholt the region.3 Sudeley also posed a threat to Gloucester,
and to a small satellite garrison that Massey had placed in
Tewkesbury. Corbet related 'Lieutenant Colonel Massey was
intrusted with the manage of this action, who drew from Gloucester
a party of 300 musketeers, with two sakers assisted with four
score horse and four companies of dragoons from Cirencester by
order of a Counsel of War held there, and the consent of the
deputy lieutenants' .4
This shows that Massey and his regulars needed the sanction
of the deputy lieutenants to undertake operations of significance
in the overall defence of the county. It also makes clear that the
civilian authorities recognised the practical capacities of Massey
and his forces to conmand and staff the expedition. Massey was
able to capture Sudeley castle with little difficulty,5 placing it
under the coninand of Lieutenant Colonel Forbes and then
withdrawing to Gloucester.6
(1) BG, p.l78.








The fall of Sudeley drew Royalist attention back to
Cirencester,1 at a time when Kyrle, who chose this moment to
change sides, was divulging secrets of the town's defences.2 If
they knew of this betrayal, the local Parliamentarians can not
have been wholely surprised when Prince Rupert arrived to turn it
to good account.3 At any rate, most of the deputy lieutenants were
warned in time to absent themselves discreetly from the town:
very few of them were seized when it was stormed. On 2 February,
Rupert's forces fought their way into the capital of the mid-
wolds.4 The war had finally entered Gloucestershire. Fettiplace,
and all his officers were captured, with 2,000 arms 'which the
county had there laid up as a secure magazine' .5 Around 1,100
comon soldiers were also taken prisoner.
The fall of Cirencester had profound consequences for the
course of the war in Gloucestershire. It resulted in the collapse
of the deputy lieutenants authority in military affairs. For it
made clear that the. decision of these civilian amateurs to
concentrate all of the county's resources at Cirencester had been
a disaster for the Parliamentarians.6
On 3 February, Rupert appeared before Gloucester. Probably
calculating that the blow he had dealt the day before had
demoralised the inhabitants, he requested the surrender of the
city. The Prince, however, underestimated the resolve of Massey
and the corporation. Both refused, though it is interesting that
Governor and mayor felt obliged to send sep.rate answers
(1) E 246(1): A Perfect Diurnall, no. 34, Jan 30-Feb 6, Feb 3;
BG, p.162; Warburton, ii.104-7; BL, Add.tlss.18,980, f.17.
(2) Bodi., Firth Mss,C6, f.3.
(3) Corbet, p.2O; E 89(17): Special Passages, no. 27, Feb 7-10,
p.22O; ORN, i.83, Mercurius Aulicus 5 1643.





because 'the martial coamand was not fully settled'.l
To the Gloucester corporation's chagrin Massey now assumed
total control over the perilous military situation. He moved
quickly to tighten the security of the city and to abandon those
of its satellite garrisons which he could no longer protect or
support.2 Forbes abandoned Sudeley iriinediately on hearing of the
fate of Cirencester, though whether upon his own initiative or in
response to Massey's order is not known. A small garrison at
Berkeley castle was also evacuated.3 The Tewkesbury garrison was a
problem. 'Hitherto' Corbet observed 'the city had been lodged in
the midst of many outgarrisons, as the heart in the body, but now
it hath enough to do in its own safety, and the remote parts must
be pared off that a liberal nourishment might preserve and foster
that place which was the set and fountain of life unto these parts
of the Kingdom' .4 Tewkesbury was abandoned, though Massey was able
to retrieve, probably via the Severn, all the ordnance, arms, and
stores that he had sent to it from Gloucester.5
Although Royalist hopes for the complete conquest of
Gloucestershire had been frustrated by Massey's refusal to
surrender its capital, a new offensive, probably spearheaded by
Lord Herbert's forces in Morimouthshire, was extremely likely. The
nearby Forest of Dean had abundant supplies of coal, iron and
manufacturing facilities which the South Wales Royalists eyed
greedily.6 And Gloucester was an obvious target in that it blocked
their coniliunications with the Royalist capital at Oxford.7
(1) Corbet, p.22.
(2) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.264b.
(3) ORN, i.91, Mercurius Aulicus 6 1643; BG, p.l74.
(4) Corbet, p.23.
(5) E 90(3): Certain Informations, no 5, Feb 13-20, p.34





On 8 February, Herbert wrote to Rupert from Raglan assuring
him that his forces had already entered the Forest of Dean and
hoping for the cooperation of the Prince's regiments in eastern
Gloucestershire.1 This new Royalist offensive from the West helps
explain Massey's failure to attempt the relief of Cirencester.
His strategic withdrawal from other positions naturally caused
problems at Gloucester. The city became crowded with troops and
free quarter had to be introduced.2 Massey's ability to raise
money and supplies was curtailed by Rupert's operations in the
East of the county, and the unpaid soldiers became sullen and
mutinous .3
In London, the importance of Massey's small force was
already clear. It stood between the Royalist armies, preventing
their merger, blocking the strategically important corridor
between South Wales and Oxford.4 A highly mobile force of cavalry
was therefore detached from Essex's army near Windsor, and ordered
to advance ininediately into the West under the coninand of
Nathaniel Fiennes.5
Massey wrote to Fiennes on 11 February. He was relieved but
pessimistic, reporting that all the local Royalist coninanders were
expecting Rupert to advance from Cirencester to block Gloucester
up completely. 'For my part', he added, 'I fear not to secure this
city with this small force we have here; yet our business should
be to purge the country about us from the enemy that the country
be not destroyed and our provision straightened which already is
in great measure' .6
(1) Bodl., Firth Mss.C6, f.9.
(2) GRO, B 3/2, ff.248-9.
(3) Corbet, pp.25-6.
(4) Bodl., Eng.Hist.Mss.C58, f.7.
(5) E 246(13): A Perfect Diurnall, no. 35, Feb 6-13, Feb 7.
(6) BL, Add.Mss.18,979, f.133.
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Lieutenant Colonel Forbes was dispatched to regarrison
Berkeley, thus securing Gloucester's corrnunications with Bristol.1
Once in possession of the castle, Forbes, who was aware of the
crypto-Royalism of many in the locality, began to take revenge
against upon them, enriching himself from the estates of the
Ro)List Lord Berkeley which lay at his rnercy.2 Some of his
rampaging troops even looted the homes of local Parliamentary
gentry, while pretending to be detachments of Prince Rupert's
horse! 3
Before Herbert's forces could attempt to besiege Gloucester
they had to clear from the Forest of Dean Colonel Berrow's
regiment, newly raised there, and quartered in the mining
coninunity of Coleford. This force was obstructing further Royalist
progress towards Gloucester from Monmouth.4 Coleford, however,
like Cirencester, was unfortified, and the Royalist soldiers
numerical preponderance soon began to tell. Berrow's Lieutenant
Colonel and forty of his men were captured.5 The rest fled into
the depths of the forest, and the regiment was never again
reformed.
The South Wales Royalists could now advance to the western
approaches of Gloucester without further impediinent,6 and took
possession of Sir Robert Cooke's house at Highnam a mere two miles
from the city of Gloucester.7 There they hoped to achieve, in
(1) Corbet, p.26; HMC 5 Report, p.356.
(2) U, vi.69.
(3) C.H.Firth, ed. Raymond and Guise Memoirs 1622-1737, Camden
Society (1917), pp.172-4.
(4) Corbet, p.26.
(5) F.A.Hyett, 'The Civil War in the Forest of Dean 1643-45'
TBGAS (1893-4), p.95; Corbet, p.26; Webb, i.228-9.
(6) BL, Md.Mss.37,343, f.264b; Clarendon, ii.482.
(7) Corbet, pp.26-7; Clarendon, ii.482, is mistaken when he says
that the Royal forces occupied the Vineyard. This was




conjunction with Rupert's forces from Cirencester, an effective
blockade of Massey's principal garrison from East and West.1 The
sudden proximity of this large Royalist force compelled Massey to
occupy the Vineyard, a moated medieval mansion, offering an
excellent defensive position from which to hold the Welsh in
check, and to guard Over bridge and the approaches to Gloucester.2
Sir Jerome Brett, who was coninanding Herbert's army in his
absence, suninoned the city but this was contemptuously refused.3
In the meantime, Fiennes and his cavalry had reached
Bristol,4 and arrested the dissolute Governor Thomas Essex on
suspicion of pro-Royalist sympathies.5 Although the security of
that great seaport was thus dramatically reinforced, Bristol was
still believed to include a large Royalist element among its
population. At Gloucester, by contrast, it was reported 'they are
all for the Parliament and at unity among themselves, and both
soldiers and townsmen united' .6
The Parliament had dispatched Colonel Fiennes's mounted
detachment as a stop-gap support for its forces in the West. On 11
February, the Comons decided to send Sir William Wailer with a
more sizeable force to try and bolster the Parliamentary cause in
the wider region.7 The Lord General granted Wailer a comnission as
Sergeant Major General of all the forces, both in existence and
yet to be raised, within the counties of Gloucestershire,
Wiltshire, Somerset, Worcestershire, and Shropshire.8 This
clearly implied the supercession of Massey's brief independent
(1) ORN, i.119-20, Mercurius Aulicus 8 1643; Corbet, p.27.
(2) Corbet, p.27.
(3) Ibid; Webb, i.235.
(4) E 90(11): The Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer, no. 8, Feb 14-
15, p.62.
(5) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist.C53, ff.13,15b-16; Latimer, p.168.
(6) Ibid, f.13.
(7) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.25.
(8) Bodi., Tanner Mss.66, f.167; CJ, ii.960; LI, v.602.
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coninand at Gloucester. Soon Massey was being assured of Wailer's
impending march for his relief.1 Even so, Sir William's force was
more of a marching brigade than an army, only ntznbering 2,500 men,
of wriich most were horse and dragoons.2
In the meantime Massey did all he could to entertain Brett's
Welsh troops who were busily building earthworks around Highnam
house to protect themselves from sorties from Gloucester. The
earthern sconces and trench lines which soon surrounded Sir Robert
Cooke's mansion also comanded the Ross and Newent roads from the
city to the West. From these defensive positions the Welsh
pillaged the surrounding area, and travellers bound for
Gloucester .3
The close confinement of Massey's forces imposed the need to
finance them out of loans from both private individuals and the
city corporation.4 On 1 March, Gloucester's civic records relate
that 'whereas this city is in irmiinent danger of a sudden siege
and many soldiers residing therein for the defence thereof who are
ready to mutiny for want of pay for the prevention thereof of
sudden mischief upon us it is most requisite that every burgess
should be resident and according to his oath to support the burden
thereof'.5 Free quarter had to be introduced in the city.6
Fortunately for Massey, Rupert's forces were distracted by
an ill conceived attempt to surprise Fiennes's garrison at
(1) E 89(17): Special Passages, no. 27, Feb 7-14, p.220.
(2) BL, Harleian Mss.164, f.305b; E 91(8) The Kingdom's Weekly
Intelligencer, no. 9, Feb 21-8, p.67.
(3) Corbet, p.27; Bodi., Mss.Eng.Hist.C53, f.20b.





Bristol.1 This plan was thwarted at the last rnoment.2 Rupert's
cavalry regiments returned to their quarters in eastern
Gloucestershire, where they remained curiously inactive as
dramatic events unfolded elsewhere.3
Brett's small army had now been at Highnam for five weeks,
vainly awaiting cooperation from the King's forces at Cirencester
and Oxford.4 The deadlock between his own and Massey's forces
could only be broken by the arrival of reinforcements for one side
or the other. On 22 March, Wailer stormed into Malrnesbury.5 He
contemplated an attack upon Cirencester, but at Tetbury a
dispatch arrived from Massey and Sir Robert Cooke urging him to
come to their assistance against the Welsh at Highnani.6 Sir
William ininediately altered his line of march, making for the Vale
of Berkeley and Framilode passage, an ancient ferrying point on
the Severn, five miles below Gloucester.7
Wailer's plan was a sound one. He ordered Massey to float
some pontoons, which had arrived in Gloucester in November, down
to Framilode, where his small army might use them to cross the
Severn, bypassing Over bridge.8 This was unexpected - Brett
thought that he would be unable to do it - and enabled Wailer to
cut the Royalists coninunications with their rear in South Wales.
To maximise the element of surprise, Sir William ordered
(1) Warburton, ii.140.
(2) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, ff.32-3; CJ, ii.1002-3; P.M.Crath,
pp.17-9.
(3) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist.C53, f.18b.
(4) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.264b; Corbet, p.27.
(5) E 94(12): Letter From Wailer to Essex; BL, Harleian tlss.
164, f.343b.
(6) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist.C53, ff.26b,30.
(7) ORN, i.182, Mercurius Aulicus 13 1643; VCH, x.157.





Massey to attack the earthworks around Highnam the following
morning so that the unsuspecting Welsh would be fully
preoccupied.1 This pincer movnent succeeded spectacularly: the
Royalists were taken completely by surprise. The battle of Highnam
(24 March) consisted of a confused series of skirmishes, bet its
outcome was a decisive defeat for the Royalists, who were nearly
all compelled to surrender.2
Massey had played his part well; not only had the Gloucester
garrison distracted Brett, giving Wailer the advantage of
complete surprise, bit it was also Massey's men who, when the
Royalist position collapsed, stormed one of the earthern sconces
around Highnam house, fatally breaching the mansions's defensive
perimeter.3 The spoils of victory were great. The Monmouthshire
and Herefordshire Royalists lost many prominent men and extensive
material.4 The weapons, munitions and armour captured nust have
compensated handsomely for the loss of the county's magazine at
Cirencester the month before. Five hundred horses alone were
seized.5 The Marquess of Worcester and Sir John Winter fled deep
into South Wales after Highnam: the Royalists had been forced on
the defensive again.6
Gloucester's military isolation was over, and Massey's
comand now became part of a large association of Parliamentary
forces and territories, which spread untidily from the Severn
(1) Corbet, p.28.
(2) Ibid,	 pp.28-9;	 Bodi.,	 Mss.Eng.Hist.C53,	 ff.27b-8b;
Clarendon, ii.483.
(3) Corbet, pp.28-9.
(4) Bodl., Tanner Mss.303, ff.115,120b; E 94(30); Dirkes, p.67;
E 247(19): A Continuation, no. 39, March 30-April 6, p.3.
(5) E 97(2): The Victorious and Fortunate Proceedings of Sir
William Wailer; E 94(30); May, p.203.
(6) E 96(4): The Kingdoms Weekly Entelligencer, no. 15, April 4-
11, p.119; Bodi., Mss.Eng.Hist.0 53, f.30b; Hutton, p.55.
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valley through northern Wiltshire to Somerset and Dorset. Massey
became, in effect, one of Wailer's leading staff officers. The
victory at Highnam transformed his responsibilities and functions
within the region as a whole, and initiated a brief but fruitful
partnership with Waller.1
February had been a month of spectacular success for the
Royalists in Gloucestershire, but March had been one of increasing
frustration. Bad coordination between the King's forces in the
West and East of the county had made the Parliamentary victory at
Highnam possible. But the Royalist high coninand also proved unable
to distribute its forces such that that the area in which they
were billeted could support them without undue hardship.2
Wailer spent a week in Gloucester, farniliarising himself
with Massey, the forces at his disposal and the general strategic
situation.3 The city was overcrowded with troops and prisoners;
Wailer and Sir Arthur Heselrige found it necessary to share the
same house.4 Ininediately upon his arrival Sir William began to
order payments from the city's military treasury without any
apparent consultation with Gloucester's deputy Governor.5
Stamford's blue coats were now being recruited locally from
the citizens and country folk. Sickness, casualties and desertion
must have steadily thinned the regiment's ranks from October 1642
onwards, reducing the proportion of veterans from its days at
Hereford. This shift in composition may have helped to ensure that
the billeting of the troops upon the city people aroused less
resentment than it would had they consisted entirely of
'foreigners'.6 On 8 April, Massey made small payments to the
(1) J.Adair, Roundhead General: A Military Biography of Sir
William Wailer (1969), pp.60-9.
(2) BL, Harleian Mss.6804, f.128.
(3) Corbet, p.31; Adair, pp.62-63.
(4) Bodi., Mss.Eng.Hist.0 53, f.29.
(5) SP, 28/129, pt.5 f.3b.
(6) GRO, B 3/2, f.250.
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company corrinanders of the 'new men', doubtless to encourage
recruitment.1 Slowly but surely the regiment was losing its
Leicestershire character, and becoming predominantly a local
force.
Meanwhile, Prince Maurice, in an attempt to reverse the tide
of Royal fortunes in the region, arrived at Tewkesbury.2 This
disrupted the progress of the Parliamentary forces. Waller had
advanced into Moomouthshire, but had failed to accomplish much in
the staunchly pro-Royalist counties of South East Wales.3 Now he
received intelligence from Massey at Gloucester that Maurice was
deploying horse regiments in a wide arc between Ross and Newnham,4
and threatened to cut off his retreat. Waller quickly decided to
double back and force his way through these lines.5 Driving one of
the Royalist outposts from Newnhain with his horse and dragoons,
Waller skirmished heavily with the Prince's troops at Little Dean
on the fringes of the forest.6 Hearing that his corrmnander was
heavily engaged, Massey drew some troops out of Gloucester to help
him. But he soon met Wailer, who had extracted himself safely,
only two miles from his would-be rescuer.
It was on the roadside, close to Highnam, that Massey
suggested to Waller a plan to surprise Tewkestury with a force of
soldiers transported up the Severn by boat. The idea was very
timely. Maurice had drawn many men out of the town to take the
field against Wailer, and the small garrison remaining at
Tewkesbury might well be under the illusion that the Prince's
(1) GRO, B 3/2, f.250.
(2) BL, Harleian Mss.6802, f.48; Harleian Ms.6851, f.131; E
247(21): A Perfect Diurnall, no. 43, April 3-10, April 7;
Corbet, p.32.
(3) U, vi.4-5; Warburton, ii.161.
(4) E 97(2); U, vi.5; BL, Harleian Mss.164, f.368; Webb, i.250-
1.
(5) Corbet, p.32; E 97(2); U, vi.5.
(6) P.Young, ed. Military Memoirs: The Civil War, Richard Atkyns




Forest operations had successfully snuffed out any danger.1
Wailer agreed to Massey's plan and the amphibious expedition
was sent up the Severn forthwith. The Tewkesl:xiry garrison under
Sir Mathew Carew was as careless as Massey could have hoped.2 On
11 April, the town, a strategically important crossing point at
the confluence of the rivers Severn and Avon, was seized by the
Gloucester forces.3 The following day, Wailer wrote informing the
Comons that 'the taking of Tewkesbury is of great consequence to
these parts: Prince Maurice's design of taking us in the forest is
now spoiled, and so have we the bridge he passed over' .4
Northern Gloucestershire had now been secured for the
Parliament and and the Worcester Royalists placed on the
deferisive.5 But Maurice was unlikely to suffer the loss of his
principal base of operations without an attempt to retake it. Both
Wailer and Massey feared he would try and cross the Severn further
up river, and assault Tewkeslxiry from the North.6 These fears
proved well founded. Maurice marched North from Ross to Upton
bridge, the only permanent crossing point between Worcester and
Tewkesbury.7 Both Wailer's and Massey's forces tried to bar his
southward advance on Tewkesbury, but suffered a sharp reverse at
Ripple Field on the morning of 13 April.8 The arrival of
Parliamentary reinforcements, however, and the converging and
confining 'V' formed by the rivers Severn and Avon, prevented
(1) P.Young, ed. Atykns Memoirs, pp.9-10; Corbet, p.32.
(2) U, vi.5; ORN, i.210, Mercurius Aulicus 15 1643.
(3) Corbet, pp.32-3; BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.40; Warixirton,
ii.163; E 247(25): A Perfect Diurnall, no. 44, April 10-17,
April 17.
(4) U, vi.5; E 97(2).
(5) Bodl., Rawlinson Mss.D 924, ff.150-50b.
(6) U, vi.5; E 97(2).
(7) E 99(15): Certain Inforrnations, no. 14, April 17-24, p.109




Maurice from recapturing Tewkesttiry. 1
Ripple Field was a tactical, but not a strategic, defeat for
Wailer and Massey. For Maurice was prevented from pressing his
advantage in the Severn valley. He was recalled to Oxford to help
repulse the Lord General's main field army, which had advanced up
the Thames valley and now posed a threat to both Reading and
Oxford itself.2 In the face of this danger, the key Royalist
garrisons at Cirencester and Malmesbury were also withdrawn.3
.cordingly, the threat to Gloucester from the East, which
had existed since the storming of Cirencester, was suddenly
removed. Wailer and Massey now had undisputed military control in
the region. They had destroyed Herbert' s army and checked Prince
Maurice, until he was called away on more pressing Royalist
business. They were now in a position to exploit to the full the
consequences of their victory at Highnam, and of the Prince's
withdrawal. Recruitment became much easier. Since before the
campaign against Maurice, Massey and Waller had sought to augment
with fresh regiments the meagre forces at their disposal. Now that
Wailer's horse and dragoons were in unopposed control, he
'protected the gentlemen of the county whilst they were raising
forces for the Parliamerit'.4
Sir William's original coninission of 10 February envisaged
that the bulk of his forces, especially his foot, would be raised
in the jurisdictional area of his new conmand. As early as 1
April, Sir Robert Cooke, a former deputy lieutenant, and the MP
for Tewkesbury, was engaged in raising a regiment of foot, and
(1) ORN, i.212-3; Corbet, p.35.
(2) LI, vi.17; Hutton, p.56.
(3) ORN, i.225,231-2, Mercurius Aulicus 16 1643; J.Bamfield,
Colonel Joseph Barnfield's Apology (1685), p.5; I.Roy, ed.
Royalist Ordnance Papers, Oxford Record Society (1963-64),
i.77,93.
(4) C.H.Firth, ed. Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow (1894), i.52.
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had already marshalled two hundred men.1 Recruitment of this force
continued rapidly throughout the early part of the month.2 Cooke
nad received his Colonel's coninission from Wailer, with whom he
had worked closely in the crucial stages before the battle of
Highnafn.3
Cooke's regiment must have been intended as a replacement
for that of Colonel Berrow, shattered at Coleford. Certainly the
'country people come daily in to Sir William Wailer in great
abundance especially out of the forest' , 4 where Berrow' s regiment
had largely been raised. But imediately after Ripple, Wailer
appointed Sir Robert Governor of Tewkesbury. Cooke and his newly
formed regiment soon took up residence, guarding Gloucester's
northern approaches and acting as a check on the Royalists at
Worcester.5
On 15 April, the Coninon Couticil of Gloucester decided that
another foot regiment should be recruited, from 'within this city
and county for the defence thereof'.6 Now that its professional
garrison was venturing further afield, Gloucester began to look to
its own security: the new city regiment's initial purpose 'was to
defend the city within the walls, according to the infancy of
war'.7 The corporation decided to nominate for the position of
Colonel, Henry Stephens, the eldest son of Nathaniel Stephens of
Eastingtori, a knight of the shire.8 This local emphasis seems to
(1) Bodi., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.27.
(2) Ibid, f.30b.
(3) Corbet, p.35.
(4) Bodl. tlss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.30b.
(5) Corbet, p.35.
(6) GRO, B 3/2, f.254.
(7) Corbet, p.37.
(8) GRO, B 3/2, f.254; T.Fitz-Roy Fenwick & W.C.tletc.alfe ed. The




indicate anxiety, amongst Parliamentary supporters in the city and
the shire, that the new force should be more responsive to local
needs than the professional detachments sent into the region by
Parliament. But Henry Stephens, like Robert Cooke, obtained his
Colonel's coiiinission from 1aller himself.1
All the officers of Stephens's regiment were prominent city
or county Parliamentarians. Thomas Pury and his son became
Captains of two of its companies, as did the then mayor of
Gloucester, bike Nurse.2 These new officers soon became 'Captains
of the watch for the city'; taking over from the ordinary members
of the Coninon Council.3 Perhaps the civic authorities were
relieved to be able to dispose their own military force, which
might relieve them of the need to rely on regular soldiers
responsible only to Parliament, in the many duties relating to
Gloucester's defence. Stephens had obtained his conission from
Waller, but there was still a danger that friction might arise
between the officers of the city rehnent and Parliament's
professional military men. It is clear that Massey and Waller saw
Gloucester as a base for operations into neighbouring shires.4 For
city and county Parliamentarians, the defence of Gloucestershire
was the first priority.
At Berkeley, Colonel Forbes also started to recruit a
regiment but little trace of it survives.5 Perhaps the local area
could not find the resources to equip yet another regiment. The
two thousand arms which Waller and Massey had captured at
(1) Corbet, p.37.
(2) BC, p.229; E 67(31): A Brief and Exact Relation...
(3) GRO B 3/2, f.258.
(4) Adair, pp.63-9.
(5) Bodl. Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.30b.
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Highnarn were certainly available for Cooke's and Stephen's
regiments.1
Since February, the military Government of Gloucestershire
had been transformed. In many other counties the deputy
lieutenancy of 1642 was gradually superceded in military affairs
by county corrmittees.2 But in Gloucestershire, the authority of
the deputy lieutenants collapsed abruptly after the debacle of
Cirencester.3 The influence of the local Parliamentary gentry
also diminished dramatically, since their power and prestige
depended upon landed estates in the eastern hundreds of the shire,
now largely occupied by the Royalists. Gloucester's new status, as
a major garrison and the temporary headquarters of Waller's
ccxanand, also helped to ensure that national concerns tended to
outweigh the local interests represented in its corporation.
The Severn Vale was strategically vital to the Parliament,
because its occupation prevented the Royalists from completing
their conquest of a vast block of territory comprising Wales and
the South Midlands.4 Should it fall to him, the lUng would reap
not only the military advantage of free coninunications between
South Wales and Oxford, via Gloucester, but the economic benefits
of a region rich in natural resources.5
The integration of Massey's Gloucester coninand into Wailer's
broader association was important for financial, as well as
purely military considerations. Gloucestershire's wealth was
(1) E 247(19): A Continuation, no. 39, March 30-April 6, p.3;
Bodi. Eng.Hist.Mss. C53, f.29.
(2) Morrill, pp.66-7.
(3) Corbet, p.25.
(4) Adair, p.55; Hutton, p.54; Corbet, pp.5-6,
(5) I.Roy, TR1-1S (1978), p.134; BL, Harleian Mss.6804, ff.160-1;




still partly in Royalist hands, but enough remained for the county
to be seen as a financial cornerstone of Wailer's association.1
After Highnam, Wailer had begun to sanction the payment of grants
for a wide variety of purposes at Gloucester.2 In May and June he
was authorising payments to Stamford's regiment, and to many other
Gloucester based units and individuals.3 Yet the financial
situation had not improved to the extent that Stamford's men could
be removed from free quarter. They remained the enforced guests of
the citizens of Gloucester throughout April and May.4 The county
was still a frontier zone between the opposing sides, and rough
treatment was inflicted upon those who failed to cooperate
willingly. Both Wailer and Massey must have breached accepted
conventions in their coLlections of fines and contributions:
surrounding Royalists, who no doubt used similar methods
themselves, certainly made much of such infringements.5
In eastern Gloucestershire, both sides attempted to levy
contributions, and by May, parish constables were in receipt of
contradictory orders in regard to collections. At Cirencester, the
Royalist Colonel Crawford heard of Wailer's orders for the
collection of contributions from the parishes around the town.
Crawford in turn threatened the civilian officials with 'fire and
sword if they paid him a penny'.6 This also suggests that Sir
William had effectively taken over the administration and finance
of the Gloucester conmand. Only the administration of the Earl of
Stamford's regiment itself remained to Massey, and even this was
(1) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.72; Warburton, ii.194.
(2) SP, 28/129, Pt.5, ff.3b,4-4b.
(3) Ibid, ff.19b,20-20b,21; SP, 28/228, Pt.1, ff.39.190; Pt.2,
ff.218-22,388.
(4) GRO, B 3/2, ff.251,259.
(5) E 101(25): A Letter From an Officer in His Majesty's Army.
(6) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.72; Warburton, ii.316.
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subjected to spasmodic interference from Waller.1 Sir William even
tried to bring Colonel Nathaniel Fiennes, the Governor of Bristol,
under his jurisdiction.2 But Massey's coninand remained the most
integrated of Wailer's association because of its commander-in-
chief's continuing residence at Gloucester.
The strategic situation having been reversed, Gloucester now
became a base for offensive operations against surrounding
Royalist garrisons. Izwnediately after Maurice's removal towards
Oxford, Wailer and Massey resolved upon the seizure of Hereford.
Sir William had received several letters assuring him that the
city was his should he appear before it.3 There was no Royalist
field force in a position to impede such an advance. As Corbet
rightly observed, 'the Parliament forces had a large and free game
in this county' .4
Massey's recent experience in Hereford, and his knowledge of
the town and its defences made it desirable for him to accompany
Waller.5 Such was the shortage of foot that Colonel Stephen's city
regiment was also pressed into service - far from the city of
Gloucester, which it had been intended to protect.6 Proceeding via
Fownhope, from the South East, Wailer and Massey appeared before
Hereford at dawn on 24 April. The bulk of their forces swung
around to the North of the city, probably at Massey's suggestion,
which was the side where his cannon could most effectively be
deployed.7 In fact, Massey was able to deploy his two saker field
(1) SP, 28/129, Pt.5, ff.3b,4b,5.
(2) Bodl., Clarendon SP.22(1673), f.25.








guns so expertly that their shots smashed through one of the
city's gates and caused considerable carnage beyond.1 Here his
engineering and pioneering experience must have played a part in
selecting what was evidently a well chosen gun position. Very soon
the Royalist Governor called for a parley,2 and on 25 April, the
Parliamentary ccxrinanders gained entry into the city.3 Those
Royalist leaders of Herefordshire who had escaped from Highnam now
fell into the hands of their opponents.4 Urged to escape, they
decided to stay, hoping that 'the yielding of their persons
might save the city' .5
Both Wailer and Massey had learnt from Stamford's mistaken
decision to leave a permanent garrison isolated at Hereford.6 They
endeavoured instead to round up as many Royalist sympathisers, and
extracting from them as much money, as possible.7 Sir William also
persuaded the city and country folk to swear an oath of loyalty to
the Parliament.8 By mid-May, having caused as much trouble as they
could, both Wailer and Massey withdrew to Gloucester. Soon,
Hereford was regarrisoned for the King by Barnabus Scudamore.9
(1) E 101(2): Certain Inforrnations, no. 16, May 1-8, p.125;
Corbet, p.36.
(2) Bodi., Tanner Mss.303, f.123b; J.Duncunb, ed. History of the
County of Hereford (1804), i.255-6; Corbet, p.36.
(3) Dunciinb, i.259.
(4) BL, Loan 29/173, f.247, misplaced in the 1642 volume; E
100(7): The Forth Intelligence From Reading, p.6; Philips,
ii.69-70.
(5) Duncixnb, i.253; ORN, i.246, Mercurius Aulicus 18 1643.
(6) Corbet, p.36; E 101(2), p.125.
(7) SP, 16/497, f.144; BL, Loan 29/173, f.247.
(8) J.W.W. Bund ed. Henry Townsend's Diary, Worcestershire
Historical Society (1915-20), ii.120-1.
(9) lXinciinb, 1.265; Bodi., Firth Mss.C7, f.104.
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Upon his return to Gloucester, Wailer was reminded of his
wider responsibilities to the West. On 16 May, Stamford was
decisively defeated by Hopton at Stratton in Cornwall.1
Parliamentary Devon and Somerset now lay wide open to a Cornish
Royalist invasion, and required heavy reinforcement. But before
Waller could leave Gloucester he had to ensure that that key
garrison was reasonably secure. Gloucester was most seriously
threatened by the Royalist presence at Worcester, which tied down
a large garrison of foot at Tewkesbury under Sir Robert Cooke.
Waller tried to free this force by taking the city of Worcester
itself,2 bet was forced to abandon the siege after a day because
of the increasingly difficult situation in which the western
Parliamentarians were finding themselves.3
As he passed through Tewkesbery towards a planned rendezvous
with the western forces at Bath, Wailer ordered Sir Robert Cooke
to abandon the town.4 Its substantial garrison of 1,000 horse and
foot was to be drafted into Waller's marching force.5 By 2 June,
Cooke was slighting the works around Tewkesbury. He noted that
'the country is much troubled at his [Wailer's] departure'.6
Gloucestershire, therefore, was deprived of a great many troops,
and the local Parliamentarians were thrust back on the defensive
once more. By 11 July, Sir Robert Cooke was dead (from natural
(1) Bodi., Clarendon SP.23, ff.31b-2; Clarendon, ii.70-3; Adair,
p.67.
(2) Bodl., Nalson Mss.11(269), f.189.
(3) Ibid; Townsend, i.124; Clarendon, iii.18; Bund, pp.93-4.
(4) Bodl., Nalson Mss.11(269), f.189.
(5) Corbet, p.37.
(6) Bodl., Nalson Mss.11(269), f.189.
- 60 -
Chapter 2
causes) at the age of forty-f ive.1 His loss was important, because
he more than anyone had established close links between the local
Parliamentary gentry and the professional military.
The survival of the Royalist presence at Worcester and the
abandonment of Tewkesbury meant that Gloucester was once more
vulnerable to enemy incursions from the North, and that Massey's
presence was still essential. Money continued to be very short at
Gloucester. A group of the garrison's officers, including Massey,
articulated several grievances to the Parliament on 3 June. They
agreed that Wailer should march into the West but complained that
there were in narrowly confined Gloucester too many soldiers to
support. Moreover, the 'want of money hath bred such mutinous
dispositions in the soldiers that no arguments will make them
stir' .2
Sir Robert Cooke, Massey and the others told of their
difficulty in adequately completing the recruitment and equipment
of newly raised regiments. 'You may perhaps hear a noise of new
regiments raising, and so over value the strength of these parts,
but the truth is, for want of money neither the new can be
completed nor the old encouraged; if we can obtain no supply, we
must wait upon God, and petition him to list our preservation
amongst his wonders'.3
After Waller's departure Massey began to authorise payments
on his own authority again.4 Thanks t his coninander's wider
strategic responsibilities, he had regained de facto coninand of
Gloucester, though Wailer, who was at .Bath by 23 June,
(1) SF, 28/129, Pt.5, f.24; Keeler, p.141.
(2) Bodi., Nalson Ms.11(272), f.192.
(3) Ibid.
(4) SP, 28/129, Pt.5, f.22.
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demanded money from Gloucester and gave himself priority over all
local payments.1 Massey's personal position had been transformed
since his days as Stamford's deputy Governor in December 1642.
Stamford's own military authority and career now lay in ruins on
Stratton Hill and his return to Gloucester was no longer
expected.2 Waller's prolonged absence now called for a resolution
of the problem of Gloucester's military Government.3 Naturally,
the corporation wanted the coiiiiand of its city settled and the
city elders 'began to enquire after a Governor' .4
Initially 'they thought well of a man near home, and cast
their eye upon a known patriot'.5 This was probably Nathaniel
Stephens, who comiianded respect in the city and county alike. But
'more intelligent men upon serious review of the city's continual
hazard, found that the necessity of this place did require a tried
soldier, and that such a one might possibly be found faithful; but
a timorous or unskillful man must needs ruin all'.6 And so, the
corporation 'reflected on Massey, whose good services gave them
also a complete assurance of his fidelity; that by the happy
choice of the citizens and the Lord General's coninission, he was
appointed Governor'.7 No doubt Waller had sent to the Earl of
Essex a glowing testimonial to the qualities of his subordinate.
Massey's loyalty, the importance to Gloucester of his military
skills, and his successful partnership with Sir William, must all
(1) SF, 28/228, pt.4, f.725.
(2) Corbet, p.37; May, p.2l5.








have weighed in favour of his selection by the city authorities as
their favoured candidate for the post of Governor.
On 26 May, the Coninon Council 'ordered that Lieutenant
Colonel Massey in respect of the love that this house beareth him
shall have £10 given him out of the chaniber'.l It is clear that
Massey had won a degree of respect from the corporation, and even
its affection. He was no longer seen as a mere mercenary and a
'professed servant of fortune'.2
Massey had risen swiftly, in only three years, from his
humble rank as a Captain of pioneers. Through chance,
circixnstances and ability, he had made the most of the
opportunities offered by the war. But Gloucester's security
depended less upon Massey than on Wailer's ability to keep the
field against Maurice and 1-lopton. June 1643 was not, as it turned
out, an auspicious time to inherit the Governorship of Gloucester.






GWUCESTER: A CIVIL WAR GARRISON BESIEGED, JUNE-SEPTBIBER 1643.
The Gloucester corporation, like many other provincial urban
governing bodies, nad to come to terms during the Civil War with
the intrusion of external sources of authority.1 But perhaps the
most significant feature of Gloucester's civil government between
1642-46 was the extent to which the corporation held on to its
administrative independence, despite the military presence in the
city.2 Massey and his garrison rarely feature in the corporation's
records .3
At the outbreak of war the corporation had pretensions to
military independence. Its measures were defensive and
isolationist.4 On the eclipse of the deputy lieutenants after the
fall of Cirencester, a Council of War was established at
Gloucester.5 The bi-partite response, from Massey and the mayor,
to Rupert's suninons of the city, suggests that the Council
comprised both civil and military representatives. Its swift
evolution seems to bear this out. By March 1643 the Council of War
had its own clerk, a city man named Foster Pleasance, who was also
'clerk to the Governor'.6 This dual role enabled Pleasance to
liaise between Massey and the corporation. Liaison was also in the
hands of John Dorney, the city's recorder, who became 'advocate to
the Council of War'.7 The Council's small administrative staff
must have been primarily concerned with ensuring good relations
between the officers of the garrison and the civic bureaucracy.
(1) Morrill, pp.7O-2.
(2) Taylor, p.11O.
(3) GRO, B 3/2, ff.236-7; F 4/5, ff.178b-309; Taylor, p.110.
(4) Ibid, ff.221-35; F 4/5, ff.178b-196b.
(5) Corbet, p.23.




It is highly probable that the initial civic component of
the Council comprised the senior officers of the trained bands.1
By April-May 1643 however the officers of Colonel Henry Stephen's
regiment, many of whom were selected as prominent members of the
city corporation, must have come to represent the city on the
Council.2 Such individuals would wear two hats: they would attend
Massey's Council of War as officers of a force under his coninand,
but report their deliberations to the Comon Council as members
of that Council. Upon his retirement from office, Dennis Wise was
described as 'a Captain as well as mayor, a sword man as well as a
gown man and how well he performed both places civil and martial
for the public good ... his works will praise him'.3
Stephens's officers were called upon to play this double
role in order to ensure the exclusion of the professional military
outsiders from meetings of the city's Coiiinon Council.4 Throughout
the course of the war, even during the direst emergencies, no
officer on Massey's staff ever sat on the corporation's governing
body.5 Even in the crisis days of early August 1643, officers from
the garrison were invited to a meeting of the Coninon Council only
to observe, and not to participate in, its proceedings.6
The permanence of the Council of War is demonstrated by the
many references to its workings which have survived from the years
1643-5. It regularly met in an 'under chamber' (probably
(1) Taylor, p.67.
(2) BG, p.229; E 67(31).
(3) J.Dorney, Certain Speeches Made Upon the Day of the Yearly
Election of Officers in the City of Gloucester (1653), p.4.
(4) Taylor, p.67.




for reasons of security), which apparently adjoined Massey's own
lodgings,1 a location highly convenient for Massey which testifies
to the informality of the Council's proceedings.2 Its discussions
must have centred around the strategic aspects of local
operations, including the strengths and deployment of Gloucester's
ring of out garrisons, when the city was fortunate enough to
possess them.3 The Council was quickly empowered to sanction
payments to particular forces, such as Lieutenant Allerdine's
train of bridge boats.4
The extent of civilian participation in the local war effort
was determined, in the last resort, by the strategic situation.
The closer the Royalist threat, the more the local Parliamentarian
civilian establishment depended upon military forces to undertake
what were essentially civilian functions, even in the more secure
areas. The professional military's success in securing the shire
was a basic condition for the reassertion of civilian
participation, and even control.
Alderman Nicholas Webb, mayor in 1643-44, saw the civil and
military components of the city Government as a partnership of
equals working in unison towards a comon end. In 1646 he declared
'let us account it a happiness to live under a government but more
especially to be under good governors, and having a particular
relation to this city and garrison, let us bless him that hath
blest us this year last past with such Governors in civil and
martial affairs, as have in some good measure taken care for
(1) E 334(5): A Relation of that Great and Public Consternation
had in Gloucester, p.3.
(2) Bodi., Tanner Mss.61, f.106; SF, 21/16, ff.148-9.
(3) Corbet, p.23.
(4) SP, 28/129, pt.5, f.3.
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our souls comfort, and our outward safety and support' .1
The citizens of Gloucester could not avoid the consequent
discomforts of living in a major garrison city. Its inhabitants
only rnibered some 4,500 by 1642.2 The arrival of Stamford's
regiment would have had a considerable impact upon such a
comunity.3 Initially many troops would have been billeted in out
garrisons. But during times of crisis all were drawn into the city
for their own and Gloucester's protection.4
But if the military presence at Gloucester brought the
inconveniences of free quarter, it also brought economic
opportunities. The city's industries, trades and manufacturers had
to be mobilised and coordinated to supply the needs of the
Parliamentary garrison, and to develop the city into a viable
military base from which Massey could operate. On the whole this
was achieved; in the process much of the slack in the local
economy, attributable to the pre-war depression and the effects
of the Royalist blockade, must have been taken up.
Massey took special trouble to develop a gunpowder
manufacturing capacity at Gloucester, clearly deeming this
industry vital to his garrison's security; and the output of
Gloucester's two powder mills was indeed crucial to the city's
success in withstanding the siege.5 When finally relieved by
Essex, Massey had left in his magazine only two or three barrels
of gunposQder.6 Without the town's manufacturing capacity of three
barrels a week, he would have run out of the vital powder during
the siege, with disastrous results for his garrison.7 It was only
after a sustained effort and heavy expediture that locally





(5) BC, pp.226-7; E 67(31); Washbourne, p.62.
(6) OPH, xi.393.
(7) BC, pp.226-7; E 67(31); Washbourne, p.62.
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use of his garrison in June 1643.1 By 1644 several magazines had
been established in Gloucester for security's sake and to prevent
the danger of a massive accidental explosion.2 During the siege
the crypt of Q-irist Church, the most secure magazine possible, was
used. In early 1644 when the city was no longer exposed to direct
fire from the enemy, private dwellings were used as stores.3
Far more money was probably spent in and around Gloucester
on industrial and manufacturing activity during the war than in
the pre-war slump. Many an unemployed clothing worker must have
found new opportunities through enlistment in the military forces
or by working in one of the many emerging industries that
sustained them.
Massey was closely involved in the basic administration of
his garrison, which, in a professional soldier with a strong
streak of opportunism is evidence of a corrinendable sense of duty.
His signature appears on warrants relating to a wide range of
matters such as the issuing of equipment, munitions and supplies.4
The Gloucester coninand was usually confined enough for Massey to
retain control over the more mundane aspects of garrison life. No
detail seemed beneath his attention. He was even instrumental in
obtaining a shroud for a dead soldier.5 Massey was both assertive
arid curious, and actively participated in the day to day finance,
administration and organisation of his garrison.
On 21 June Massey led an expedition against the Royalist
quarters in
	 Slaughter	 hundred around Stow.6 He was
(1) SP, 28/129, pt.5, f.21b.
(2) Ibid, ff.40b,43b.
(3) Washbourne, p.62; SF, 28/129, pt.5, f.40b.
(4) SF, 28/228, pts.1,2,3,4,5.
(5) Ibid, pt.1, f.26.
(6) Corbet, p.38; ORN, i.353, Mercurius Aulicus 25 1643.
- 69 -
Chapter 3
accompanied by Colonel Henry Stephens, though none of the city's
foot regiment formed part of their force.1 Initially the raid was
a success, especially at Oddington, but Massey's small contingent
was caught in the open on the high wold country close to
Andoversford, by superior ntxnbers of the enemy. There .
 the
Parliamentarians were routed and Colonel Stephens was captured, a
fate that Massey himself was lucky to avoid.2
Nathaniel Stephens was quick to send one of his servants to
Oxford to attend to the welfare of his eldest son.3 But Henry did
not long survive the horrendous conditions of Oxford castle and
its 'poisonous air'.4 His own impetuosity had led to his capture
and subsequent sad fate, but Nathaniel Stephens may well have held
Massey responsible. It is possible that the resentment of this
prominent local figure played a part in the estrangement between
civil and military forces in the months, and even years, to come.
On 13 July, a day of thanksgiving was held at Gloucester in
celebration of Waller's supposed victory at Lansdown.5 That very
day however, Sir William's army, the last Parliamentary field
force in the West, was totally destroyed on Roundway Down.6
Suddenly the King seemed to be in a position to pick off the
remaining rebel garrison at will.7 Some thought Wailer's
comprehensive defeat paved the way for a total Royalist victory.8
Prince Rupert left Oxford capital on the 18th with fourteen
regiments of foot and two brigades of horse, determined to reduce
(1) Corbet, p.38.




(6) BL, Loan 24/174, f.38; Clarendon, iii.1O1; ORN, i.395,
Mercurius Aulicus 28 1643.
(7) May, p.213; Corbet, p.39.




the remaining pockets of resistance in the region.1 It seems that
his first objective was Gloucester.2 The Royalists doubtless
regarded Massey's garrison as little more than an outpost of
Bristol. They were dissuaded from attacking it by the arrival of
Wailer with 2,000 horse on 19 July.3 Rupert abandoned his plan to
seize Gloucester before besieging Bristol.4 Instead the Royalist
forces blocked Wailer's retreat to, and reinforcement of the
Bristol garrison under Fiennes.5 Wailer had no intention of being
bottled up in Gloucester and soon left with the remnants of his
army for Warwick.6 For the moment, Royalist operations against
Bristol postponed Gloucester's ordeai.7 But on 26 July the King's
armies stormed into the second city of the realm.8 Wailer's defeat
at Roundway down had led quickly to the loss of Gloucester's
principal supply base and trading partner.9
There was a predictable sense of despondency and defeatism
in Massey's now isolated garrison.10 The sudden sharp reversal
(1) Wartxirton,	 ii.236-7;	 Clarendon,	 iii.107;	 Bodi.,
Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, ff.57-8.
(2) C.Firth ed., 'The Journal of Prince Rupert's Marches', EHR
xiii (1898), p.734; Warburton, ii.237,266; Bodi.,
Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.57; BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.85.
(3) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.86; Warburton, ii.238; Bodl., Firth
Mss. C6, f.196.
(4) Ibid; C.Firth ed., EHR (1898), p.734.
(5) Warburton, ii.238.
(6) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.86; Bodl. Firth Mss.C6, f.198; Adair,
p.96.
(7) Bodi., Mss.Fng.Hist. C53, f.57-60; Clarendon, iii.107;
Latimer, pp.l78-8O.
(8) Warburton, ii.265; BG, p.58; Clarendon, iii.113-4.




of military advantage during the previous fortnight 'made most men
question all things'.l One Royalist reported that the citizens and
soldiers were 'all in great fear and distraction' .2
Massey too doubted his ability to defend Gloucester against
a major Royalist assault.3 On 29 July, he revealed to the
Parliament that, ever since the fall of Bristol the country people
had failed to obey his warrants.4 Massey was confident that
Alderman Pury and a few other Parliamentary die-hards 'are still
cordial to us but I fear 10 for 1 do incline the other way'.5
Reinforcements, in the form of a regiment of foot with plenty of
aninunition and money, were deemed essential if he was to have any
chance of effectively defending Gloucester.6
But Massey may well have deliberately exaggerated the
problems that confronted his garrison. He was contemplating an act
of treachery.7 Whilst carefully maintaining a facade of loyalty,
Massey was conspiring to surrender Gloucester on terms highly
unfavourable to the Parliament. Local Parliamentarians such as
Corbet or Pury were unaware of this duplicity, and believed in his
continuing cooiidtment to the city's defence, in spite of the very
unpromising circumstances.8 But it is certain that by early August
Massey was in contact with the Royalist Colonel William Legge, his
old comrade in arms from the Scots wars.9
Clarendon knew that the Royalists entertained great hopes
(1) Corbet, p.40.
(2) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.100.
(3) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.67.
(4) Bodl., Tanner Mss.62(1), f.197.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
(7) S.R.Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War (1987), i.198.
(8) Corbet, pp.4O-l.
(9) Bodl. Firth Mss.C8, f.281; Warixirton, ii.276.
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of some 'secret agitation' involving the Governor of
Gloucester.1 His former superiors were well aware of Massey's
mercenary motives in deserting the Royal camp in 1642. No more was
he now, so Clarendon was informed, 'intoxicated with any of those
fumes which made men rave and fanatic in the cause': he could be
'wrought upon'.2 William Legge, who knew Massey well, certainly
believed this. With Prince Rupert's blessing, he sent to
Gloucester a letter phrased 'as was proper ... from one friend to
another' .3
Massey reproached Legge's messenger in public, probably in
the presence of some of his staff, or at a Council of War, bet
arranged that the messenger be brought unobtrusively back to him.
At this private meeting, the Governor made clear his real
intentions. He assured the messenger that he was still Legge's
servant. If the King appeared in person before Gloucester, Massey
would offer no resistance. 'For it would not stand with his
conscience to fight against the person of the King'.4
Massey also thought the Royal presence would enable him to
win over Parliamentarian stalwarts, 'which otherwise he could not
do'.5 He wrote to Legge that, should the King appear personally,
'he would bring him in with a 1,000 men'. This gravely
underestimated his officers' loyalty to the cause they served.6
Perhaps his own opportunism rendered Massey incapable of
understanding the deep and principled attachment of most to the
Parliamentary cause, which they would not abandon lightly.
Gloucester might have been spared the effects of his
contemplated treachery, since some of the King's advisors at







(7) Clarendon, i.130; Corbet, p.56; P.Young, ed. Atkyns, p.29.
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August, the Royal Council of War, with the King presiding, decided
after all to concentrate his forces against Gloucester.1 Its
Governor's expected return to his former allegiance was probably
decisive in securing a majority against an inediate march on
London and for a mobilisation against Massey's embattled corrnand.2
Massey's renegacy, therefore, had momentous repercussions. It
altered the course of the war, and may even have affected its
outcome.
Leaving Massey's own role aside, the Royalists were well
aware of the advantages of taking the last Parliamentary
stronghold on the Severn.3 Success in this would complete their
domination of a large block of territory and obviate the need to
tie down their forces in the region.4 The Royalist seizure of
Bristol added even greater point to the conquest of Gloucester,
since Massey's garrison continued to act as a barrier to trade on
the Severn, stifling the activities of Bristol as a major port and
as a supply base for other Royalist garrisons further up river.5
Many professional soldiers, most notably Monck and Goring,
derived great personal advantage by changing sides during the war.
Massey could have expected a handsome reward as the instrument of
the bloodless surrender of such a major garrison at this crucial
point. He could have expected, at the least, to have retained his
rank, and could even have hoped for promotion to a higher coninand
in the Royalist army, an eminence denied to him at York in 1642.
And the position of the Gloucester garrison looked very bleak.
Many local people believed that their interests would best be
served by the city's surrender to the King's forces.6 Even
should the city succeed in holding out, it seemed destined to be
(1) Warburton, ii.272; GRO, D 115, f.3.
(2) Clarendon, iii.131-2.
(3) Ibid, iii.129-30.
(4) Warburton, ii.263-4; Hutton, p.113; Washbourne, pp.46-9.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Corbet, p.41; May, p.2l5; Morrill, p.9O.
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trapped in a confined and fiercely contested war zone, 'enforced
to stoop perpetually under two burdens' .1 Some of the most ardent
local Parliamentarians must have paled at the prospect of a
prolonged siege, even if it were resisted successfully.
Throughout the last days of July and during early August,
the Royalists mobilised formidable forces before Gloucester.2 Such
a snow of strength, they believed, together with the presence of
the King, would suffice to convince the city to submit. Even
Parliamentary coninentators conceded that, in the face of such a
powerful concentration of Royalist manpower and resources, the
fate of Gloucester was sealed.3
Meanwhile, the city authorities procrastinated, unable to
decide whether to comply with Royalist calls for imediate
surrender.4 There was panic amongst some of them; some were
allowed to leave the city.5 Other citizens contacted Royalist
friends and relations, pledging their loyalty and asking to be
preserved from 'plunder and violence'.6 The Royalists drew up a
list of their supporters, to be spared from reprisals in the event
of the sack of the city, in each of the city's wards. It totalled
104 inhabitants and included one alderman.7 These represented a
potential fifth column, arousing great hopes amongst some of the
King' s conianders .8
(1) May, p.215; Corbet, p.41; Morrill, p.90.
(2) BG, p.207; E 67(31); GRO, D 115, f.3; Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist.
C53, ff.60b-61; BL, kld.Mss.18,980,ff.95,97,99,101,103;
Bodi., Firth Mss.C6, f.212; I.Roy, ed. Royalist Ordnance
Papers (1971-73), ii.263-4; Hutton, pp.113-4.
(3) E 63(13): The Parliament's Scout, no.6, July 27-Aug 2 p.46.
(4) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.100; Bodl., Firth tlss.C8, f.11.
(5) Corbet, p.41.
(6) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.100; Bodi., Firth Mss.C8, f.11.




By the end of the first week of August, Massey had begun to
doubt his ability to convince his officers that the city should
be surrendered inuiediately. By 7 August, Legge had informed Aston
that any formal suninons of Gloucester 'will be to little purpose
until we can put him to some distress'.l Massey had given
Legge the impression that he had 'little intention to surrender up
the town upon fair terms'.2
What was the reason for the Governor's apparent change of
heart? In the desperate circunstances in which the city found
itself, Massey and his officers had been invited to attend the
Coninon Council.3 During this meeting the recently sworn Solemn
Covenant was discussed.4 This had bound the citizens and soldiers
to defend the Parliamentary cause and to refuse all dealings with
the 'popish' Royal army which sought to undermine 'the true
Protestant religion' .5 The oath had been taken in church, with due
religious ceremony. Its inference that Parliament stood between
England and full blown Catholicism probably united the corporation
around a policy of resistance.6 The role of puritan Parliamentary
die-herds such as Thomas Fury and Dennis Wise must have been
crucial in this decision.7
Nevertheless, it seems that only after long and earnest
debate did the garrison and corporation jointly resolve to refuse
the Royalist 'tender of peace'.8 The unanimity of the decision
suggests that the majority of Massey's officer corps, as well as
civilians, were also prepared to resist, despite the unfavourable
odds confronting them.9
(1) Warburton, ii.276.
(2) Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, f.281.
(3) Corbet, p.41.
(4) May, pp.2l5-6; Washbourne, p.5l.
(5) A&O, i.175-6.
(6) May, pp.2l5-6; Washbourne, p.51.
(7) Hyett, pp.l2,l8; Washbourne, p.51.




Against such a determined coalition, Massey could do little.
He could have swayed the debate only in the event of divisions
between officers and the city elders. To have persisted with an
isolated stand in favour of surrender would have served only to
arouse suspicion and undermine his own authority. This was still
intact. Even at the height of his duplicity Massey had been
careful to maintain the demeanor of a loyal servant to the
Parliament.1
By 4 August, a Royalist collector of intelligence on the
Gloucester garrison was prepared to identify Massey with the
Parliamentary hardliners in his desire to defend the city.2 On 7
August, having received pessimistic reports from Legge, Aston
labelled the Governor a 'traitor'.3 On 8 August, however, a
Royalist Captain, Mollineaux, who had been recomended to the King
by his secretary, Edward Nicholas, tried to revive hopes for the
viability of a conspiracy involving Massey.4 But Mollineaux, by
the time of his arrival, encountered only cynicism amongst the
Royalist high conmand, whose hopes of Massey had by now
collapsed.
The decision to defend Gloucester was a courageous one in
the circunstances. Few supplies could be collected, and the city's
markets were already empty.5 Its meagre garrison consisted of
Stamford's regiment, then numbering only some 500 to 600 men, and
the city regiment, with some 500 more.6 Several troops of horse
and dragoons completed a total of perhaps 1,500 men at Massey's
disposal.7
(1) Washbourne, pp.51-2; Corbet, pp.40-i.
(2) BL, Add.tlss.18,980, f.100; Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, f.11.
(3) Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, f.281.
(4) BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.104; Warburton, ii.278.
(5) Bodi., Tanner Mss.62(1), f.199.
(6) Ibid, f.197.
(7) Ibid; Corbet, p.L.2; Warixirton, ii.263,279; May, p.2l5; ORN,
i.432, Mercurius Aulicus 31 1643.
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Yet Gloucester's position did possess certain compensatory
strengttis, noted by the experienced Royalist Colonel Aston. The
numerical inferiority of its garrison, compared with that of
Bristol, was balanced by its possession of a tighter, and
therefore more easily held, circuit of defence. Aston warned
Rupert on 7 August 'I doubt we shall find a hard business of it,
being it is fully as strong and better watered than Bristol as
also it is a far lesser curcuit and a much better soldier
(although an ill a traitor as Fiennes was) for the Governor, for
certain the water is round about the town'.l
On 10 August the Royal army formally laid its siege. It
seems that an estimated 1,000 musketeers accompanied the two Royal
heralds to one of the city's gates.2 This force matched in
strength that which Massey had boasted he could bring into his
garrison several days before.3 On the 10th 'some whisperers gave a
malignant intimation that the King's presence would sway the
people', as Massey had claimed that it would.4 But the show of
force did not have this effect. The corporation and Massey's
officer corps replied that they would 'obey the coninands of his
Majesty signified by both houses of Parliament'.5 Two delegates
were dispatched from the city to convey this defiant response to
the the King's quarters.
Imediately upon their return, Gloucester's suburbs were
fired from end to end.6 A third of the city's housing stock had to
be destroyed. The 241 houses outside Gloucester's defensive ring
of fortifications must have been abandoned several days
(1) Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, ff.281-2.
(2) Clarendon, iii.132-3; BG, pp.2O9-lO; E 67(31); Warburton,
ii.281; Rushworth, v.286; Washbourne, pp.52-3; I.Roy, ed.
Royalist Ordnance Papers (1971-73), ii.267, 484, note 191.
(3) Wartxirton, ii.280.
(4) Corbet, p.43.
(5) Ibid, p.44; GI4Q, iii.464.
(6) Clarendon, iii.132-3; Corbet, p.45; Warixirton, ii.281; May,
p.2l7; BG, p.2ll; E 67(31).
- 79 -
Chapter 3
previously to create time for incendaries to be prepared.1
Parliamentary comentators were full of admiration for
Gloucester's stubborn stand. The city seemed to 'stand forlorn,
and without hope of rescue in the midst of a large country,
possessed by their victorious enemies'.2 charles was not alone in
judging that the Parliamentarians were in no position to send
relief: 'Wailer is extinct and Essex cannot come' he replied to
Gloucester's defiant answer.3 Apparently, Massey's embattled
co1rnand did 'stand alone without help and hope' .4
The Royalists, having sustained heavy casualties during the
assault on Bristol, decided to take the city 'by approach' rather
than by storm.5 Charles was assured by most of his military
advisors that his objective could be attained within ten days by
means of trenchworks, mines and batteries.6 Massey was
experienced enough to realise quickly what his opponents had
decided, as he watched the Royalist pioneers toiling along their
lengthening lines of trenches and earthworks. His 1,500 men
constituted only a thin line of defence, without reserves or
seconds .7 The garrison could have been overrun by a well
coordinated encircling rush towards the city's defences, as at
Bristol. Now, however, the Royalists, engaged in entrenching
themselves, were vulnerable to sorties from the city, and Massey
was determined to exploit this to the full.
Massey was now fully coninitted to the defence of Gloucester,
even taking excessive risks in the hope of inflicting the
(1) S.Rudder, Rudder's New History of Gloucestershire (1779),
p.111. The total cost of the property destroyed on August 10
was assessed at over £26,000.
(2) May, p.2l5.
(3) Corbet, p.45; May, p.217.
(4) Ibid, p.39.
(5) Clarendon, iii.113,134; Warburton, ii.275-6; Washbourne,
p.55.
(6) Clarendon, iii.134.
(7) Corbet, p.49; May, p.219; Washbourne, p.62.
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maximun damage upon the enemy. With the inhabitants, garrison and
corporation united in their resolve to defend the city from the
consequences of a Royalist sack, and the King's troops showing
extreme caution in their preparations, Massey must have come to
consider prolonged defence possible. His earlier doubts and
duplicity were forgotten: once the siege was underway and its
defiance known, Gloucester fought for its own preservation rather
than for the Parliament, and so, in his own way, did Massey.
But Gloucester's continuing resistance could not prevent the
convergence upon it of greater Royalist forces. By the end of
August, Charles had probably massed close to 30,000 men around the
city, by far the largest force he ever comanded in the field.1
Parliament began to attribote to Gloucester 'no small importance
to the safety of the whole Kingdom' .2 Optimistic promises were
made at Westminster that a relief force would be sent, though
these were significant only in so far as they may have persuaded
Massey and his garrison that they were not about to be left to
their fate.3
But the concerns voiced in London were real enough. It was
widely believed that, were Gloucester captured, the capital's own
security would shortly be menaced by a formidable Royalist advance
eastward.4 Such fears were openly voiced in the press.5 From Pury
in Gloucester, correspondence arrived which further heightened the
sense of urgency in the Comoiis.6 It was soon resolved to
attempt the relief of Massey's garrison, and Essex agreed to
(1) Hutton, p.113; Washbourne, p.62.
(2) Bodi., Tanner Mss.62(1), f.209.
(3) Ibid.
(4) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.274b; R.R.Sharpe, London and the
Kingdcm (1894), ii.193.
(5) E 65(17): The Parliament's Scout, no.8 Aug 10-17, p.57.





undertake the hazardous operation if his forces were adequately
recruited and their arrears paid.1
By the 26th Essex had made a tentative advance towards
Aylesbury, but had halted to await supplies and reinforcements,
especially from the London trained bands.2 On the same day the
Lord General promised to begin his march on the morrow,
pledging either to relieve Gloucester 'or leave his bones
before it' .3 But perhaps Gloucester had already rendered its
most valuable service to the Parliamentary cause, by providing
through its defiance of the King' s overwhelmingly superior
forces, a source of inspiration and a rallying point in
Parliament's darkest hour.4 Massey persisted with offensive
tactics wherever and whenever he could, though on 21 August a
significant nuiiber of his men were killed in a sortie. The
Royalists were by now more firmly entrenched: such aggressive
tactics were clearly becoming more dangerous.5
Clarendon and his colleagues had nothing but admiration
for the way that Massey left 'nothing unperformed that became a
vigilant comander' .6 His conduct throughout the siege
consistently aimed to maintain the morale of his troops and the
civilian population. Massey never failed to hold out 'rational
hopes of success'.7 He could also point to the dangers of
capitulation, pointing out that the Royalists had violated all
their agreements with the garrison and citizens of Bristol.8
(1) BL, Harleian Mss.165, f.149b.
(2) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.74.
(3) BL, Harleian Mss.165, f.158.
(4) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.274b; Corbet, pp.54,56; Clarendon,
iii.134.
(5) ORN, i.487, Mercurius Aulicus 34 1643; Washbourne, p.64;
Warburton, ii.283.
(6) Clarendort, iii.167; May, p.2l8.
(7) Corbet, p.50; May, p.219.
(8) E 65(24): Certain Informations, no.31, Aug 14-21, p.238.
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As time went on, Massey was constrained to reduce the
number of his sorties, probably because the consolidation of
the King's siege lines and the growing numbers of Royalist
troops deployed in forward positions now rendered aggressive
tactics too dangerous. Powder for such ventures was also
running short. Anyway, Massey was certainly very much on the
defensive, and began to concentrate the efforts of his pioneers
and civilian volunteers on constructing works within the city,
at and between the various gates, to minimize the consequences
of any isolated enemy breakthrough.1 Massey also expertly
organised the few cannon he possessed to strafe the Royalist
trenches to the maximum effect.2
Towards the end of the siege, with the promised relief no
where in sight, the continued exertions demanded of the
garrison began to take their toll. A deserting cannoneer
informed the Royalists that Massey's men were so 'tired with
continual duties, that they were not able to stand out long' .3
Dorney recorded, probably years later, that on 29 August 'there
was a speech amongst the comon soldiers they should have
orders to march away' .4 Loyal troops surrounded the
discontented elements and some men were arrested. [Corbet's
account, published shortly after the siege, ignored both this
incident and the earlier debate over resistance or surrender.5]
By early September, therefore Gloucester's defences were
battered and its garrison hard pressed and exhausted; spirits
flagged. The city was in irrininent danger of falling, or of
being forced to surrender, should help not. arrive promptly, as
(1) Corbet, p.52; BG, p.217; E 67(31)M
(2) Ibid; BG, p.222.





informed Royalists were well aware.l Parliamentary accounts
downplayed the deteriorating situation inside the city walls.
It was at this critical juncture that Essex entered
Gloucestershire at Stow on 3 September.2 There he brushed aside
the tentative resistance of Rupert's cavalry, forcing them
westward to the Cotswold escarpment.3 The Royalist forces,
strong in cavalry, were better deployed on the open wold than
in the Severn Vale, which was divided by hedgerows. Anxious to
avoid being caught between Massey's garrison and Essex's army,
and acutely short of supplies in the ravaged country, tharles
decided to abandon the siege at Gloucester.4
On the 5th Essex advanced unimpeded over the high wold
country to Presthury hill, above the small market town of
Qieltenham.5 There he ordered four of his biggest cannon to be
fired, as a signal to Gloucester that its relief was inininent,
though an adverse wind prevented the discharge being heard
there.6 On 4 September, Massey noticed unusual activity in the
enemy's various leaguers and camps constructed over the
previous four weeks.7 Next day the besiegers withdrew their
ordnance and foot. Finally, when 'the men were drawn out of the
trenches and the rear guard fired their huts', those inside
Gloucester could be sure that relief was at hand.&
The Royal high comand were extremely unwilling to abandon
carefully prepared positions, and had good reason to hope, till
the last minute that the reduction of the city was invninent.9
(1) I3odl., Mss.Eng.E-List. C53, f.70; Washbourne, p.64.
(2) BC, p.238; E 70(10): A True Relation...Oct 7; BL, Harleian
Mss.165, f.169b.
(3) Bodi., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, ff.70-70b; Clarendon, iii.170.
(4) C.Firth ed., EHR (1898), p.734; Clarendon, iii.170.
(5) BC, p.258; E 69(15).
(6) Corbet, p.55; BC, p.258; E 69(15); BG, p.239; E 70(10).
(7) BC, p.224; E 67(31).
(8) Corbet, p.55; BC, p.226.




Some confusion accompanied their much delayed and therefore
hasty witlxlrawal.1 Doubtless the Royalist Generals were highly
frustrated at the eventual result of the siege. Many men, great
quantities of materials and above all, a lot of time, had been
expended for nothing.2
Despite the relief and jubilation in the city Massey and
his garrison remained on their guard, fearing that the Royalist
withdrawal was simply a ruse to draw them out into the field.3
But next morning country people informed the city about
Rupert's reverse at Stow and the proximity of Essex: the scarce
hoped for relief had finally arrived.4
The Lord General expressed great admiration for the way in
which Massey had conducted the defence of the city. Although he
had expended all but '2 or 3 barrels of powder', the Governor,
the Earl related, had 'managed his business with so much
judgement and courage that the enemy not knowing of such want,
had but small hopes of attaining their desires'.5 Such high
praise soon reached the ears of Parliament.6 Essex also related
that the garrison had hopes that its loyalty and prolonged hard
service might be substantially rewarded. He believed that
Gloucester required numerous reinforcements or 'the enemy will
be master to the very gates'.7 Essex therefore urged that the
Parliament now dispatch imediately the £8,000 to £10,000, and
the 1,000 foot, which, he reminded, it had already promised.8




(4) May, p.22O; BG, p.236; E 70(10).
(5) U, vi.218; OPH, xi.393; May, p.222.
(6) BL, Harleian Mss.165, ff.192-2b.
(7) 1J, vi.219; OPH, xi.394.
(8) BL, Harleian Mss.165, f.192b; U, vi.219.
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Essex had brougkit three culverin cannons into Gloucester
along with forty barrels of powder,1 but now withdrew the bulk
of his forces to Tewkesbury. The combined effect was to relieve
the city of the burden of his troops but to provide a
protective iinbrella under which Massey could replenish his
diminished stores.2 This task involved Massey in foraging as
far as Herefordshire, since the Gloucester region had been
'ransacked by the enemy'.3 But both Essex and Massey were able
to levy contributions from those local Royalist estates left
relatively unscathed by the King's army.4 By such uieans 'great'
and 'plentiful markets' were held in Gloucester shortly after
the siege.5 'The granery was quickly filled', noted Corbet.6
Essex was in no position to reinforce Massey with troops.7
He was already preoccupied with the march back to London. But
there was the problem of the Royal army, now lay astride his
path at Sudeley and Wirichcombe.8 The Royalist high coniiand was
anxious to exploit their superiority in cavahy by engaging the
Parliamentarians on the open wold country.9 When Essex moved
North to Tewkesbury the bulk of the Royal army fpllowed,
reathing Evesham, with a view to blocking any .intended
(1) BG, p.240; E 70(10); BG, p.261; E 69(15); May, pp.222-3;
Corbet, p.57.
(2) BG, p.261; E 69(15); BG, p.2LeO; E 70(10); E 67(30), p.l3l;
J.Rushworth, ed. Historical Collections.(1721), v.292.
(3) BG, p.240; E 70(10).
(4) $ 67(14): The Parliament Scout, no.12, Sept 7-12, p.9O.
(5) E 67(8): Mercurius Britanicus, no.3, Sept 5-12, p.24; E
67(12): Mercurius Civicus, no.16, Sept 7-14, pp.121-2.
(6) Corbet, p.57.
(7) Ibid, p.58.
(8) SF, 16/498, f.7; Clarendon, iii.171; T.Carte.,. ed. Life of
Ormonde (1851), v.465; C.Firth ed., EJR (1898), p.734.
(9) BG, p.240; E 69(10); Clarendon, iii.171.
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Parliamentary advance upon Warwick.1 The Royalists were keen
for an engagement. If the Parliament's main field army could be
engaged on ground favourable to its opponents, and destroyed,
then the Royalist sacrifices during the siege would not be in
vain.2 But Essex's deployment to the North of Gloucester was a
feint.3 After four days at Tewkesbury, he marched South to
Cirencester on 15 September.4 The Royalists streamed across the
Cotswolds in pursuit.5 But the inconclusive battle at Newtxiry
was poor reward for a Royal campaign which in mid-sumer had
promised so much. Many of the King's party were well aware that
vital opportunities had been lost. Back at Oxford
recriminations began, amongst emerging Royalist factions which
jostled for supranacy.6
The relief of Gloucester has rightly been considered the
Stalingrad of the English Civil War. The retention of
Gloucester as a base for Parliamentary operations prevented the
consolidation of a large block of Royalist territory.7 Without
it, the Royalists could not integrate their strongholds in the
West, Wales and South Midlands into a militarily coherent
force. The King's effort to establish complete control over the
Severn basin and its long established trading systems was also
thwarted. As a result, the Royalists were unable to develop
their economic and military resources to their full potential.
(1) Bodl., Mss.Eng.[-List. C53, ff.71-lb; BC, p.240; E 70(10);
Clarendon, iii.171; Carte, v.467.
(2) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, ff.72-2b; Clarendon, iii.134.
(3) E 69(2), Ps2; BC, pp.261-2; E 69(15); Rushworth, v.292.
(4) BC, pp.261-2; E 69(15); BC, pp.240-i; E 70(10); May,
p.223; Rushworth, v.292; ORN, ii.51, Mercurius Aulicus 37
1643.
(5) Bodl., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.74; E 69(10), pp.l-2;
Clarendon, iii.171-2.
(6) Clarendon, iii.191-2.
(7) Corbet, p.56; Clarendon, iii.239.
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But perhaps what tharles regretted most was 'the loss of his
precious time in that full tide of victory'.l
The relief of Gloucester also appears, in retrospect, as a
symbolic turning point, which broke a run of swift and
spectacular Royalist victories.2 Bishop Goodman, writing to the
Gloucester corporation in 1649, considered the relief 'the
turning of the wheel, for ever after the Parliament's forces
prevailed. Which before they did not'.3 This obviously owed
much to hindsight. The place of the relief in history was by no
means clear in September 1643. London celebrated the safe
return of Essex's army, and the city's own trained band
regiments, as much as the relief of Massey's garrison. Even so
many Royalists looking back on the abortive siege saw it 'as
the ruin of the King's affairs' .4
The raising of the siege transformed Massey's prospects
and his career. Almost overnight he became a national figure,
credited by many with rescuing the Parliamentary cause in the
hour of its supreme crisis.5 It is ironic that Massey was thus
lionised, given his earlier attempts to betray the Parliament
for profit: it had been the corporation and the officers of the
garrison who had decided to resist. Massey had been carried
along by events which he could little influence. The zeal and
efficiency with which he subsequently conducted Gloucester's
defence owed much to his dread of how the Royalists might repay
his duplicity should they take the city.
Massey had to admit that the King's supporters had tried
to win him over. He made light of such attempts, in order to
(1) Corbet, p.56; Clarendon, iii.239; CSPV 1643-47, p.16.
(2) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.274b; Clarendon, iii.171; May,
p.ZZO; P.Young, ed. Atkyns, p.29.
(3) Rudder, p.110.
(4) Clarendon, iii.192; P.Young, ed. AtkynS, pp.289.
(5) Corbet, p.56; Clarendon, iii.171.
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conceal his own contemplated treachery.l The Royalists supposed
failure to seduce him was even celebrated in verse;
'Then him of virtue; neither could reward,
Nor battery of court honours break his guard,
Nor promises nor threats an entrance got,
But did return as fruitless as their shot'.2
From obscurity, as Governor of a provincial garrison
eclipsed first by Stamford and then by k1aller, Massey had
suddenly achieved great eminence. He was acclaimed in the
popular press as one of the Parliament's heroes. The valour of
the Colonel and his garrison became a focus of Parliament's
propaganda.3 John Vic.ars, for example, described Massey as the
saviour of London for containing the King at Gloucester.4
Thanks to his resolve, Charles was forced to depart 'extreme
hungrey and angrey; being thus, both back-beaten, to God's
eternal high praise and glory be it everlastingly remembered,
to this most noble and renowned Colonel's indelible fame and
honour, be it mentioned and to the unutterable joy and comfort
of the whole Kingdom' .5
Massey's professional competence was praised by persons of
diverse political sympathies. Clarendon and the Lord General
spoke as one in their praise of his handling of the defensive
operations which thwarted the purpose of the seige. Massey
naturally hoped that Parliament would reward him as well for
defending Gloucester as the King would doubtless have done for
surrendering it. The professional soldier had served his
adopted masters well, despite himself. As a result his future
was linked with theirs more securely than ever before. Time and
unforseen developments were to bring their own disappointments.
(1) May, p.2l5.
(2) E 316(4): Verses on the Siege of Gloucester and Colonel
Massey.





GLOUCESTER AT l3AY, SEtF iEER 1643-MAY 1644.
If the raising of the siege of Gloucester could be seen as a
turning point nationally, its local significance was unclear. No-
one could be confident of Gloucester's continuing survival as a
Parliamentarian stronghold. The city's strategic position had
been transformed by the events of July and August 1643. No longer
a component part of a large association, it was now an isolated
bastion, surrounded on every side by Royalist territory.
The friendly garrisons nearest to Massey's truncated coninand
were at Plymouth, Southampton and Warwick: no sizeable
Parliamentary force lay close enough to divert the Royalists from
eliminating Massey's garrison, the last remaining obstacle to
their complete consolidation of the region.1 Paradoxically,
Gloucester's isolation actually increased its importance to the
Parliamentary cause. It lay 'in the heart of the enemys country,
like a forlorn hope'. But it was 'maintained not so much for its
own sake, or that so much ground might lie under a Parliamentary
power, but to divide the King's association, to stop his recruits,
to scatter his forces and continually to distract the designs of
that army'.2
Massey had attained his independent coninand, but in
circiinstances that few soldiers would have chosen. Isolation
presented opportunities, making for a 'more free comand, and make
way for the perfect work of a soldier'.3 But. it also involved
daunting problems. The position of the Governor of Gloucester was
perilous. No local Parliamentary army kept the field. The small
garrison was incapable by itself of controlling territory






comand as a viable military entity. Coordinated action by the
surrounding Royalist forces threatened Gloucester with slow
strangulation. 1
Shortly after the relief the Parliament suggested to the
Lord General that Massey should be advanced into 'some place of
honour and profit'.2 It seems that Massey asked to be replaced in
Gloucester on several occasions.3 In November, exasperated by the
non-arrival of money and men, he asked the Parliament to put 'a
more able Governor into Gloucester and suffer him to go into the
Lord General's army, where he might do better service' .4 But the
Parliament seems to have had second thoughts about Massey's
relocation: at one point he expected to 'embrace another cocrinand
in the General's army', but was coninanded by the Parliament to
stay at Gloucester.5 Various Gloucester gentlemen petItioned
Essex for Massey's retention, promising to make 'that Government
worth his service and employment'.6
It is clear that many local citizens were apprehensive and
even panic stricken at the prospect of Massey's departure. This
was certainly the case when he finally left the city in June
1645.7 Anxiety was probably increased by the complete absence of
leading local Parliamentarians from the city after the siege. 'All
things rested upon the Governor's sole care', recorded Corbet.8
The Parliament, having initially raised Massey's hopes of a
(1) Corbet, pp.58-9.
(2) CJ, iii.241; U, vi.218.
(3) Corbet, p.62.
(4) ORN, ii.187, Mercurius Aulicus 45 1643.
(5) Corbet, p.59.
(6) CJ, iii.278; Washbourne, pp./9-80.




transfer, now found it inadvisable to remove such a capable
coninander from a Governorship where he had already proved his
worth. 1
The Coninons also decided that a Parliamentary Comittee for
Gloucester should be formed in London, nominating Fury, Stephens,
Hodges and others with local connections and interests to serve on
it.2 The Coninittee's brief was to consider suggestions made by
Massey and his Council of War 'touching the subsistence of that
garrison and city'.3 There can be little doubt that Fury was the
head of this new, if small, Parliamentary Coninittee for
Gloucester. 4
Massey had to set about financing his conrnand as best he
could from that 'small pittance of the country out of the enemies
hands' .5 Captain Blaney, the military treasurer, later recalled
that 'the garrison of Gloucester was so nearly surrounded with
many garrisons of the enemy that contributions at large could not
be taxed and collected for the supply thereof, but several persons
in and near that city were sent unto for contribution of such sums
of money as might serve for the present necessary support of that
garrison'.6 But such ad hoc measures were insufficient to pay off
arrears, especially since none of the monies voted in London had
yet arrived.7 Rank and file soldiers grew discontented at the lack
of reward for their hard service during the siege. Finally
'apprehending more misery than in the late siege' Massey 'was
(1) Corbet, p.59.
(2) CJ, iii.247; BL, Add.Ms.18,778, f.49b.
(3) Ibid.
(4) SF, 16/498, ff.54; CJ, iii.272.
(5) Corbet, p.6O.




constrained to lay some easy taxation on the country to supply the
present extingency' .1
But the Royalists now began to organize their dispositions
with a view to increasing Gloucester's difficulties. After the
battle of Newbury, their activities in the region were coordinated
by Sir William Vavasour, who was created a baronet and granted
the military authority to rebuild Lord Herbert's exhausted
coainand.2
In an attempt to prevent Massey's forces raising supplies
from the Forest of Dean the King issued a corriiiission to Sir John
Winter, former Secretary to Queen Henrietta Maria, confirming the
official status of the garrison in his mansion at Lydney. It was
now considered vital that Winter's house 'be secured against the
attempts of the rebels from Gloucester'.3 After Newbury Lord
Chandos returned to his home, at Sudeley castle with 400 foot.
These troops effectively blockaded Gloucester to the North West
and severely impeded the city's comunications with Warwick.4
The Royal coninissioners for Gloucestershire now sought to
complete the city's encirclement without burdening excessively
the already ravaged countryside. They planned to establish three
key garrisons at Cheltenham, Painswick and Newent. Each would have
600 foot and two troops of horse, 80 men in each troop.5 These
strongholds would form a tight ring around Gloucester and, it was
hoped, starve it into suhnission. But the plan was never put into
(1) Corbet, p.60.
(2) Bodl., Dugdale Mss.19, f.20; Corbet, p.59; Hutton, p.112;
Webb, i.347.
(3) Bodi., Dugdale Mss.19, f.30; CR0, D 421, A,1,8.
(4) Corbet, p.63.
(5) GRO, D 115, f.13.
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effect. The local Royalist comand structure remained too
decentralised for any coirmon strategy and financial priorities to
be agreed.1
Massey, meanwhile, sutxnitted a sumary of his various
intelligence reports to the thrd General. Large numbers of enemy
soldiers, • Essex was informed, lay at Tewkesbury, Sudeley and
'towards Evesham and their full resolutions are to lie at Stroud,
Painswick and Cheltenham, on the forest side at Newnham,
Mitcheldean and Newent and nearer also'.2 Massey also doubted his
ability to hold Gloucester without reinforcements: its citizens
were weary and disillusioned by military service. He noted that
the country people, well aware of the consequences of the garrison
holding out, 'dare not, or will not look upon us, beifig also
likely to loose our markets, since we are not able to defend them
from the enemies seizure' .3
Massey was able to capture Tewkesbury from Vavasour's Welsh
forces in a surprise attack.4 But he could not afford the men to
garrison the town permanently, and abandoned it shortly after.5
Vavasour retired to the security of Hereford, from where combined
operations against Gloucester might be planned.6 During this
crucial period Massey faced a crisis of confidence in his ccxrmand.
Widespread complaints were heard that the new contrit..itions he had
levied to support the garrison were unfairly assessed, and
that he had failed to take proper account of the ravaged
(1) BL, Harleian Mss.6804, f.121; BL, Add.Mss.18,980, f.115b;
GRO, D 115, f.13; Bodi. Dugdale Ms.19, f.30; Warburton,
ii.357; Hutton, pp.112,115.
(2) Bodi., Nalson Mss.3(42), f.82.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Bcdl., Nalson Mss.3(42), f.82; Corbet, pp.62-3.
(5) E 71(21): Mercurius Civicus, no.21, Oct 12-19, pp.164-5.
(6) Bodl., Nalson Mss.3(42), f.82; Corbet, p.&3.
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state of the parishes around the city.1
Resentment was perhaps especially concentrated on Massey
because of his almost absolute dominance in local affairs, which
itself had arisen mainly as a result of extreme conditions during
the city's recent ordeal. Massey's ascendancy was the more glaring
in the absence of most leading local Parliamentarians. 'Not one
gentleman of the country durst be seen to assist us', recalled
Corbet, 'no NP did reside here to encourage the business'.2
In response to such criticisms Massey held a special meeting
of his Council of Jar. It was agreed that some citizens and
off icers should form a new coninittee to consider complaints over
the assessments and to 'use that moderation which reason did
require'.3 The reintroduction of civilian participation was
essential, since military rule had alientated public opinion more
than was desirable. But the new cofrmittee could also relieve the
Governor of part of his enormous administrative burden in civil
affairs: 'the petitions of the country pressed upon the Governor
in such multitudes' that they distracted him from military
matters.4
Corbet rejoiced that it was never Massey's intention 'to
rule by the sword'.5 Massey could hardly profit from an image as a
military tyrant.6 He seems to have seen the new coninittee as a
temporary body, but this did not arise from hostility in principle
to civilian influence. After his requests for a transfer were
rejected, Massey made it a condition of his continuance as
Governor that an official County Conniittee answerable to






(6) S.S.Webb, The Governors General (1982), p.36.
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Gloucester: he urged that Parliament 'send down a coaiuittee, that
might take off the former cares'.l
The Royalists inaugurated their blockade of Gloucester
with a proclamation forbidding all trade between the city and
Lndon.2 The circle of Royalist garrisons was closed with their
occupation of Beverstone castle. Their aim was not to 'leave one
strong house unguarded, both to enlarge their own quarters and to
stop' Gloucester's 'markets and contribution' .3 The whole conduct
of the war in Gloucestershire was changing. In spring and suniner
of 1643, mobile field forces had sought the best ground to engage
each other. Now the focus was upon static garrisons, and the
retention of territory from which contributions could be extracted
- and denied to the other side.4
The Parliamentarians were unwilling to engage in pitched
battles with the ni.nnerically superior Royalists, but the latter's
advantage was not so great that they felt able to resune the full
scale siege of Gloucester.5 Ia terms of open conflict, therefore,
deadlock had been reached: battle was now waged indirectly, as
both sides tried by economic means to undermine the other's
capacity for survival. The fortified manor house or medieval
stronghold became keys to this struggle.6
Massey could only hope to secure a tax base for his forces
in the city by establishing a ring of out garrisons to
(1) Corbet, p.62.
(2) J.F.Larkin, ed. Stuart Royal Proclamations (1983), ii.962-3;
Rushworth, v.365.
(3) Corbet, p.63.





protect it. Not all his men could easily be quartered in
Gloucester anyway.1 Massey sent his own foot company to occupy a
fortified house at Frampton on Severn, nine miles to the South
West, which helped check the Royalists at Berkeley, further down
the vale.2 Enay forces at Sudeley were contained by a garrison of
150 men under Colonel Devereux at Prestbury, just East of
Cheltenham.3 This new garrison also 'did a little to open the
passage towards Warwick'.4 Finally Massey boldly established a
third out-garrison at Westixiry on the edge of the Forest of Dean,
a full ten miles from the city.5 The Parliamentarians based there
were soon skirmishing with Sir John Winter's men from Lydney.6
Massey's ceaseless exertions were reported in the London
press and led to calls for his reinforcement and resupply.7 He had
successfully established out garrisons, and demonstrated his
flexibility by the adoption of hit and run tactics, essential
given the unfavourable balance of forces in the region.8
The last months of 1643 saw the arrival at Bristol of large
numbers of troops from Ireland, shipped across St Georges thannel
in order to reinforce the Royalist cause.9 Significant numbers,
(1) Corbet, p.63.
(2) Ibid; VGI, x.143-4.
(3) Corbet, p.63; Rudder, p.6O4.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid, pp.63-4; Webb, 1.355; Hutton, p.116.
(7) E 74(14): Mercurius Civicus, no.23, Oct 26-Nov 2, pp.271-2.
(8) E 78(15): The Weekly Account, no.15, Dec 13, p.l3; E 78(17):
Mercurius Britanicus, no.16, Dec 7-16, p.127; E 78(19): The
Parliament Scout, no.25, Dec 8-15, p.213.
(9) Clarendon, iii.282-3; Carte, v.478; Warburton, ii.320.
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however, defected to Massey irtinediately after disembarking,1
though the Gloucester treasury lacked sufficient funds to keep the
great majority of them in the Parliament's service.2
Vavasour's growing frustration at his failure to dislodge
Massey led to the long drawn out saga of the Backhouse plot.3 John
Backhouse, a wealthy Gloucester lawyer, and second in coniriand of
Massey's cavalry, was approached by an old friend to betray the
garrison to the King's forces.4 Backhouse ininediately reported the
attempt to Massey. The Governor persuaded him to pretend
acquiescence in the proposed intrigue, hoping thus to gain access
to Royalist plans.5 This counter-plot seems to have enjoyed
considerable success. Vavasour was for months deceived as to
Backhouse's real loyalties and the Gloucester garrison benefited
substantially from the respite gained by such misplaced trust.6
Backhouse's later publication of an account .of his efforts further
undermined the naive Vavasour's position within the Royal camp.7
By early December Vavasour had moved from Hereford to
Bristol to be in a better position to conduct his operations
against Gloucester. Sir William expressed the hope to Rupert that
he could 'this winter ... block up Gloucester round, and to
prevent a handsome array to your highness by the spring'.8 He
planned to leaveBristol, garrison Painswick and then press on to
Tewkesbury. There he would be ideally placed to coordinate
(1) Corbet, p.68; L.idlow, i.80.
(2) E 75(22): The Parliament Scout, no.20, Nov 3-10, p.176; SP,
21/16, 1.100.
(3) Corbet, p.75.
(4) BC, pp.287,3O5; E 45(12): A True Relation of a Wicked
Plot...; Corbet, pp.76,84.
(5) BC, pp.288-9; E 45(12); Corbet, p.77.
(6) Ibid, pp.287-324; E 45(12); Corbet, pp.75-86.
(7) Hutton, p.115.
(8) BL, Add.Nlss.18,980, 1.155; Warburton, ii.332.
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movements with the forces of Lord Herbert and Winter in the Forest
of Dean.1
Vavasour, however, could not imediately find as many troops
as he had expected, and Massey was able to raise '1,500 armed foot
and 200 horse'.2 Sir William also feared that the Gloucester
forces would take the offensive 'to prevent being penned in since
the loss of men will rather be an advantge to thern'.3 In mid-
December, veteran English reinforcements from Ireland, under their
able coniiander Colonel Mynne, were assigned to Vavasour, and
proved both loyal and highly professional.4 Their arrival made it
possible to initiate the long-delayed blockade of Gloucester.5 The
Royalists set off for Tewkesbury, suffering continual harrassrnent
by Massey's forces on the way.6 The scale and tenacity of these
attacks convinced Vavasour to abandon his original plan of
garrisoning Painswick.7 But the Royalist conirianders were not
deflected from the reoccupation of Tewkesbury.8
Gloucester's military difficulties were compounded by the
inability of its representatives at Westminster to secure any
substantial financial support. Massey's letters were referred to
them but they could do little.9 The reasons were simple.
(1) BL, Md.Mss.18,980, f.155; Warburton, ii.332.
(2) Ibid, f.157.
(3) Ibid.
(4) BG, p.296; E 45(12); Rushworth, iii.1248; Hutton, p.116;
Webb, i.356.
(5) Hutton, p.116.
(6) Bodi., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.107b; URN, ii.307, Mercurius
Aulicus 1 1644; Corbet, p.68.






When Gloucester had been part of a broad association of forces
under Wailer's comand, it had aroused the interest and support of
a great many MP's with western interests and connections. But
Massey's rmich diminished conmand lacked the offensive capacity to
win back what had been lost. Western MPs tended therefore, to use
their influence to secure financial support for Wailer's army of
the South East, a more realistic vehicle for reconquest.1
Massey was not well versed in how such affairs were managed
at Westminster, and he must have become increasingly frustrated
with Pury's and the Stephens's apparent inactivity. The financial
situation grew steadily worse, and by late Decanber the Governor
himself was broke.2 Part of the problem was that the out garrisons
at Presbery, Westbury, Eastington and Frampton naturally kept the
contrilxitions they raised for themseives.3 Sometimes they even
diverted other valuable income from Blaney's central treasury at
Gloucester.4 But it was difficult to dispense with such
satellites. Massey's urban base depended upon than to 'preserve
the country and keep the markets open' .5 The Governor himself
admitted 'our out garrisons (though of good use) are of great
expense thereof unto us'.6 Gloucester was provided with victuals
and raw materials by its out garrisons, bet precious little else.7
By early February 1644 Mynne's forces had advanced to
Newent, to the North West of Gloucester.8 But Vavasour allowed
(1) cJ, iii.291,300,308.
(2) SP, 28/228, pt.l, f.67.
(3) SP, 28/129, pt.5, f.18; Corbet, p.70.
(4) Ibid, f.31b.
(5) Corbet, p.70.
(6) BL, Egerton Mss.785, f.7.
(7) SP, 28/129, pt.5, ff.31b,33; Hutton, p.116.




himself to be deceived by the Backhouse plot into wasting time.1
This was lucky for Massey, since his garrison was in no condition
to clear the city's inuiediate neighbourhood, had a concerted
attempt been made to invest it.2
By early 1644 the new civilian coninittee was beginning to
assert its control over the administration. 'The Grand Coninittee',
as it began to call itself, issued a document laying down rules
for expenditure, including that relating to the garrison. Massey
inserted a clause which would allow him to control certain
payments by his 'special order' .3 He did agree however that the
money raised should only be paid to soldiers that were properly
mustered, and that none was to be spent on making good any of the
mens arrears.4
Within the Grand Conniittee there existed an inner ring of
civilian members whose names appeared frequently on its papers.
The leading four were William Shepard, Silvanus Wood, Thomas Lyitt
and Edward Broughton.5 Silvanus Wood, thirty nine years old in
1644, was the eldest son of Richard Wood of Brookthorp just to the
South of. the city.6 Silvanus was no stranger to the Parliamentary
administration of the city or county alike.7 He was typical of the
active civilians who now rose to prominence in Gloucestershire's
Parliamentary war effort. Of middle gentry rank, he was to inherit
several manors from his father, and distinguished himself by his
keen coninitinent to the cause when more eminent and established men
faltered.8 Like Shepard, Lyitt and Broughton, Wood owed his
(1) BG, pp.3Ol-2; E 45(12); Corbet, p.82.
(2) Corbet, p.66.
(3) SP, 28/228, pt.3, f.545.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid, pt.4, ff.773-81,783-4.
(6) T.'itz-Roy, ed., HSP, (1884), 	 p.207; W.R.Williarns, The






emerging prominence to the absence of the great Gloucestershire
Parliamentarians of 1642 and 1643. Sir Robert Cooke was dead;
Pury, Hodges and the Stephenses were engrossed in their duties at
Westminster. 1
The Royalists had lost time, but they were still strongly
placed to starve Gloucester into submission, and made no secret of
the fact.2 They openly expressed the hope that the city could be
reduced by blockade within one month.3 Richard Dowdeswell, a
Worcestershire Royalist, organised meetings of country people 'to
keep in the rogues at Gloucester' for then 'there would be no
living for them' .4 The Parliamentary press in thndon was forced to
deny that Gloucester was in any danger.5 But the Venetian
ambassador recorded rumours that the city was 'now in dire
straits, although not besieged', but it was cut off from all
relief .6
The Royalists redoubled their efforts to establish control
of local strongpoints, from which the city's supplies could be
choked off; Massey's forces sought couriterthrusts to frustrate
them. Garrisons were moved around like chess pieces. Winter
occupied Newnham in great strength, at his own cost, fortifying
the church. From here he could 'run up to the gates of Gloucester,
rob the country and take mens persons at pleasure'.7 To check his
operations across the Severn via Newnham ford, Massey placed a
garrison at Arlinghain.8 This certainly disrupted Winter's
coninunications with Berkeley castle.9 Meanwhile, however, Colonel
Mynne advanced from Newent and took possession of Highleadon and
(1) Corbet, pp.59-60.
(2) Bodi., Mss.Eng.Hist. C53, f.112b.
(3) Ibid, f.116.
(4) CCAM, ii.858.
(5) E 31(1): The Weekly Account, no.22, Feb 1.
(6) CSPV, 1643-47, p.68.
(7) ORN, ii.377: Mercurius Aulicus 6 1644; Corbet, p.72.




Taynton, thus blocking access to Gloucester from the North West.1
All Massey could do was place a garrison at Hartpury court to
threaten his lines of coniiunication, should tlynne decide upon
further advance.2
In an audacious move, Massey advanced his garrison at
Frampton to Slimbridge, in an effort to contain the Royalist
garrison at Berkeley, which had become very active under Colonel
Veale.3 Slirnbridge was supported by two forces to its rear, at
Frocester and Eastington.4 Such garrisons, to the South West of
Gloucester, were established 'to perserve and enable the people to
contribution'.5 By these means the city continued to fetch 'its
livelihood out of the fire' .6 Skirmishes with the enemy became
part of the out garrisons everyday existence.7
Vavasour's tentativeness in his manoeuvrings around
Gloucester had already exasperated subordinates such as Mynne and
Winter.8 Finally, on 5 February, he led a powerful party of horse
and foot over the wolds to Painswick.9 This forced Massey into
confronting his principal antagonist. The Gloucester forces were
badly cut up by Vavasour's forces on Brookthorpe hill .10 But the
Parliamentarians managed to preserve all their garrisons in the
(1) Bodi., Clareridon SP, 271(2136), f.73; Corbet, p.72.
(2) Corbet, pp.72-3.
(3) Ibid, p.73.
(4) Ibid; VCkI, x.127-8.
(5) Corbet, p.73.
(6) Ibid.
(7) BL, Egerton Mss.785, f.7.
(8) Bodi., Clarendon SP, 271(2136), ff.73-4.
(9) BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.26; Hutton, p.116.
(10) BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.26; Corbet, p.74; ORN, ii.376:
Mercurius Aulicus 6 1644; BG, p.3O7; E 45(12); E 33(13): The
Parliament Scout, no.34, Feb 9-16, p.287.
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vale 'by which means all the bottom was preserved from spoil' .1
And the ininediate advantage gained through Vavasour's victory at
Brookthorpe hill was lost the next day, when he abandoned
Painswick and returned to Tewkesbury 'laden with plunder'.2
Soon, however, Massey lost the two key garrisons protecting
the approaches to Gloucester from the Forest of Dean. Both Huntley
and Westixiry were betrayed to the enemy.3 To prevent Winter from
seizing the Vineyard and blocking Over bridge, a new garrison had
to be placed at the village of Churcham, only three miles to the
West of Gloucester.4
It was vital to the defence of the city that. its 'inshire'
and Whitstone hundred were kept clear of the enemy.5 Contributions
could still be brought in even if Massey's range only extended up
to between three and seven miles around Gloucester.6 The revenues
derived from Whitstone hundred alone were quite substantial and
must have been vital in the fiscal battle to keep Massey's comand
afloat.7 Supplies could also be gleaned from Painswick and Stroud,
and, when iinnediate circlinstances were very favourable, from as
far as Wootton.8
Vavasour was most fearful of the relief of the garrison at
Gloucester, which, freed from its confined quarters, might then
move onto a dangerously disruptive offensive.9 This was exactly
(1) Corbet, p.75.
(2) BL, Add.Mss.18,981, ff.26,29; Corbet, p.75; J.Bennet, The
History of Tewkesbury (1830), p.65.
(3) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.289; Corbet, p.75; ORN, ii.377:
Mercurius Aulicus 6 1644; E 34(4): The Parliament Scout,
no.35, Feb 16-22, p.295.
(4) Corbet, p.84.
(5) BC, p.3O7; E 45(12); Corbet, p.87.
(6) Corbet, p.87.
(7) SP, 28/228, pt.4, f.769.
(8) SP, 28/37, pt.2, f.180; SP, 28/129, pt.5, ff.31b.




what Massey and others had in mind.1 The Royalists certainly put
great emphasis and effort into thwarting any attempt to reinforce
Gloucester.2
The Royalists in Berkeley hundred felt Massey's presence
most heavily. Here his troops coninitted 'great outrages from
certain houses wherein they had placed garrisons' .3 Such was their
influence that the Royalist monthly contribution could not be
collected. Massey was also able to raid the King's horse quarters
close to Berkeley castle, capturing a nunber of prisoners.4 He
ordered that a fanfare of 'five trunpets' be sounded in
celebration of this triixnph upon his re-entry into Gloucester.5
His temperament was not such as pass up the opportunity of a
symbolic gesture.
Such was the extent of its disillusion with Vavasour's
performance, that the Royal Council of War undertook to direct
operations around Gloucester itself.6 On 24 March, it ordered
Vavasour to advance once more on Painswick. Winter was also
ordered to support him on the Forest side.7 Sir Francis Hawley,
acting Governor of Bristol, and Colonel Veale of Berkeley, were
also expected to advance and drive Massey's out garrisons from
Whitstone hundred and back into Gloucester from the South.8
Had these manouevres been carefully coordinated and
sustained, the result would have been to subject Gloucester to a
second siege: some at Oxford expected that Vavasour would soon
(1) BL, Egerton Mss.785, f.7.
(2) E 35(21): The Military Scribe, no.2, Feb 27-March 5, p.14.
(3) BL, Harleian Mss.6852, f.57; Corbet, p.88.
(4) E 38(14): Mercurius Civicus, no.43, March 14-21, p.438.
(5) E 38(18): The Parliaments Scout, no.39, March 15-22, p.329
(6) BL, Harleian Mss.6852, f.57.
(7) Ibid.
(8) BL, Egerton Mss.785, f.7; BL, Harleian Mss.6852, f.57.
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'besiege Gloucester very close'.l Sir William was certainly keen
to 'repair his credit in the King's army'.2 By 27 March he was
near Painswick, vowing to 'clear all these parts of the rebels
garrisons' .3
Massey was acutely aware of Vavasour's plans to occupy
Painswick 'to keep us in'.4 The loss of Painswick would breach
Gloucester's ring of out garrisons; as matters stood, no other
strong-points would then stand between Vavasour and the very
gates of the city.5 Massey would be forced to surrender.6
Therefore, when the Royalists stormed into Painswick and captured
Massey's small garrison there,7 the Parliamentarians were forced
to abandon their remaining garrisons on the wolds, such as Stroud,
and to retreat into the vale.8 Massey called in volunteers to
guard the roads and passes down the escarpment 'so that the enemy
durst not adventure below the hills'.9
Vavasour was therefore confined to the wold country around
Painswick and Stroud, and wasted it 'to the bear walls', while
Massey secured the vale, Gloucester's fertile lifeline.1O Sir
William had once more failed to confine the city closely enough to
force its suhl1ission. Again the Royalist high coninand was
disappointed by his failure to coordinate his own forces and those
at Bristol or in the Forest of Dean. This was not entirely
(1) Bodi., t4ss.Eng.Hist. C53, ff.127b-28.
(2) Corbet, p.88.
(3) BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.112; Bodi., Firth Mss.C7, f.1.
(4) BL, Egerton Mss.785, f.7, in which the wrong date is given.
The correct one is 27 March.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Corbet, p.88.
(7) ORN, ii.464: Mercurius Aulicus 13 [644; Corbet, p.89; BL,







Vavasour's fault; it reflected divisions and vested interests
within the Royalist coalition. Though Massey was not aware of it,
this latest failure to mount decisive action against Gloucester
marked the end of the crisis. Vavasour could try to block the
Parliament's relief coli.unn (delayed at Warwick since November
1643), and keep up some pressure on the city, but the Royalist
high coninand could no longer afford to keep so many of its
soldiers tied down in an indecisive blockade.1
Massey had proved himself a master of garrison warfare. He
had showed himself adept at hit and run skirmishing.2 He had
displayed good ,judgement in marshalling his small and over-
stretched forces, choosing well the strong-points at which to
deploy his out garrisons to greatest effect.3 Corbet thought that
during the winter of 1643-44, Gloucester's garrison 'made the best
of a bad game, in continual petty services and small parties, yet
beyond the strength of the place; not to conquer but to live, not
to destroy the King's forces, but to starve off or delude them' .4
The theatre of war in Gloucestershjre was interrelated with
others. The Royalist defeat at Cheriton in Hampshire on 29 March
improved the prospects of Massey's embattled redoubt in the lower
Severn valley. The King's comanders now feared a general
Parliamentary advance into the West, and were forced to think
defensively.5 To secure the West and protect Oxford, the Royal
Council of War looked first to Vavasour's small army
(1) Hutton, p.117.
(2) E 80(6): The Weekly Account, no.18, Jan 3, p.2; Hyett, p.4.
(3) D.Pennington, 'The War and the People', in J.Morrill ed.
Reactions to the English Civil War, (1982) p.124.
(4) Corbet, p.91.
(5) Sir.E.Walker, Historical Discourses Upon Several Occasions
(1705), .p.8; Clarendon, iii.342; BL, Add.Mss.18,981,
ff.126-7; Carte, vi.85,87; Adair, p.l49.
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which had been fruitlessly engaged for so long.1 On 2 April,
Vavasour was ordered to march his Gloucestershire forces to
Marlborough to reinforce the King's main field army, newly arrived
from Oxford, and to help secure the approaches of the West
country.2 Sir William was now expected to retain under his
independent coninand only the garrisons of Tewkesbury and Sudeley,
and Colonel Mynne's regiment in the Forest of Dean.3 From this
point, the Royalists practically abandoned the project of a
special force, led by Vavasour and designed to bring about the
blockade and reduction of Gloucester.4
The Parliamentary relief convoy, so long been delayed at
Warwick, was also freed as a result of the general rendezvous at
Marlborough, since the various detachments of Oxford horse which
barred its path were also suinoned to attend.5 The road to
Gloucester now lay open and the local Parliamentary comanders
were quick to take it.6 It seems that small parties of horse from
Warwick found little difficulty escorting supply-laden pack
horses past the remaining Royalist garrisons.7 Some supplies were
carried thus only as far as Prestixiry, where they were transferred
to the carts of local country people for the final journey into
Gloucester.8
(1) Walker, p.8; BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.27.
(2) BL, Add.Mss.6802, f.62; BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.27.
(3) Ibid; BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.126b; Webb, ii.9.
(4) Webb, i.380.
(5) SP, 16/501, ff.76b,98,119; Walker, p.8; W.Hamper, ed.
Dugdale's-Life, Diary and Correspondence (1827), p.64;
Carte, vi.89.
(6) BL, Add.Ms.18,779, ff.90-91b; Corbet, p.90; Hutton, p.117;
Webb, ii.1O.
(7) SP, 16/501, f.108; Corbet, p.90.
(8) SP, 28/129, pt.5, f.37b; E 42(4): The Kingdom's Weekly
Intelligencer, no.49, April 2-10, p.400.
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Massey was now able to take the offensive. The withdrawal of
Vavasour's forces allowed him to collect some contrilxitions from
southern Worcestersliire.1 Three troops of horse arrived with more
supplies from Warwick.2 For the first time in many months Massey
could operate far from Gloucester and give adequate support to his
infantry in the field instead of confining them to out garrisons.
This was a sudden and sharp reversal of fortunes within the
county: it became clear that the King's men were now engaged in
holding what they had, rather than in moving forward to conquer
the whole shire.3 Oxford thought its Royal coninissioners could no
longer 'with security abide ... in the county (by reason of the
present distractions there)'.4 As a result, the new sheriff Sir
William Morton was vested with the formal powers formerly
possessed by the civilian Royal coninissioners.5
The King also had to consider whether to appoint a new
coiinander for the county. As he himself noted, 'if there be any
intermission of care in coninand all will be presently possessed by
the rebels'.6 Three. candidates soon emerged. Vavasour himself
hoped to be retained, because of his friendship with Rupert, and
there were two prominent local noblemen, Lord thandos and Viscount
Conway.7 After some delay, however, Rupert decided to reject all
three, and to select instead the hardened English veteran from
Ireland, Colonel Nicholas Mynne.8 A professional .outsider like
(1) SP, 28/129, pt.5, f.65b.
(2) E 43(11): The Parliament Scout, no.43, April 11-18, p.364;
Corbet, p.90.
(3) BL, Harleian Mss.6802, f.69.
(4) Ibid, 6804, f.119.
(5) Ibid, ff.119-19b.
(6) Bodi., Firth Mss.C7, f.69; C8, f.358.
(7) BL, Add.Mss.18,981, ff.16,134; Hutton, p.118.
(8) Corbet, p.97; Webb, ii.10.
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Massey, Mynne was not a choice best calculated to satisfy the
local Royalist gentry establishment.1
The Parliament at last began to consider Gloucester's
affairs systematically, and to devote time towards the city's
'relief and maintenance'.2 An ordinance was also brought forward
'for reducing the other parts of Gloucestershire to the obedience
of the King and the Parliament' .3 This began to proceed through
both houses during mid-April.4
Massey was very anxious that his comand be reinforced by
more cavalry because it was of 'such great consequence'.5 The
authorities at Westminster soon realised that Gloucester had the
potential to strike offensive blows at the heart of the Royalist
domain. On 17 April the Coninittee of Both Kingdoms ordered Colonel
Purefoy to take his Warwickshire regiment of horse to reinforce
Massey.6 The imediate purpose of Purefoy's expedition was to
'remove or take the garrisons that lay around the city' .7 This was
an essential precondition for establishing for Gloucester an
aggressive expansionist role: the garrison first needed undisputed
space, in which it could recruit and levy contritxitions.
As soon as Purefoy arrived Massey drew his regiment out with
some of his Gloucester forces to confront Mynne at Newent.8
Anxious to avoid being boxed in for a second time, Massey had
besieged him there before, Mynne hastily withdrew to Ross. He




(4) Ibid, 455,458; U, vi.517,524.
(5) U, vi.525.
(6) SP, 21/18, f.70; Webb, ii.16.
(7) Corbet, p.91.
(8) Ibid, p.92.
(9) Bodi., Clarendon SP, 271(2136), 1.75.
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At Ross, where he rushed to fortify the church, Mynne was joined
by some of Winter's troops from the Forest of Dean.1
Aware of their strategic advantage, the Parliamentarians
marched confidently on, to Ledbury in Herefordshire. Mynne had to
leave that county' s border undefended because of his lack of
numbers .2 At Ledbury, Massey began to levy contributions
vigorously from the surrounding corrinunities.3 In this area of wide
Royalist support, he did not scruple against plundering 'all
places about him' .4 Such was the relative security of Massey's and
Purefoy's position at Ledbury that they were able to mount a
powerful show of strength in the direction of 1-Iereford.5 But they
lacked sufficient numbers to launch any serious attack on the city
itself. Ininediate withdrawal to Gloucester was in any case
necessary, since Rupert had appeared at Evesham with a
considerable body of horse and dragoons.6
Aware of the initiative presented to them by the void in
the local Royalist high comand, Massey and Purefoy, after four
days rest at Gloucester, directed a new offensive against Winter's
garrisons in Dean on 6 May.7 Supported by Purefoy's horse Massey's
Gloucester forces stormed into Westixiry, the Royalist garrison
that had most imediately prevented their westward advance.8
Another small detachment was able, with a little luck, to
(1) Corbet, p.92; Webb, ii.17.
(2) Webb, 11.18.
(3) Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.94; ORN, iii.65: Mercurius Aulicus 19
1644; Rushworth, v.737; Dugdale, p.66.
(4) Bodi., Firth Mss.C7, f.94.
(5) Corbet, p.92.
(6) E 43(16): The Scottish Dove, no.27, April 12-19, p.2ll;
Rushworth, v.737; C.Firth ed.., -{R (1898), p.736.
(7) BC, p.327; E 50(17): 'Eben-ezer'; Rushworth, v.737; Corbet,
p.92-3; Webb, ii.28.
(8) Corbet, p.93; BC, p.321; E 50(17); Rushworth, v.737; E




capture the Royalist garrison at Little Dean just to the North.1
The lightness of his losses on the 6th encouraged Massey to
advance further the following day, along the bank of the Severn to
Newnham.2 Here, after a confused fight his forces seized the
circular earthwork and the church around which the majority of
Winter's garrison had been based.3
The London news-sheets soon proclaimed Massey's feat of
capturing three enemy garrisons in two days.4 One reported 'many
garrisons have done bravely, but Massey at Gloucester hath
exceeded them all'.5 A further 171 Royalists were captured at
Newnham, including supplies of powder, match, arms and Winter's
four pieces of ordnance.6
The road to Winter's mansion at Lydney, the White Cross, was
now open. But Massey and Purefoy found the house well fortified
and received a defiant answer from Sir John's wife.7 Even more
alarming was the intelligence that Mynne, Winter and Lord Herbert
had finally been roused into coordinated action by the loss of
the Dean garrisons. Advancing from Ross they had organized a
rendezvous at Coleford, from where they were well placed to march
to the relief of Lady Winter.8
(1) Corbet, p.93; BC, p.327; E 50(17); Rushworth, v.737; E
47(25), p.7; E 47(19): The Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer,
no.54, May 7-14, p.343.
(2) Ibid; BC, p.328; E 50(17).
(3) Ibid; Corbet, p.94; Rushworth, v.738; VcH, x.31.
(4) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.298, BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.161; E
47(26): The Parliament Scout, no.47, May 10-17, p.244.
(5) E 47(29): The Scottish Dove, no.31, May 10-17, p.244.
(6) E 47(19), p.343; BG, p.328; E 50(17); BL, Add.Mss.31,116,
f.137b; CJ, iii.490; Vicars, p.64.
(7) F.A.Hyett, TBGAS,	 (1893-94), pp.101-2; ORN, iii.82:
Ilercurius Aulicus 21 1644; BG, p.329; E 50(17); Webb ii.30.




A witI.1rawal to Gloucester was prudently agreed. The
Parliamentarians had to absorb three new garrisons and half the
forest division, a daunting enough prospect in itself. Before
their departure from Lydney, Massey and Purefoy plundered the
entire neighbourhood.1 Winter's three iron mills and furnaces
'the main strength of his estate and garrison' were also fired.2
The heartening story of Massey's exploits soon reached the
Houses at Westminster.3 The Comons voted that Purefoy's regiment
should renain at Gloucester.4 Massey still depended for his
offensive capacity upon reinforcements from outside the county.
The more territory and resources he could secure by such
aggressive caupaigning the more troops his comand could sustain.
Both city and county still lay in a bitterly contested and
economically depressed war zone. Yet the strategic position of the
Gloucester comand had markedly improved. With the removal of
Vavasour's forces the Royalists lacked the capacity to take the
offensive. Reinforced from outside the shire Massey could begin to
carry the war to the depleted, scattered and leaderless Royalist
forces on the county 's periphery.
For these reasons, the war was increasingly to be fought on
the borders of the shire and in the Royalist held counties beyond.
Gloucester's security and survival, after its long ordeal, was
finally guaranteed. The Royalist position within the county now
became increasingly difficult. Gloucester could at last begin to
assune its function as the lynch pin of an area of Parliamentary
influence at the heart of three converging Royalist territories.5
The battle for the city was over, that for the shire was about to
begin.
(1) ORN, iii.69, Mercurius Aulicus 19 1644.
(2) Corbet, p.35; BG, p.32'9; E 50(17); Rushworth, v.738;
Washbourne, p.87.





SECURING ThE SHIRE, MAY-DECEMBER 1644.
By early May 1644 conditions in Gloucestershire had so
improved for the Parliamentarians, that they felt able for the
first time to set up a mainly civilian administration, of the type
now normal in securer parts of the country. On May 10 the Corrinons
passed an ordinance establishing a County Couirnittee, which
replaced the stop-gap 'Grand Corrinittee', at Gloucester.1
Appointed to this body were Sir Robert Harley,
Gloucestershire's long absent MPs (including most prominently the
Stephens's, Pury and Hodges), and the mayor and recorder of
Gloucester. The last named would, it was hoped, help to forge a
union of city and county interests on the Coninittee. The military
was represented by Massey himself.2 Members of the old Grand
Coninittee such as Silvanus Wood, William Shepard and Edward
Broughton, were also included in the new body, largely for their
administrative experience. Issac Bromwich from Frampton on Severn
was the most prominent newcomer.4
The reorganised system ended the strict division between
the civilian and military aspects of the city's government. The
military's success in securing the county gave rise to favourable
conditions for a reassertion of civilian rule. But there were
sources of tension - reasons why the military authorities could
not simply be cast aside. Pragmatic Gloucestershire gentlemen
foundt advisable to look to Massey to 'secure themselves
(1) A&O, 1.428; E47(12): Ordinance of the Lords and Comons...
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid; Williams, Parliamentary History of Gloucester, p.'59.
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from spoil and the soldiers violence'.l By June a Parliamentary
news-sheet could claim that the 'whole county of Gloucester do now
generally come in to him'.2
With the approaches of the Forest cleared and Purefoy's
regiment still available, Massey was well placed to unleash a new
offensive. His principal aim was to further fracture the ring of
Royalist garrisons created to contain him.3 Frustrated at
Tewkesbury, Massey and Purefoy marched on Ross, determined to
carry the war to the Royalists, in the manner of earlier forays
into Herefordshire, as well as to 'raise moneys for the garrison
out of the remoter parts'.4 The fortuitous capture of the Royalist
Governor of Beverstone castle by a patrol from Gloucester led to
Massey's rapid abandonment of Ross soon after his arrival there.5
Beverstone was more important: its capture would. 'free the
clothiers of Stroudwater from the bondage of that Government'.6
Its fall would also disrupt the vital Royalist coninunications
between Bristol and Oxford.7
When, on 23 May, Massey and PureE oy appeared before
Beverstone, its demoralised garrison soon surrendered.8 Captured
Royalist officers provided valuable intelligence about the
weaknesses of the King's garrison at Malmesbury, a market town
just to the South East, coninanding the North West corner of
Wiltshire. Massey's sumons of Malmesixiry was defiantly
(1) Corbet, p.95.
(2) E 50(18): Mercurius Civicus, no.54, May 30-June 6, p.531.
(3) Hutton, p.147.
(4) Corbet, pp.96-7; Webb, ii.32; BC, p.329; E 50(17).




(8) Ibid, p.98; BC, p..33l; E 50(17); BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.300;
BL, [-Larleian Mss.166, f.67b; Vicars, p.64.
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refused, but he successfully stormed it the following day.l
Malmesbury now coninanded a wedge of Parliamentarian
territory, driven between the Royalist lines of comunication from
Bristol and the Dorset ports to Oxford.2 It also compromised the
Royalist control of northern Wiltshire.3 Massey's military reach,
and therefore his responsibilities had dramatically widened. In
just eighteen days he had taken eight Royalist garrisons and
killed, wounded or captured 600 men.4 Massey's and Purefoy's
forces raided as far South as Chippenham, Caine and Devizes,
before falling back to their new garrisons at Beverstone and
Malmesbury, and then, in early June, to Gloucester itself.5 The
authorities at Westminster allowed Massey to choose the new
Governor of Malmesbury, and he appointed Colonel Nicholas
Devereux.6
In early June, Purefoy and his regiment were at last
recalled, to Warwickshire,7 leaving Massey seriously short of
cavalry. The Comons expressed the hope that Massey's own horse
regiment, coniissioned in late 1643, would soon be recruited.8 The
Parliament also decided to reward Massey for his valuable services
with an estate, yielding £1,000 a year, created from the
(1) Corbet, pp.98-lOO; BG, pp.333-4; E 50(17); Rushworth, v.739;
Vicars, p.64; BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.68.
(2) E 50(5): The Scottish Dove, no.33, May 24-31, p.263; BC,
p.335; E 50(17); Corbet, p.103; Harrison, p.234.
(3) Harrison, pp.240-1,257.
(4) Washbourne, p.88.
(5) BC, p.335; E 50(17); Corbet, p.lOO; BL, Add.Mss.31,116,
f.141; HMC, 15 Report, p.34.
(6) BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.68; BC, pp.33l,336; E 50(17); CJ,
iii.511; SP, 16/502, f.79.
(7) SP, 16/502, f.4; SP, 21/16, f.29; BC, p.336; Corbet, p.lOO.




confiscated lands of various Royalists, including Sir John Winter
in the Forest of Dean.1
Massey's new responsibilities transformed him from a
provincial garrison Governor into a regional couinander. As a
result he rose higher in the list of the Parliament's broader
strategic priorities. The Coninittee of Both Kingdoms began to
inform him of events in London and York.2 It asked him to send to
it, in return, regular dispatches concerning his own operations.
This, Massey was assured, would enable the Comittee to determine
more accurately and promptly the needs of his cooinand.3
Maintaining such a regular correspondence was time consuming, but
Massey always tried to fulfil consistently the Corrinittee's
request .4
The Conmnittee of Both Kingdoms also wrote to Massey
confirming that the Gloucester Coninittee at Westminster had 'been
ever upon all occasions earnest solicitors' for his supply.5 It
also sought to reassure him that the Comittee had praised his
'faithfulness and industry' as Governor of Gloucester.6 It seems
that such assurances were designed to allay doubts on Massey's
behalf, concerning both the Gloucester Conmnittee's efficiency, and
its loyalty to him.7
In Gloucestershire, on 6 June, a detachment of Massey's
forces, comanded by the recently arrived Major Robert Hanmnond,
successfully took Tewkesbury,8 which remained in Parliamentary
hands for the rest of the war, securing the northern approaches of
the county from the Royalists at Worcester. The Royalist cause
(1) CJ, iii.3; BG, p.337; E 50(17); BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.300.
(2) SP, 21/7, f.76.
(3) SP, 21/18, ff.104-5.
(4) Bodl. Tanner Mss.61, f.106.
(5) SP, 21/18, f.104; SP, 21/7, f.78.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid.




in the county was further undermined by forces under the coninand
of Sir William Wailer, which now began operating in the eastern
hundreds of the shire.1 These had long been under Royalist
control. Many, sensing that the crown's grip on the county was
weakening, presented themselves at Wailer's headquarters and
compounded for their delinquency.2
Wailer was now able to consider an offensive against Sudeley
castle, the most important Royalist garrison left in the region,
requesting and receiving help from Massey in the operation.3 The
stronghold, and the Royal sheriff Sir William Moreton, surrendered
to Waller and Massey on 10 June.4 George Massey, Edward's younger
brother, was installed as Sudeley's new Governor, presumably with
Wailer's consent.5 With the fall of Sudeley, Royalist influence in
eastern Gloucestershire shrank, and it became confined to the
borders of Warwickshire and Oxfordshire. It marked the collapse of
Royalist strategy for the county's conquest and control; no
concerted operations were possible, now that so little territory
within the county remained in the King' s hands.
Two other pockets of Royalism remained. Winter still
controlled half the Forest division from his house at Lydney, and
the King's garrisons at Berkeley and Bristol secured the extreme
South West of the county. But Massey had succeeded in reducing the
majority of the shire 'into a reasonable condition of ease and
security' .6
(1) SP, 21/16, f.22..
(2) E 50(35): The Parliament Scout, June 6-13, p.408.
(3) SF, 21/16, f.21-2; BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.72; ORN, iii.114:
Mercurius Aulicus 24 1644; Corbet, p.1O3.





At the same time, however, relations between the military
and civil authorities at Gloucester worsened. As the strategic
situation became more secure, officers felt more able to air their
various resentments, the new civilian authorities became more
determined to establish their right to participate in the conduct
of the war, and Massey sought to retain his great authority,
accumulated during Gloucester's months of trial.
By early June the newly established County Comnittee was
criticising certain officers of Massey's administration, including
Captain Blaney the military treasurer, perhaps finding them too
subservient to the Governor.1 Massey, as the only military officer
on the Coniiittee, must have been aware of the resentment and
assertiveness of its civilian members. He was sufficiently worried
by such problems to be eager to confront the Cannons with them in
person. But the houses ruled against his being allowed to travel
up to London to argue his case.2
The Parliament's regional military fortunes worsened sharply
in late June. Waller was defeated by the King's Oxford army at
Cropredy bridge. The Royal forces, anxious not to burden loyal
Oxfordshire unduly, then retreated into the eastern fringes of
Gloucestershire.3 With the King's army suddenly comanding the
field, Gloucestershire once more stood in 'danger of ruin'.4
However, on receiving at Evesham the news of Marston Moor, Charles
decided to march West in the hope of trapping Essex.5 This removal
of the main Royalist field army meant that the balance of forces
resulting from the May and June campaigns remained favourable
(1) BL, Loan 29/174, f.40.
(2) CJ, iii.525; Washbourne, p.88.
(3) SP, 21/16, f.94; Carte, vi.199; Adair, pp.163-65; BL,
Add.Mss.17,062, f.39b; Walker, p.35; Warburton, ii.473;
Dugdale, p.71.
(4) SP, 21/16, ff.98-99; Corbet, pp.l06-7.
(5) Walker, p.37; Clarendon, iii.371-2,385.
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to the King's opponents. Massey had consolidated his position in
Gloucestershire, confirming Parliament's supremacy there. A
Royalist, lamenting that 'Gloucestershire is lost totally', was
exaggerating, but only slightly.1
In Gloucester, however, discord was growing amongst Massey's
officers, who seem to have resented his authoritarian style of
coiiinand. This had been adopted during the crisis of 1643, and
never subsequently abandoned, despite its increasing
inappropriateness now the emergency had passed, the scope and
complexity of the coninand had enormously expanded. Obviously this
changed situation meant that a broader base of decision-making
was both possible and necessary. Massey himself was an obstacle to
this. Contemporaries ranked vanity and jealousy high amongst his
failings.2 Even Corbet thought him 'jealous of honour' .3
Others saw the Governor's envy expressed in spiteful
behaviour towards his more able subordinates.4 Despite the high
local status of Massey's position as Governor, he had attained
only the comparatively modest military rank of Colonel. [Perhaps
his failure to achieve the rank of Major General, like Richard
Browne at Abingdon, derived from his superiors' belief that he
coninanded too few men to merit such an exalted rank.5] Securing
unquestioned obedience may not, therefore, always have been easy.
This may be the reason why Massey posted the only other
coninissioned Colonel in his corrinand, Nicholas Devereux, far away
from Gloucester as soon as the opportunity presented itself.
Massey could also exercise favouritism and nepotism, making his
brother George Governor of Sudeley.
(1) Carte, vi.152.
(2) Washbourne, p.95; CCSP, ii.177.
(3) Corbet, p.96.




Officers of the Earl of Stamford's regiment, Massey's
initial power base, were becomimg increasingly frustrated at his
behaviour. Edward Grey, as its Major, carried all the
responsibility of running his kinsrnan regiment, but gained little
prestige. It was probably he who led his officers to complain in
writing to the authorities at Westminster about Massey's conduct.1
Massey must have regarded this as disloyal and unwarranted.2
But his record of military success proved to be his salvation.3
The Coninittee of Both Kingdoms thought that Grey and his
supporters had done Massey an injustice in even petitioning the
Lord General against him.4 Grey's case was further weakened by
divisions amongst the officers of his regiment as to what
allegations they should forward to London. Some of. the more
outspoken criticisms against the Governor was later disclaimed by
them in writing.5
The contesting factions were warned that Gloucester could. be
put in danger by such internal distractions. Rather optimistically
it was hoped that all concerned would forget the past and work
together in the future.6 The Coninittee of Both Kingdoms thought
that a 'private grudge or emulation' was behind the divisions at
Gloucester.7 There can be little doubt that Major Grey's
challenge to the monopoly which Massey had established over the
garrison's command structure was related to the frustration of his
own career prospects. But Massey's pragmatism and lahk of
ideological coninitment to the Parliamentary cause may also have
become obvious to those who served under him.









In early August, troops under Colonel Thomas Stephens, long
since appointed sheriff by Parliament, and Colonel Edward Harley,
arrived to reinforce the garrison at Gloucester.1 The new sheriff
was the eldest son of Edward Stephens of Little Sodbury, and a
rising member of the shire's most consistent and prominent
Parliamentary family.2 Edward Harley, the eldest son of Sir Robert
Harley, had recently been comissioned to raise a regiment of foot
in Gloucestershire.3
Upon his arrival in Gloucestershire Thomas Stephens began to
recruit his own cavalry regiment rather than Massey's mounted
forces.4 This breached an earlier agreement that tt no new
cavalry troops should be raised until Massey's regiment had been
completed,5 and helps explain Massey's resentment.6 The urgency
with which Stephens raised his new troops reflected the County
Coninittee's desire for a force under the coninand of a local
Parliamentarian gentleman rather than a professional soldier and
outsider.
The cavalry brought to Gloucester by Stephens and Harley
certainly strengthened Massey's position in the field.7 His
reinforcement was timely, since Mynne had resolved to advance on
Gloucester, ordering for the purpose a general rendezvous of the
Herefordshire and Worcestershire forces at Corselawn.8 Massey
called a Council of War at his lodgings, to plan the repulse of
Mynne's offensive.
It was at this critical juncture that the long-repressed
rivalries and frustrations within the Gloucester comand boiled
(1) Corbet, p.l08; BL, Loan 29/174, f.44; Webb, i.66.
(2) T.Fitz-Roy, ed., p.176; GNQ, v.36-7.
(3) BL, Loan 29/174, f.44; DNB, viii.1276; Corbet, p.lO5.
(4) SP, 21/16, f.209.
(5) BG, pp.336-7; E 50(17); CJ, iii.511.
(6) SP, 21/16, f.209.
(7) Rushworth, v.740.
(8) Corbet, p.109; Webb, ii.66.
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over into violence. At the meeting, Major Haninond, a strong
supporter of Massey, antagonised Major Grey. The dispute
continued, with swords, in the street, and Grey received a wound
in the neck, which proved fatal.1
This incident caused widespread disorder throughout the
garrison.2 Corbet recorded that certain officers of Stamford's
regiment used Grey's death to further their 'own discontent' and
'fell of f the hinges'.3 Whether political differences lay behind
this crisis must remain a matter of speculation. Perhaps Grey no
longer believed in the sincerity of Massey's attathnent to the
cause of Parliament. It is possible that those closest to the
Governor knew of his attempt to surrender the city in August 1643.
At any rate, it was in this dangerous situation that Massey
had to lead an expedition from Gloucester to meet the advance of
Mynne. It seems that the majority of the foot were not prepared to
leave the city.4 But the bulk of the horse were prepared to
follow Massey. Even so his position was precarious: a military
victory was more urgently needed than ever before.5 It
materialised in spectacular style, when Massey's mounted forces
almost annihilated Mynne's foot regiment at Redmarley. Mynne,
Massey's most persistent and professional adversary, was killed
and most of his officers and men were captured.6 The only
significant Parliamentary casualty was Edward Harley who received
a wound in the shoulder.7
(1) Bodl., Tanner Mss.61, f.106; SP, 21/16, ff.148-9; BL,
Add.Mss.37,343, f.329b; Corbet, p.109; Rushworth, v.740.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Corbet, p.11O.
(4) SP, 21/16, ff.149-50; Corbet, p.11l.
(5) Ibid, f.150.
(6) Bodi., Tanner Mss.61, f.106; SP, 21/16, f.150; Corbet,
pp.11O-ll; CI, iii.583; E 4(28): Mercurius Civicus, no.63,
Aug 1-8, p.598.




This defeat was a heavy blow against the Royalist cause
locally.1 Southern Herefordshire and Worcestershire now lay
practically undefended: Massey could raid them almost at will.2
The improved military situation strengthened his hand against the
remaining discontented officers. But Massey's authority now faced
a new challenge - from the County Coninittee. In early August
Thomas Fury arid other absent members reached Gloucester from
London.3 Their arrival signalled a new clash of wills.
The County Coniiiittee was able to use its influence in the
Coimnons to persuade the house to pass, on 7 August, a series of
instructions which, if implemented, would re-introduce the
mechanisms of civilian control over the Gloucester garrison.4 When
Massey's civilian rivals on the County Comittee attempted to deny
his joint authority to coirmand the troops of the garrison, he
decided to act. He boldly appended to the instructions a clause
excluding himself from its provisions.5 He was able also to
persuade Parliament to uphold his sole right to hold Colonelcies
at Gloucester in both foot and horse regiments, which tended to
strengthen his position in relation to individuals such as
Stephens.6	 -
But the core problem had not been resolved and continued to
trouble Massey's sensitivities. He was eventually driven to
confront the Parliament in person. On 14 August the Coiriiions was
surprised to hear that its Governor-of Gloucester was at the door
of the house. He was called in twice and on the second
(1) Corbet, p.112; Webb, ii.69-70.
(2) E 6(32): The Weekly Account, no.51, Aug 14-21, p.258;
Hutton, p.l49.
(3) C.J, iii.575; E 4(23): The Weekly Account, no.49, July 31-Aug
7, p.237; E 6(32): The Weekly Account, no.51, Aug 14-15,
p.258.
(4) Bodi., Tanner Mss.61, f.41; CJ, iii.583-4.





occasion his 'great valour and fidelity' were acknowledged 'in the
whole course of his Government in that place'.l But Massey was
also promised the 'favour and protection of the Parliament' which
was probably the objective of his journey.2
The Parliament was keen that he return as quickly as
possible to his responsibilities.3 Yet Massey stayed in the
capital for two weeks, and was supported by the London newsheets
against the claims of Major Grey.4 Only towards the end of August,
satisfied of the failure of further attpts to discredit him in
the eyes of the Parliament, did Massey undertake the return
journey to his garrison.5
Back in Gloucester, Massey became increasingly exasperated
with the independent attitude of the County Conrnittee.6 He had
long been used to wield unchallenged power in the military affairs
of the county, and threatened, rather theatrically, to resign
rather than tolerate civilian intrusion into this jurisdiction.7
There were also policy differences. The County Coniriittee was
reluctant to finance military operations far from Gloucester, and
even began to describe Massey's professional officer corp as being
'unnecessary to the service'.8 Massey's response was to- urge the
Corrinittee of Both Kingdoms to restrain this interference into the
running of his military Goveriiment.9
(1) BL, Harleian Mss.166, ff.106b-107; BL, Add.Mss.31,116,
f.155; CJ, iii.589.
(2) E 6(28): The London Post, no.2, Aug 20, p.7.
(3) CJ, iii.589.
(4) E 4(23): The Weekly Account, no.49, July 31-Aug 7, p.237.
(5) E 7(13): The Weekly Account, no.52, Aug 28-Sept 4, p.421.






Eventually, Parliament's war executive Cotmdttee reminded
Pury, Stephens and Bromwich that Massey was coiimander in chief of
all their forces. The Gloucestershire County Coninittee was also
warned to comply with its Governor, a 'person of whose judgement
and fidelity to the public the coninonwealth has received ample
testimony'.l But having gained control of the Gloucester finances,
the County Conuiittee began to deny funds to Massey's cavalry
forces, which led to increased rates of desertion.2 Conmittee
control of the general expenses account led to similar problems
among the local scout forces and the spy and intelligence network
which it financed.3 Massey perceived that this financial policy
was shaped by the Coninittee's 'resolution not to support a
strength above the constant number required by these garrisons'.4
Corbet confirmed that the Coninittee had no interest in sustaining
the military strength necessary to provide for a marching
brigade. 5
What was the thinking behind the County Conmittee's new
defensive strategy? It was precisely that of the deputy
lieutenants of 1642 and early 1643. The Conuiittee saw its chief
function as protecting the city and the shire, an objective
largely achieved by the ring of out garrisons created during the
spring and sunnier of 1644. Unlike Massey, the Coninittee members
did not see Gloucester as a spring board for offensive operations
against the enemy in surrounding shires. They may have feared the
success of such forays as much as their failure. For while failure
risked all that had been won, success threatened the reimposition
of military preponderance in local government.
(1) SP, 21/19, f.22.
(2) SP, 21/16, f.244; Corbet, p.115.





In mid-September Massey was informed that the remnants of
Langdale's northern horse, under Colonel Tuke, had decided to join
Rupert at Bristol via the Beachley and Aust ferry.1 The ferry had
taken on a new and vital strategic significance for the Royalists,
since their opponents now controlled all the Severn crossing
points from Tewkesbury to Newnham.2 Rupert shipped across the
estuary to Beachley a party of 5-600 horse and foot, to support
Sir John Winter's forest forces and those at thepstow.3 Beachley
was easy to fortify because it lay on a narrow spit of land
between the estuaries of the Severn and the Wye.4 But Massey could
hardly allow such a bridgehead to be established and was
determined to destroy it at all costs.5 He set off for Beachley,
and was joined on the way by Major Robert Harley, whose elder
brother, Colonel Edward Harley was unable to appear, having left
for London to have his wound treated.
Colonel Stephens's horse troops, upon which Massey had been
depending, failed to arrive, delaying the operation.6 Massey had
ordered Stephens to join his forces in the Forest of Dean. The
sheriff, with astonishing boldness, denied that his men were under
Massey's comand at all, basing this upon the ordinance passed by
the Parliament on 15 August 1642 'concerning the power given to
the deputy lieutenants of the county at that time'.7 This amounted
to a reassertion of civilian control of the local war effort
(1) SP, 21/16, f.245; Corbet, p.116; Rushworth, v.741; BL,
Add.Mss.18,981, f.270.
(2) Corbet, p.lO3; VCH, x.56; Webb, ii.75-6.
(3) SP, 21/16, f.246; Corbet, p.116; Rushworth, v.741; Philips,
i.257.
(4) Ibid; E 10(17): The True Informer, no.47, Sept 21-28,
pp.349,351.
(5) SF, 21/16, f.246; Corbet, p.116; Rushworth, v.741.
(6) BL, Loan 29/174, ff.67,74; DNB, viii.1276.
(7) SF, 21/16, f.268; BL, Loan 29/174, f.74.
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through the deputy lieutenants, as if their dramatic eclipse after
the debacle of Cirencester in February 1643 had never occurred.
Massey angrily wrote to the Parliament, protesting that
Thomas Stephens was not even a deputy lieutenant in 1642, and that
the ordinance in question only applied to the period of time
before the 'county came under the Goverwnent of the soldiery'.l
His letter was swiftly conveyed to London by one of the Coninittee
of Both Kingdom's own dispatch riders.2
Massey became convinced that Stephens was acting in the
interests of a 'party or faction in our Comittee', who were keen
'to set up some who are abetted by them to contest my authority' .3
With conuiand of his own regiment of horse, Thomas Stephens was
certainly the most important military champion of the reassertion
of civilian rule within the county. He tried hard to keep his own
forces strictly separate from those of the Governor. Massey
complained that Stephens's officers were never allowed near him to
'receive orders as was fitting'.4 It seems clear that the civilian
establishment in the county was attempting to raise an alternative
force as a counterweight to those of the professional military.
On 19 September, Massey appeared before the narrow isthmus
of the Beachley peninsular.5 Despite the lack of Stephens's
cavalry he successfully stormed the Royalist bridgehead and routed
Rupert and Winter. Many Royalist soldiers drowned or captured and
at least two pieces of ordnance came into Massey's possession.6
Colonel Tuke and the northern horse were at a loss to know what
(1) SP, 21/16, f.268.
(2) E 10(5): The London Post, no.3, Sept 24, p.5.
(3) SP, 21/16, f.267.
(4) Ibid, f.268.
(5) E 10(17): The True Informer, no.47, Sept 21-28, p.349.
(6) E 10(22): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, no.74, Sept 24-
ct 1, pp.591-2; Corbet, p.117; Rushworth, v.741-2; CJ,





Soon after his triunph at Beachley, Massey received
substantial reinforcements, eleven troops of horse and 400 foot,
from the Earl of Denbigh.2 Having effectively confined Tuke and
Winter to Qiepstow, he decided to march North to Monmouth, a
strategic crossing point on the Wye.3 There, the second in comand
of the Royalist garrison was none other than Robert Kyrle, who now
found it expedient to change sides once more.4 Kyrle's relations
conveyed to Massey his offer to betray Moninouth to the
Parliament.5 Massey may have risked accepting this offer partly
because of pressure brought to bear on him by opponents, probably
including County Coninittee members, who criticised 'slackness' in
his operations.6 He was looking for a dramatic victory to bolster
his position against antagonists at Gloucester. Kyrle's duplicity
proved decisive in the capture of Monmouth. He helped arrange the
admittance into the town of a detachment of Massey's men, which in
turn was able to secure the gate through which the rest could
pass.7
The great Royalist Herbert family of Raglan mobilised all
available local resources to win back the town.8 Sir William
Blaxton, a Royalist officer, launched a formidable attack against
Massey's newly created garrison at Wonastow, a large house two
miles South West of Monmouth.9 But the threatened strong point
was rapidly reinforced by troops
	 led by the newly
(1) Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, ff.178-9; BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.257.
(2) SP, 21/16, f.267; Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.180.
(3) SP, 21/17, f.33.
(4) BL, Add.Mss.18,981, ff.259-9b; Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.180;
Rushworth, v.742; E 10(22), p.595; Webb, ii.95-6.
(5) SP, 21/16, f.268; SP, 21/17, f.33; Corbet, p.117.
(6) Ibid.
(7) SP, 21/17, ff.33-4; Corbet, pp.11S-9; Rushworth, v.742;
Webb, ii.99-100.
(8) Ibid.




promoted Major Backhouse, and the Royalist forces were completely
routed.1
These fresn victories strengthened Massey's hand against the
Gloucester Coirinittee. The Lords expressed the opinion that 'Massey
had not only been valient and careful but successful also'.2 One
London news-sheet reported that the County Cormittee had been
ordered 'to take care of the man, that he be valient and
faithful', triat there was still 'the need of such, because the
enemies game is played most that way'.3
In late September, the Cofimons nudged the Coaniittee of Both
Kingdoms towards intervening in the dispute between Massey and the
County Coanittee. The Comittee of Both Kingdoms seems to have
been tentative in its attempts to to reconcile their differences.4
Eventually, at its session on 8 October, it was resolved that a
sub-comittee of the Parliament's war executive should be created
to deal with the situation at Gloucester.5
The atmosphere remained highly charged. On 11 October,
Massey complained that the Gloucester Comitte was levelling
'false and scandalous complaints' against him.6 Sir Samuel U.ike
informed Essex from Newport Pagnell that Massey 'hath had bitter
articles put up against (him), wherewith he is so discontented
that he is again returned to Monmouth, having sent a gent on
purpose by here, to the Parliament to crave that right might be
done him, before he will return'.7 Massey's was especially
aggrieved, because no one on the Corrrnittee was now prepared
(1) E 12(23): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, no.76, Oct 8-
15, p.610; Corbet, p.l2O; SF, 21/17, f.35; BL, Stow Mss.190,
ff.7; Rushworth, v.742.
(2) BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.130; U, vii.20.
(3) E 10(31): The Parliament Scout, no.67, Sept 26-Oct 3, p.538.
(4) CJ, iii.641; SP, 21/7, f.216.
(5) SP, 21/7, f.44.
(6) SF, 21/17, f.44.
(7) BL, Stow Mss.190, f.323.
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to defend him openly. He resented strongly his opponents growing
dominance in the city and county government. 'I am something
afflicted that such strange vagarys to my traducement should pass
amongst them of the Coninittee', he wrote 'without one gentle
correcting hand in the same'.l At the heart of this protracted
dispute was the County Coarnittee's drive to assert its supremacy,
even in military matters.2
Meanwhile, the Royalists had again begun to fortify
Beachley, in a second attempt to ship Tuke's cavalry across the
Severn estuary.3 Since a refortified Beachley posed a serious
threat to his local garrisons, Massey again concentrated against
it all the forces available to him.4 On 12 October he successfully
repeated the storming of the peninsul4, though it was more
heavily fortified than before.5
Massey was less successful in subduing his civilian
protagonists. By the 18th the Gloucester Coriinittee was arguing
that to provide its Governor with a regular income was illegal,
since no Parliamentary ordinance provided for such an outlay.6
Massey's position rested formally upon his coninission to the post
of Governor by the Lord General in June 1643.7 But Essex's
political and military fortunes had suffered a severe setback at
Lostwitk-1, and some Coninittee-men sensed the opportunity to
dispute the validity of that appointment. In response, Massey
demanded that his coainand of all the Gloucestershire forces be
confirmed by Parliamentary ordinance.8 It seems that he also
(1) BL, than 29/174, f.79.
(2). SP, 21/16, f.270.
(3) SF, 21/17, f.55; Corbet, p.l22; Webb, ii.102; Walker, p.lO3;
C.Firth, ed., EUR (1898), p.737.
(4) Corbet, p.122; Rushworth, v.743; Webb, ii.102.
(5) Ibid, pp.l22-3; Vicars, pp.66-7; E 13(18): The London Post,
no.10, Oct 23, p.5.
(6) SP, 21/17, f.68.
(7) Corbet, p.37.
(8) SP, 21/17, f.68.
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entertained hopes of promotion to the position of Major General,
and therefore clear authority over the Coninittee's military
champion, Colonel Edward Stephens.1
Massey understood that his differences with the local
Connittee were rooted in their opposed conceptions of the strategy
appropriate for Gloucester and its garrison. He considered that
the town was 'situated upon so great a pass' that it should be
'furnished with a brigade not only for securing the smaller
garrisons but for hindering the enemy's march, contributions,
levies and recruits' .2 When Thomas Pury left for London in early
November, Massey hoped he would never return to Gloucester.3 The
Governor's relations with the Coainittee had reached an all-time
low. He worried increasingly what men like Pury were saying about
him in London. 'I know there are some of the Comittee', Massey
wrote 'whose passions, envy or malice cause them to be more
troublesome in their complaints than either reason or good
affection would prompt'.4
Meanwhile, Massey was ordered to advance into Oxfordshire to
help the main Parliamentary armies against the King.5 The Royalist
presence across the Cotswolds effectively denied the Parliament
accurate knowlege of the strength and capacities of Massey's
corinand.6 Massey obeyed the order, though he was unhappy about
it.7 It would have been inadvisable, given his political isolation
in Gloucester, to ignore the wishes of the Comiittee of Both
Kingdoms. But Massey was concerned that his strength was being
(1) BL, Loan 29/174, f.89.
(2) SF, 21/17, f.69.
(3) BL, Stow Mss.190, f.54.
(4) SF, 21/17, f.121.
(5) SF, 21/19, f.121; Corbet, pp.l25-6; Rushworth, v.743.
(6) Corbet, p.125.
(7) SF, 21/17, f.119; Corbet p.l26.
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dramatically over-estimated in London, and that the weakened or
half recruited regiments remaining in Gloucestershire would be too
thinly spread around the shire's large circle of out garrisons,
including a force positioned at Tidenhain to watch the decimated
Beachley peninsula. Militarily Massey had 'too many irons in the
fire' .1 He asked the Parliament flippantly if he should abandon
these important posts in order to fulfil its marching orders.2
Its seems that it was at this point that Massey was called
upon to refute the persistent allegations of disloyalty reported
to the Parliament by some of the County Conrnittee.3 This
whispering campaign had been going on since at least June 1644.
Corbet insinuated that some of Massey's civilian rivals were
jealous of his continuing success and authority over the armed
forces in the county.4 But Massey's essential pragmatism, his lack
of ideological conuiitment and his contemplated treachery in 1643
must have been hard to conceal completely. Certain members of the
County Conuittee may have tried to undermine Massey's coninand over
the military forces in the snire simply because they did not trust
him to use them effectively against the enemy. Political and
personal differences complemented each other in the factional
infighting which beset Massey's comand.
The Parliamentary garrison at Monmouth was now dangerously
depleted, and fell to a surprise attack by Royalist forces f.rom
Raglan at dawn on 19 November.5 The fledgling Conniittee,
(1) Corbet, p.l26.
(2) SP, 21/17, f.119.
(3) Ibid, ff.120-1.
(4) Corbet, p.126.
(5) BL, Add.Mss.18,981, f.324; Bodi., Firth Mss.C6, f.265; C7,
f.234b. Corbet, pp.127-8b; Rushworth, v.744.
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established there by Massey, was captured with all its papers.
Many prisoners and substantial stores of arrinunition were also
seized by the victorious Herberts.1 Massey returned from Burford
as quickly as he could but could do little to salvage the
situation .2
The Royalist comander Sir Jacob Astley was assigned to
quarter in eastern Gloucestershire in late November. Writing from
Faringon on the 26th, Astley admitted the necessity of a strong
garrison to secure the vital route between the Royal capital and
Bristol because 'Massey from Gloucester and the country by him
hath power sufficient to give us hinderance and affront' .3 Astley
contemplated establishing such a force at Cricklade, but
eventually decided upon Cirencester.4
For Massey, these military setbacks were counterbalanced by
a significant personal success. The attempts to discredit him in
the Comons had clearly failed, and the London press lent its
customary support to the Governor of Gloucester.5 His heroic stand
in 1643 and its effect in averting the Royalist threat to London
were not quickly forgotten in the city. The Gloucester Conrnittee
lamely tried to dissociate itself from the failed campaign against
Massey, and from the County Coninittee's past complaints.6 Massey's
antagonists, faring that the Coninittee of Both Kingdoms was about
to rule against them, now hastened to hide behind those members of
the County Coninittee who had remained quietly well disposed to the
Governor after their eclipse during the autunn. The Comittee now
disowned its earlier attempt to undermine Massey's position as
(1) ORN, iii.371-2: Mercurius Aulicus 47 1644; Corbet, p.128;
Rushworth, v.744; CJ, iii.685; U, vi.48; Webb, ii.114.
(2) Ibid; Philips, i.272-3.
(3) Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.241.
(4) J.Waylen, Devizes, p.206; Harrison, pp.325-6.
(5) E 18(16): The Weekly Account, no.65, Nov 20-6, Nov 22.





Governor and audaciously denied that any real quarrel had existed
at all!1
The loss of a single garrison at Monmouth gave rise to the
need to replace it with many garrisons in the forest: more
resources had to be deployed in the region.2 Royalist garrisons at
Monmouth, Hereford and Lydney were countered by new Parliamentary
strongholds at Highmeadow, Ruardean and Nast respectively. But
Massey's many coninitments elsewhere prevented him from fully
protecting all of the forest contnunities.3 In early December he
decided to abandon a garrison he had established at Yate court
near Bristol. The local Royalists quickly burned down the manor
house so that it could not be garrisoned again.4
In the East, too, Massey's problems continued to escalate.
Astley had tnstalled large forces at Cirencester, comprising three
brigades of foot and several crack regiments of horse. Corbet
thought Astley's design was to 'destroy the country and live upon
.the ruins thereof'.5 The many Royalist garrisons, quartered in the
region for the winter, were severely to strain its resources. They
also changed the military balance of forces in the county, where
Royalism was once more in the ascendant.6 'These parts were born
down by the main bulk of the King's army' recorded Corbet.7
Massey placed new garrisons at Stroud, and at Lypiatt Park
house, just to its East. Ideally placed to impede Astley's
(1) BL, Loan 29/174, f.87.
(2) Corbet, p.129.
(3) Ibid; Webb, ii.123.
(4) Ibid, pp.l29-3O; BL, Stow Mss.190, f.282; BL,
Add.Ms.37,343, f.347b; BL, Add.Mss.18,981, ff.332-2b;
Bodi., Firth Ms.C7, f.250.





foragin, operations from Cirenc.estec,l these were also well
situated to protect the nearby comunities of weavers and their
mills. Massey's Gloucester horse successfully skirmished with some
of Astley's forces at Hampton Road, South East of Stroud.2
But the position of Massey's comand was highly dangerous,
and this must have created fresh impetus for a resolution of its
internal problems at Westminster.3 Significantly Major Haninond was
released from custody on 3 December and cleared of the blame for
Grey's death. It was resolved that he had 'slew in his own self
defence'.4 This was both a vindication of one of Massey's most
prominent supporters, and a condemnation of the conduct of Grey,
formerly one of his most formidable opponents.
On 12 December, however, the Comittee of Both Kingdoms
expressed the hope that both sides would 'let those things die
which may hinder the good agreement desired between the Conriiittee
and the Governor'.5 Massey's indignant demands that his 'honour
may be vindicated' were simply ignored.6 A compromise was imposed.
Essex's appointment of Massey to the post of Governor was
reconfirmed, but his hopes of promotion to the rank of Major
General were disappointed. The Westminster authorities agreed that
Massey should be paid for the many Colonelcies within his cofilTiand,
a sum of between £8 and £9 a day. It was ordered that such an
amount should be paid to him by the local Coninittee 'in respect of
his being Governor' .7 But Massey's position as supreme comander-
in-chief was not clarified. It was decided to confirm the
(1) Corbet, p.l3l; VCH, x.103.
(2) Ibid; Bodi. Firth Mss.C7, f.259.




(7) SP, 21/8, f.33.
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provisions laid down in Parliament's ordinance of association of
10 May.l This specified that the garrison of Gloucester and the
'other forces' were under Massey's comand, but also envisaged the
Governor and the Coiinittee working together in harmony to
administer the local war effort.2
Massey, therefore, did not obtain everything he had hoped
from Parliament's mediation. He may have chafed especially at the
failure of the Coninittee of Both Kingdoms' to declare his complete
innocence of the allegations against him. But the Corrinittee did
offer its broad support against civilian encroachment into the
purely military aspects of his comand.3 This was not surprising.
Massey's willingness to see Gloucester as a base for offensive
operations coincided with Parliament's own strategic views, which,
like his own, were increasingly impatient of the more provincial
defensive position taken by the County Coarnittee. The trend was
reflected in the New modelling of the Parliament's armies along
national lines.
The Coninittee of Both Kingdoms conirunicated to the
Corrinittee at Gloucester its hope that both sides there would
'hold all good correspondence' amongst thense1ves, so that the
'public service be not prejudiced for the want thereof'.4 It also
pointed out that if Gloucester stood in any danger as a result of
such divisions they would be the 'first and deepest loosers'.5 The
hope was also expressed that all former antagonisms 'will be
happily and permanently be buried'.6 The London authorities
(1) SF, 21/8, f.33a.
(2) A&O, i.428-31; E 47(12),
(3) SP, 21/8, f.33a.





did riot want to anta6onise the Governor or his opponents by
meeting the claims of either side in full. But their expectation
that such a bitter and protracted quarrel could be so easily
forgotten, was naive to say the least.
Massey's political position at Gloucester was further
strengthened at this time by the city's military weakness
resulting from the concentration of Royalist winter quarters
within and around its boundaries. Just as in the siege of winter
1643-4, the professional military were now able to set the agenda.
This probably exerted more pressure towards unity than any
arbitration from London could have done.
During this period the two Massey brothers, Edward arid
George, were joined in Gloucestershire by a third. 'Captain Robert
Massey of London' arrived 'with a good troop of horse, he being a
valient man as well as the rest'.l Robert Massey was certainly
well established in London. Described as a citizen of that city,
he had married Jane a native of Shoreditch.2 But the tragedy of
the Civil War split the Massey family, as it did many others. The
younger generation served the Parliament, but their father
remained stubbornly Royalist. By August 1643 John Massey, then
sixty years of age, was a prisoner of Parliament's forces in
Cheshire.3 Despite his age it seems that he had actually taken up
arms for the crown. In August 1644, John Massey was imprisoned in
Manchester. Edward Massey tried to exert what influence he
could to obtain his father's release. 'Yet', reported a Royalist
newsheet, 'his father was to loyal to receive it (as he said) at
the hands of such a rebel'.4 John Massey's sons must have
disappointed him as much as he embarrassed them.
Intelligence reports forwarded by Samuel Luke confirm the
extent to which Massey's corrinand was again encircled by strong
(1) E 28(18): The London Post, no.18, Jan 17, p.4.
(2) Ormerod, 11.399.
(3) BL, Add.Nlss.18,980, f.104; Warburton, ii.278.
(4) ORN, iii.235, Niercurius Aulicus 35 1644.
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Royalist forces. Luke noted that 'the enemy lies now...between
Cirencester, Evesham arid Gloucester, so that they will so
straigthen those parts, that if Colonel Massey have not relief,
tis thought he cannot subsist long'.l The strategic situation was
once more similar to that of winter 1643-44, but with two
important differences. First, Massey now possessed a wider ring of
out garrisons, so his supplies were more secure. Second, the
King's comanders were principally concerned to secure decent
winter quarters for their troops rather than to mount a concerted
assault on the city. Their skirmishes with Massey's forces
therefore lacked coordination and an offensive goal.2
Both the civil and military aspects of Gloucester's
Government had confronted great dangers, and now, the future was
again uncertain. A heightened sense of danger may have helped to
overcome the legacy of misunderstanding and jealousy. Massey had
made friends as well as enemies and even his foes recognised that
his services were once more indispensable. Major Wise spoke for
many when he acknowledged the 'vigilancy, valour and fidelity of
your Governor and the soldiery' .3
During 1644, Gloucester had emerged from its encirclement to
become a centre of offensive operations. But military success and
subsequent over-extension had stimulated internal conflicts over
its proper strategic purpose, and led to new military reverses.
Massey lacked the men and resources to hold his temporary
conquests. It proved impossible for a single county like
Gloucestershire to support and sustain a large association of
Parliamentary counties around itself.
Massey's autocratic style of comand had outlived its
usefulness, antagonising both officers and an increasingly
assertive civilian group. Continuing military success ensured
Massey's survival. Yet at the end of 1644, he could feel no more
secure than he had at the start of the year.







ThE LAST )NHS AT GLOUCESTER, JANUARY-JUNE 1645.
Nationally, by early 1645, Royalism was losing ground. Only
in the near West, where the bulk of the King's Oxford forces were
concentrated for the winter, did it retain a rather artificial
ascendancy.1 Astley's forces continued to skirmish with those of
Massey in the Stroud area.2 During these operations, Astley
stormed Lypiatt Park house, firing it to prevent reoccupation by
his opponents.3
Once more, the Parliamentary forces at Gloucester faced
close confinement, and a consequent fiscal crisis. Free quarter
again became the rule, and conditions were poor. Increasingly,
Massey and his officers had to devote their energies to preventing
a general mutiny amongst their rank and file.4
One Parliamentary newsheet wondered how the West was to be
reconquered 'considering how the enemy fortifies in every
corner' .5 One such garrison was at Devizes, which Colonel tharles
Lloyd spent the months of December and January strengthening.6
Prince Maurice fortified Evesham, so that it could contain George
Massey's garrison at Sudeley and secure a direct line of
coainunication between Oxford and Worcester. Once again the
Royalists attempted to exploit to the full the raw material
(1) E 23(10): The Parliament Scout, no.80, Dec 26-Jan 2, p.644;
Harrison, p.330.
(2) SF, 21/17, f.166; ORN, iii.377-8: Mercurius Aulicus, Dec 29-
Jan 5, 1644-5.
(3) Corbet, p.l.3l; ORN, iii.377-8; SP, 21/17, f.166; ccc, i.82;
VGI, x.103.
(4) SF, 21/17, f.166.
(5) E 23(10): The Parliament Scout, no.80, Dec 26-Jan 2, p.644.
(6) BL, Add.Mss.18,982, f.7; E 25(18): The Parliament Scout,




reserves in the Forest of Dean.1
Colonel Sir Henry Bard was ordered by Rupert to establish a
garrison at thipping Campden, and given three of Astley's foot
regiments for that purpose.2 From here the Royalists were able to
bring a large part of Kifsgate hundred under their fiscal control.
This initiative complemented Maurice's activity at Evesham and
fitted the Royalists general strategy in the region.3
In Gloucester, tensions arising from the prolonged financial
dearth reached the surface. Arrears of pay led, as in 1643, to
disorders among the foot. The infantry officers came to their
Governor as one man and laid their coimiissions down before him.
They expressed their determination to leave Gloucester, and enlist
in the Parliament's service in a place where, it was hoped, their
loyalty would be better rewarded.4 It seems that some of the rank
and file in the garrison refused duty over their arrears of pay.5
Massey blamed such discontent on the Gloucester Coninittee, which
had promised the soldiers substantial increases in pay. He thought
his opponents, such as Fury, intended to form 'a party with them',
undermining his own authority over the garrison.6
Massey pleaded with his officers to remain at their posts,
and penned another impassioned plea to the Parliament.7 He rigkitly
argued that whilst isolation made finance and supply especially
hard, it was strategically vital to the broader Parliamentary
(1) 1-IMC, Hastings Has. ii.135; Dugdale, p.77; Warburton, iii.53;
BL, Add.Mss.18,982, f.16; BL, Harleian Mss.6802, f.1.
(2) Bodl., Firth Mss.C6, ff.307-8; Hutton, p.167.
(3) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.356.






cause. Massey also felt able to complain bitterly that he was the
'most miserable officer in this county, knowing no way any longer
how to subsist in this condition'.l
Massey had certainly been disillusioned at the abandonment
of Gloucester by some of the County Corriitittee as the military
situation deteriorated.2 They had deserted their posts once before
in the difficult period after the city's relief in 1643. The rump
of the Coninittee granted him full powers to levy contributions,
but the collectors had little success in the face of the strong
Royalist presence.3 Things got so bad that Massey feared a violent
and general mutiny amongst the troops.4
In these trying circumstances relations between the Governor
and the Coninittee broke down completely. Massey wrote that he was
not prepared to confide any of his knowledge of the garrison's
finances 'to the ignorance of some of the Coninittee of
Gloucester'.5 Further concessions to the civilian amateurs would
be the ruiu all the Parliamentarians at Gloucester. It is clear
that the garrison's acute difficulties had suddenly given Massey a
new ascendancy in the county. He used it to the full to embarrass
the local Cocinittee and to vindicate his past behaviour. His
methods had become as unscrupulous as those of his civilian
protagonists .6
Sheriff Stephens's reputation was somewhat tarnished by the
desertion, with fifteen troopers, of the Major of his horse
regiment.7 It seems that the champion of the County Coninittee





(6) SP, 21/17, f.190.
(7) SP, 16/506, f.49.
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had no more success than Massey in controlling his forces.
Since late 1644, Massey's dominance in the Forest of Dean
had been disputed by the forces of Winter and the Herberts. In
early February, Prince Maurice and his troops set off from Evesham
for the North Welsh marches; but this was a mixed blessing for his
opponents.1 For the Prince left behind a regiment of horse, under
the coninand of Winter, in the hope that thus reinforced, Winter
and the Herberts could drive Massey from the forest entirely.2 In
response, Massey decided to blockade Winter's fortified mansion at
Lydney with a ring of outposts. The occupying forces were
effectively contained after heavy skirimishing around the White
Cross.3 On the other side of the Severn, however, strong Royalist
detachments, probably from Cirencester, caine within five miles of
Gloucester and 'did much hurt to the country' .4
Meanwhile, it seems that the behaviour of certain members of
the Gloucester Comittee had finally exhausted the patience of the
Coninittee of Both Kingdoms. It now praised Massey's continuing
defence of his comand, in the face of obstruction by the 'want of
those who should preserve it'.5 The abandonment of Gloucester by
some of the County Couinittee would have been very hard for the
central Parliamentary authorities to condone.6 A separate letter
of reassurance was addressed to Massey's disgruntled officer
corps.7 In December 164I Parliament's war executive had, refused
to take sides between the Governor and the local Coninittee, hoping
(1) SP, 21/17, f.205.
(2) Corbet, p.l13; Webb, ii.124.
(3) Ibid; E 269(13): Perfect Passages, no.16, Feb 5-12, pp.126-
7; BL, Loan 29/175, f.24.
(4) E 269(13), p.126.
(5) SF, 21/19, f.201.
(6) SP, 21/17, f.188.
(7) SF, 21/19, ff.202-3.
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to reconcile them. Now it swung decisively behind Massey. The
gravity of the crisis, which threatened to engulf his cocrinand
from without and from within, probably convinced the Comittee of
Both Kingdoms that such a decision was unavoidable.
Meanwhile, the military situation in the exposed area near
the border with Wiltshire became more dangerous. The Royalist
Governor of Devizes, Colonel Lloyd, laid siege to Rowdon House,
one of Colonel Devereux's out garrisons Just South of Chippenham,
occupied by 200 or 300 men.1 There were Parliamentarian forces
available for the relief of Rowdon, at Malmesbury under Devereux
and at Beverstone castle. Here the new governor, recently
appointed by Massey, was none other than Sheriff Thomas Stephens.2
Stephens's hopes of establishing County Coninittee control over
Massey had collapsed, but at Beverstone he had scope for
independent action, and did not delay to use it. Without
consulting Massey, Stephens marched to Rowdon's relief, collecting
troops from Malmesbury on the way.3
Stephens was successful in breaking through the Royalist
lines, but then found himself besieged along with the garrison
that he had come to help.4 The King's coninanders then mobilised a
formidable concentration of troops against Rowdon. Astley brought
thousands of soldiers from Cirencester and ordnance came from
Bristol.5 The Royalists sought to lure Massey into sending a
relief force, in the belief that, distant from Gloucester and its
(1) ORN, iii.427: Mercurius Aulicus, Feb 9-16, 1645; E 270(5):
Perfect Passages, no.17, Feb 12-19, p.l13; Corbet, p.l34.
(2) BL, Stow tlss.190, f.156; Corbet, p.134.
(3) SF, 21/17, ff.216-7; BL, Stow Mss.190, f.198; Corbet, p.l34.
(4) Ibid, f.217; Corbet, pp.l34-S; ORN, iii.427-8.
(5) Ibid; ORN, iii.428.
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out garrisons, it could easily be cut off and destroyed.1 Massey
inrnediately wrote to the Comittee of Both Kingdoms explaining
that Stephens had acted on his own initiative and that his own
response to the crisis was bound to be inadequate.2 But he also
took the opportunity to ask that the military comand of the
region should be settled once and for all 'for independent
officers (as I may call them) promise not advantage but
destruction' .3
A relief operation organised by Colonel Devereux failed to
extricate the encircled Parliamentarians.4 Massey was sensitive to
charges that his failure to organise more effective assistance was
the result of past differences with Stephens. Unable to do more he
put the onus squarely on the Parliamentary authorities in London
to organise the relief of Rowdon.5 They, however, could do little.
Eventually, on 15 February, his position hopeless, Sheriff
Stephens surrendered the garrison and his own forces at Rowdon.
Between 300 and 400 men were captured.6 Thomas Stephens's apparent
incompetence was soon ioudiy broadcasted abroad. 7 The eclipse of
Massey's rival for the military coinnand of the county could not
have been more complete. Massey was not directly responsible for
the loss of Rowdon, and he was not held accountable for it.8
Meanwhile, some of Winter's cavalry had managed to break
(1) Corbet, p.l35.
(2) SP, 21/17, ff.217-8; BL, Stow Mss.190, f.130; Corbet, p.l35.
(3) Ibid, f.218.
(4) Ibid, ff.223-4; Corbet, pp.l35-6.
(5) SP, 21/17, f.225.
(6) ORN, iii.427-8: Mercurius Aulicus, Feb 9-16, 1645; Corbet,
p.136; BL, Stow Mss.190, ff.198,202; Harrison, pp.344-S.
(7) BL, Stow Mss.190, f.198.




through Massey's encircling blockade at Lydney. Sir John posted
these, together with sane reinforcements from Qtepstow, at
Lancaut.1 This small village was enclosed on three sides by a
meander of the river Wye, and was thus easy to fortify. Winter
hoped to turn it into a bridgehead on the river's East bank, from
which to launch offensives against the tigitening blockade around
his house.2
Like the similarly configurated position at Beachley,
Lancaut threatened to disrupt seriously Massey's operations in the
forest. He decided to attack it ininediately and stormed the neck
of the meander during 22 February.3 Winter's force was all but
destroyed, and Sir John himself was lucky to escape by swinining to
one of his ships which lay close by.4 This victory marked an
extremely welcome break in a run of reverses. Massey could hardly
conceal his satisfaction in reporting the tri.inph to Colonel
Edward Harley. 'Thus has God been good to us', he wrote, 'in
giving us some victories by such as will be comanded by me'.5
This came very close to claiming that divine favour lay with him
rather than Stephens or the Coninittee!
But, as Massey was acutely aware, attempts to discredit
him continued. He wrote to Edward Harley in London that he had
been informed of 'mischief preparing against him' there, and 'the
same promoting here also'.6 Massey asked his old comrade in arms
to pass any information he had on to his brother George,
(1) Corbet, p.l36; E 271(13): Perfect Passages, no.18, Feb 26-
March 5, p.l5O; Webb, ii.124.
(2) Corbet, pp.l36-7; E 271(18): The Scottish Dove, no.72, Feb
28-March 7, p.5153; BL, Stow Mss.190, f.156.
(3) Ibid; BL, Loan 29/175, ff.28-9.
(4) Ibid; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, ff.370-71b; BL, Add.Mss.31,116,
f.196b; SP, 21/20, f.6.





who was also in the capital, so that he could be forwarned
about such developments. Certainly the Coarnittee of Both
Kingdoms was investigating allegations made by Issac Bromwich
against Massey.1
The onset of spring and the campaigning season were very
welcome to Massey, especially because Astley's forces, which
had wintered at Cirencester, were finally obliged to abandon
the nigh wold country and march to reinforce the King's field
forces.2 There was a further, and unexpected, favourable
development, in the growing club agitation in Herefordshire.
Barnabus Scudamore, the Royalist Governor of Hereford, thought
that Massey was the guiding force behind it.3 This was a gross
exaggeration, though Massey must certainly have recognised the
benefits offered by such unrest to the Parliamentary cause.4
In the absence of the imprisoned Sheriff Stephens, William
Shepard and the double turncoat Kyrle now assumed the role of
opposition leaders on the County Conrnittee.5 Massey noted that
Pury and Bromwich were 'their guides at a distance' but hoped
that the Parliament would have nothing to do with their 'hocus
pocus jugglings'.6 It is clear however that this faction had
lost the initiative it had enjoyed from October to Decanber
1644. Kyrle and Shepard were forced abandon the idea of
controlling the County Coninittee, and attempted to boycott it
instead. Massey suspected that they hoped to 'erect some new
structure of their own fancy'.7
(1) SP, 21/8, f.127.
(2) E 273(2): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, no.90, March
4-11, p.722; Corbet, p.137.
(3) Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.342; Hutton, pp.162-3.
(4) Corbet, p.138.





Massey thought, optimistically, that the maladministration
of the shire by the opposition faction during its period of
ascendancy had permanently undermined its credibility, and that
his own position was now unassailable.1 This view owed much to
wishful thinking. Most of Gloucestersftire's Parliamentary
supporters found subordination to the professional military
extremely irksome, and accepted it only when circu-astances gave
them no other choice.
It is perhaps significant that Massey felt obliged to
reassure Edward Harley that the treatment he had received from
the more vociferous members of the County Coninittee had not
undermined his loyalty to the cause of Parliament as a whole,2
though as events had proved, such loyalty could be swayed by
the changing fortunes of war.
These, however, were moving Parliament's way. In Hereford,
Scudamore had been effectively besieged by several thousand
club men.3 It was ruinoured in London that the club leaders had
sent to Massey for 'some horse for their better assistance' .4
Corbet certainly confirms that Massey advanced to Ledbury to
take advantage of this widespread uprising against the Royalist
military authorities.5 Certain club leaders even informed him
of their proposals and 'engagements'.6 The relationship was not
an easy one: Massey was quickly disappointed and perplexed by
the club leaders' declarations of neutrality. He regarded their
stance as an elaborate sham: sooner or later, they would be
forced by circunstances to take sides.
Initially, however, Massey recognised in the movement a
(1) BL, Loan 29/175, f.34.
(2) Ibid.
(3) BL, Add.Mss.11,043, ff.19-20; Corbet, p.138; Hutton,
p.163.
(4) E 274(26): Mercurius Civicus, no.96, March 20-7, p.868.
(5) Corbet, p.138; BL, Egerton Ms.787, f.93.
(6) Ibid; Webb, ii.153-4.
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great opportunity, a substantial force which might be harnessed
in the interests of the Parliament, though he was unsure how
far to go in attempting to win the club leaders over.1 He sent
a list of their demands to London, so that the authorities
might better assess the mood of rnovement.2 Massey did realise
however that numerical weakness made sending military aid to
the club men difficult, even if it was deemed advisable, and he
therefore also requested reinforcements.3
When Scudamore's garrison opened fire on his besiegers,
some of their leaders sent dispatches to Massey at Ledbury
calling for his assistance.4 By way of reply, Massey asked them
to declare for the Parliament before Rupert arrived in the
county, when, as he shrewdly warned, 'they would be utterly
ruinated although they stood neuters'.5 Some club leaders were
swayed by such argilnents, bit most of their followers could not
be convinced.6 The negotiations at Ledbury, therefore, were
inconclusive.7 Massey then withdrew to Ross-on-Wye, perhaps
hoping that such a move would force the club leaders' hand.
Corbet seems to have thought that they were convinced Massey' s
cavalry was not strong enough for him to provide the effective
protection he had promised.8
Scudamore had been assured that Rupert would move South in
his support. The Royalist authorities at Oxford encouraged him,
(1) BL, Loan 29/175, f.35; BL, Egerton Ms.787, f.93.
(2) BL, Egerton Ms.787, f.93.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid; E 274(26), p.868; Corbet, pp.139-40; Webb, ii.154.
(5) E 274(26), p.869.
(6) E 274(29): The Scottish Dove, no.75, March 21-28, p.592;
BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.375; Corbet, p.139; E 274(26),
p.869.




in the meantime, to give 'discreet answers' to the club
leaders.1 Scudamore therefore successfully offered small
concessions to the irregular forces surrounding his garrison.2
By late March it was reported that the 'multitude of the county
of Hereford ... are vanished as it were come to nothing' 
.3
On 3 April, dispatches from Massey were read to the
Coninons, in which he related the sudden and dangerous exposure
of his corrinand to the converging forces of Rupert, Maurice and
Gerard. Against these he had barely 300 horse to take the
field. Massey asked that the thirteen garrisons of the county
be reinforced with 500 horse.4 In reply, the Coninons reassured
him of its concern for his 'honour and reputation', promising
to 'vindicate the same against all false aspersions and
unworthy traducements' .5 The house was clearly aware that the
interminable campaign against him might lead its Governor of
Gloucester to abandon the cause altogether.
Meanwhile Rupert's forces had entered Herefordshire and
were sweeping aside the remnants of the once formidable club
association..6 This intelligence prompted Massey to return to
the southern fringes of that county. There, some club men
joined him, but continuing lack of cavalry made it impossible
to protect from Rupert's vengeance the many friends and
relations that they had had to leave behind.7
(1) BL, Add.Ms.11,043, f.21.
(2) E 275(3): The Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer, no.93, March
25-April 1, pp.745-6; Webb, ii.157.
(3) E 276(15): The Scottish Dove, no.76, March 28-April 4,
p.597.
(4) CJ, iv.99; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.202b.
(5) Bodi., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.59.
(6) Corbet, p.142; BL, Add.Ms.37,343, ff.377-8b; E 277(14):
The Moderate Intelligencer, no.6, April 3-10, p.42;
Hutton, p.170.




Soon the whole Forest of Dean faced inndnent invasion by
Royalist forces.1 Massey was forced to draw out yet more
powerful detacFinents from Gloucester and its out-garrisons to
contain the threat. In all he managed to scrape together 1,500
men.2 But the concentration of Royalist forces directed against
him were very formidable in both nunbers and quality .3 Massey
wished above all to prevent the relief of Winter's long
blockaded garrison at Lydney.4
On 4 April, Rupert launched his superior forces on a full
scale invasion of the forest. By 8 April, the County Comnittee
was complaining of 'great oppressions, cruel plunders and
continual marches and inroads of the enemy lying near and heavy
upon us on every side; our county was so extremely exhausted
and miserably destroyed that it was even ready to give up the
ghost'.5 Massey had to abandon all his garrisons to the West
of Newnham: the Royalists were able to relieve Winter's
mansion.6 Rupert's and Winter's troops then began to lay waste
many forest coninunities, whose inhabitants, they believed, were
mostly 'notorious ... rebels', having long subsisted under
Massey's protection.7
Massey could not hope to engage 2,000 Royalist horse with
a mere 300 of his own. In his plea for reinforcements, he
(1) E 278(3): Mercurius Britanicus, no.78, April 7-14, p.72O;
BL, Egerton Mss.787, ff.15-6.
(2) Ibid; E 277(9), April 4; E 277(14), p.42.
(3) Corbet, p.142; BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.189b; E 277(9),
April 4; E 278(19): Mercurius Verdicus, no.1, April 12-9,
p.2.
(4) E 277(14), p.42.
(5) Bodl., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.75.
(6) BL, Harleian Mss.166, ff.189-9b; E 278(19): Mercurius
Verdicus, no.1, April 12-9, p.2; ORN, iv.20-1: Mercurius
Aulicus, April 13-20, 1645; Corbet, p.l43; E 278(14),
p.51.




argued that at least 1,000 cavalry would be needed if he was to
successfully confront Rupert.1 The County Coriinittee warned that
the shire, if subjected to further devastation, would no longer
be able to sustain the garrison at Gloucester. Ultimately, it
thought, Massey's coninand would 'sink under its own burden'.2
Massey struck a similar note in his own dispatches. Only the
prompt arrival of substantial reinforcements, especially
cavalry, could secure Gloucester and its remaining out
garrisons.3
Having relieved the White Cross and plundered what they
could, Rupert's forces abandoned most of the Forest by 9
April, and fell back into long-suffering Herefordshire.4 The
Parliament, meanwhile, began to scrape together detachments of
cavalry to send in support of Massey's hard pressed forces.5
Winter saw that the withdrawal of the Prince's regiments from
the lower parts of the forest had rendered his position
untenable; his conclusion was confirmed when Massey returned
to Lydney and stormed one of the mans ion' s outworks, capturing
two guns and many prisoners.6 Winter Ixirned the White Cross to
the ground, rather than suffer its occupation by his arch
opponent.7 It seems that he, and his remaining forces then
(1) Bodl., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.35; BL, Harleian Mss.166,
f.189b; E 278(19), p.2; Corbet, p.142.
(2) Bodl. Tanner Mss.60(1), f.75.
(3) BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.189b; E 278(19), p.2.
(4) Ibid; ORN, iv.21: E 278(8): The Kingdom's Weekly
Intelligencer, no.95, April 8-15, p.765.
(5) SP, 21/20, ff.102,134-5.
(6) E 279(11): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, no.97, April
22-9, pp.777-78.
(7) E 281(5): The Moderate Intelligencer, no.9, April 24-May




fell back to Qiepstow, presunably to hold the line of the Wye
against any further enemy incursions.
Massey had been close by when the White Cross was fired,
and arrived in time to save some of the spoils from the flames.
Corn, beef and horses were taken.1 Eight pieces of ordnance
were also captured in the earthworks around the ruins of the
mansion.2 The firing and abandonment of his home was largely a
chaotic affair on Winter's part.3 Massey could congratulate
himself on defeating his most persistent adversary, ixit must
have been disappointed at the sorry state to which Sir John's
estate had been reduced.
Despite his niznerical weakness Massey felt compelled to
follow the enemy into Herefordshire. Rupert's men had taken
many cattle from the forest, and he may have hoped to retrieve
some. He was also aware that the Royalists had by their
'oppression and pillage...utterly lost the hearts of the
inhabitants of the county'.4 Their plundering had indeed been
widespread.5
Massey reached Ledbury on 21 April, with some 300 to 400
horse and 500 to 600 foot.6 Herefordshjre had suffered in the
past at the hands of Royalist troops, and Massey was
disappointed by the lack of support with which he was greeted.7
But it seems that several hundred armed armed countrymen joined
his small detachment as it progressed through the South East
(1) E 281(5), p.66; E 281(11), p.19; F.A.Hyett, TBGAS, (1893-
94), p.105.
(2) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.382.
(3) F.A.Hyett, TBGAS, (1893-94), p.105.
(4) E 278(29): A Diary or an Exact Journal, no.49, April 17-
24, April 21.
(5) Webb, ii.172-3.
(6) Bodi., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.127; E 281(11): Mercurius




corner of the county.1 Perhaps these were the scattered
remnants of the club association.
In a surprise manoeuvre, after nightfall on 21 April,
Rupert wheeled his forces around, suddenly appearing North of
Ledixiry on the next morning. Massey engaged the Royalists with
his few horse, in order to cover the the rapid and disorderly
evacuation of his infantry.2 This small band of horse was saved
from annihilation in Ledbury, because the ixilk of Rupert's
forces had circled around the town from the West and East to
cut off any escape to Gloucester.3 But Massey's officer corps
paid dearly for this desperate exploit. Major Robert Harley
sustained sword-cuts in the head and arm, and Backhouse
received a serious head wound which ultimately proved mortal.
He was captured, as were three Captains, including Blaney, who
had previously been seized at Monmouth.4 South of Ledbury, with
most of Massey's cavalry in flight, the Royalists broke into a
coli.unn of his foot and took many prisoners.5 Perhaps 120 of
Massey's troops were killed in the battle. His baggage and
anulunition was seized along with hundreds of abandoned
weapons .6
Despite this defeat Rupert had failed in his original
objective of capturing Massey's entire force, since almost all
the horse, and over half the foot managed to escape.7 In his
(1) Bodi., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.127b.
(2) Ibid, ff.127,132; Corbet, p.l44; E 281(11), p.l8;
Rushworth, vi.23; HMC, 7 Report, p.1ó4; E 281(9): A Copy
of Colonel Massey's Letter.
(3) Bodi., Tanner Mss.60(1), ff.127-2Th,132; Corbet, p.144.
(4) Thid, ff.127b,132b; Corbet, p.144; E 281(9); ORN, iv.38:
Mercurius Aulicus, April 20-7, 1645.
(5) Bodi., Tanner Mss.60(1), ff.127-7b,132b; ORN, iv.37-8;
Corbet, p.l44-S; E 281(9); Rushworth, vi.23.
(6) ORN, iv.38.




reports to the Parliament Massey did his best to play down the
seriousness of this reverse, making sure that the disparity in
numbers between his forces and those of the enemy were accurately
reported.1 But, as Massey was forced to admit, his defeat left him
only about 200 horse, 'ill armed and exceedingly worn out with
constant duty'.2
Such problems were, ironically, compounded by the arrival of
the Warwick horse. For morale amongst Massey's bedraggled
troopers was not improved by the sight of these well clothed and
well equipped forces, and the rate of desertion increased as a
result.3 By 25 April, cavalry reinforcements from other garrisons
had begun arriving at Gloucester.4 Many of these, however, had
already accumulated large arrears of pay, and soon began to
'complain for want of rnoney'.5 Fortunately for Massey, Rupert had
decided against any major advance into Gloucestershire; his forces
retreated to the region between Hereford and Worcester.6
The Royalist press gleefully predicted that Massey could
expect a frosty reception from the estranged Coninittee at
Gloucester.7 Even one of the Parliamentary news-sheets admitted
that there was 'some private difference between Gloucester's
Governor and the County Coninittee'.8 The reverse that Massey had
suffered at Ledbury had certainly shaken his self-confidence to
some extent. He now sought guidance from the Parliament as to
(1) BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.206b.
(2) Bodl., Tanner Ms.60(1), ff.127b,132b; E 281(9).
(3) Ibid, f.128.
(4) Bodl., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.128.
(5) BL, Egerton Mss.3514, f.91.
(6) Bodi., Tanner Mss.60(1), f.132b;	 Corbet,	 pp.145-6;
Rushworth, vi.23.
(7) ORN, iv.38.
(8) E 276(6): The Weekly Account, March 26-April 2, March 29.
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military objectives in the new situation.l In requesting further
support, he also felt compelled to re-emphasise his unswerving
loyalty to the Parliament, probably anticipating that his enemies
on the County Corrrnittee would seek to make the most out of the
Ledbury debacle. 2
In late April some of the Gloucester corporation sent a
petition to the Commons requesting that Massey be kept on as
Governor of the city. Massey's supporters, such as mayor Nurse and
aldermen Brewster and Singleton, must have been informed of
further attempts to oust him.3 His relations with the city's
governing body had always been more harmonious than with some on
the County Coninittee.4 According to malicious Royalist speculation
of 30 April, Cromwell's brigade of horse was moving towards
Gloucester to 'relieve or rather displace Massey' .5
On 1 May the Commons heard details of Massey's exploits at
Lydney and his later defeat at Ledbury. In the light of his
distinguished military record, the house did not hold him
personally responsible.6 It resolved instead that he should be
granted the 'iron works and iron mills, that were Sir John
Winter's, to his own use, advantage and benefit'.7
Massey, therefore, had finally gained possession of a
landed estate. This satisfied a long-standing ambition. But
Winter's property was in no condition to yield an immediate
income. In May 1644, Massey himself had burnt down three of the
surrounding iron mills to prevent their use by the Royalist
(1) Bodi., Tanner Ms.60(1), f.128b.
(2) Ibid; ff.132b-33.
(3) GRO, B 3/2, f.327.
(4) Dorney, pp.7-8.
(5) BL, Add.Mss.18,982, f.50b; Warburton, iii.79.




forces.1 Much of the rest was destroyed by Sir John when he
abandoned it, and Rupert's army fired yet more forest iron mills
as it withdrew from Gloucestershire in April 1645.2 Still, the
Conmons also agreed to compensate Massey for his personal losses
at Ledbury. A lump sum of £200 in cash was to be sent, with a
letter of thanks.3 An ordinance was also passed to secure for
Massey a regular income of £1,000. This seems to indicate that an
earlier and similar decision had not been implemented.4 Neither,
apparently, had an ordinance to bestow £2,000 per annum from
Winter's estates.5
By early May, both Rupert and Maurice had advanced towards
Oxford to lift Cromwell's token siege of the Royal capital.6
Massey pursued the Princes, though neither he nor Cromwell could
prevent the King from joining them for the suniner campaign.7 Some
Royalists speculated that Cromwell and Massey would initiate
combined operations in the Oxford area.8
In the midst of these developments Massey was distracted by
dramatic news from London. As early as 1 May it was rtznoured that
he was about to be made Couunissionary General of horse in the New
(1) BC, p.329; E 50(17); E 281(5): The Moderate Intelligencer,
no.9, April 24-May 1, pp.65-6.
(2) E 279(11): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, no.97, April
22-9, p.778.
(3) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.382; CJ, iv.128.
(4) CJ, iii.512; iv.128; E 282(3): The Weekly Account, no.18,
April 30-May, May 3.
(5) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, ff.300,382.
(6) Ibid, f.382b; Corbet, p.l46; Sprigge, p.14.
(7) Warborton, iii.81; Dugdale, p.79; BL, Add.Mss.37,343,
f.382b.
(8) BL, Add.Mss.18,982, f.55; Bodl., Firth Mss.C7, f.326.
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Model under Cromwell.1 His continuing bad relations with the
County Coninittee, it was openly admitted, necessitated a change of
conuiand. Edward Cooke was seen as a potential replacement at
Gloucester. It was thought that the Gloucester Corrinittee could
'better harmonise' with a man of local standing and interests.2
On 5 May it was decided at Westminster that Massey should
become Major General of the Western Association.3 It is clear that
the Corrinittee for the West was instriinental in this appointment.4
Massey's record of almost uninterrupted success at Gloucester
impressed many at Westminster and in the Parliamentary high
conmand. No-one could be sure he would accept the post, even
though it involved prornotion.5 For the Western Association by now
meant very little. The areas of Parliamentarian control in the
western peninsular had been virtually wiped out in 1643 and
Essex's campaign of 1644 to reverse this situation had been a
complete disaster. Parliament retained no field force in the West.
It hung on in garrisons, of which the two most important, Plymouth
and Taunton, were closely besieged by the Royalists.6
On 7 May the King left Oxford with his army, arriving in
Stow the next day. Rupert and the other Royalist forces fanned out
into eastern Gloucestershire.7 This sudden burst of activity
prevented the hoped for combined operations between Massey and
Cromwell around Oxford. The eastern hundreds of Gloucestershire
(1) E 282(10): The Moderate Intelligencer, no.10, May 1-8, p.74.
(2) Ibid.
(3) SF, 21/8, f.230; E 282(7) Mercurius Civicus, no.102, May 1-
8, p.915.
(4) Corbet, p.l49; SF, 21/8, f.230.
(5) SP, 21/20, f.189.
(6) J.Sprigge, Anglia Rediviva (1854), xi-xiii; U, vii.350.
(7) BL, Harleian Mss.911, ff.6-7; Bodi., Firth Mss.C8, f.27;
Dugdale, p.79; Walker, p.l25.
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again suffered at the hands of the King's rampaging troops.1 Small
parties of Royalists were involved in skirmishes with Massey's
forces near Carnpden house.2 On his march to Evesham on 9 May,
charles ordered Colonel Henry Bard to abandon the mansion at
Cainpden so that his regiment could be added to the Royal field
army. Bard complied and fired the great house to deny Massey its
use.3 It would have made an excellent staging post between Warwick
and Gloucester.
On 9 May, thke wrote to Massey congratulating him on his
appointment to the ccxrinand of the Western Association.4 The
reasons for his acceptance of the post must remain open to
speculation. Corbet claimed that Massey was undecided at first.5
Contemporaries also doubted whether such a highly successful
Governor would care to confront the daunting problems of the
western coninand, and the still powerful enemy forces in the
region.6 But as a professional soldier, Massey must have found the
idea of promotion to Major General very hard to resist. In
addition, perhaps crucially, his relations with the local
Coninittee had began to deteriorate again.7 The Royalist forces had
withirawn and Gloucestershire relatively secure: once more the
balance of power between the civilian and military personnel
shifted towards the former. In the West, by contrast, Parliament
was faced with a campaign of reconquest: military comanders might
reasonably expect a free hand.
(1) E 282(12): The Scottish Dove, no.81, May 2-9, p.EAO; E
282(14): Mercurius Veridicus, no.4, May 3-10, p.28.
(2) Ibid; E 284(5): The Weekly Account, no.19, May 7-14.
(3) Clarendon, iv.37-8; Walker, p.126; BL, Harleian Mss.911,
f.7b.
(4) BL, Egerton Mss.3514, f.80.
(5) Corbet, p.149.
(6) SP, 21/20, ff.189-90.
(7) Bodi., Nalson Mss.5(107), f.243.
-177-
Chapter 6
By the 9th it was widely known in the Comons that Massey
was to be placed in cocrmand of the five South western counties.1
But the Conon Council of Gloucester iirrnediately decided that a
petition should be sent to the Parliament asking for Massey's
continuance as Governor there.2 One newsheet perhaps voiced
Massey's own motives for leaving. 'It is a pity he should only
remain a Governor in a particular garrison, who had rather meet
with the enemy in the field, than converse with the Coninittees in
towns' .3
By mid-1645, Massey was indisputably Parliament's most
successful coninander in the entire western region. Indeed, given
that Waller was now prevented by the Self Denying Ordinance from
holding coninand, he was its only successful corrinander. Massey had
proved at Gloucester that he was capable of securing widely
scattered garrisons with a relatively small marching brigade. This
was exactly what was required by the Parliamentary forces in the
western peninsular.
Massey began to give some thought as to who should succeed
him as Governor, and reconmended Colonel Burrow to Lenthall.4 He
also warned the Speaker that there was to be a petition presented
against him in the Conmons. This was probably in response to the
pro-Massey petition forwarded by the Gloucester corporation.
Massey related that although the new petition was to be presented
in the name of the county corrinittee only two of its members, Kyrle
and Shepard, had been instrumental in its compilation.5
(1) BL, Add.Mss.18,780, f.18b.
(2) GRO, B 3/2, f.327; E 282(14): Mercurius Verdicus, no.4, May
3-10, p.32.
(3) E 284(21): Mercurius Britanicus, no.83, May 12-19, p.759.




On 16 May, the Coamons began to consider an ordinance
granting to Massey comiand of all the 'forces of horse and foot,
raised, or to be raised, for the western association'.l The
Comittee of the West and the Gloucestershire County Coriinittee
were asked to consider how Massey's new appointment 'may not
intrench upon any power given to Sir Thomas Fairfax'.2 In the
midst of these proceedings, the competing factions on the
Gloucester Coirinittee introduced into the Comons the pro and anti
Massey petitions. But both of these dociiients were ignored and
the house pressed on with its original plan to send Massey into
the West.3 It seems certain that the ordinance confirming Massey
as Major General of the West was not passed inuiediately because an
amendment was needed stipulating his subordination to Fairfax.4
In the centralised New Model, the supreme comander could have no
equal.
With the removal of the King's field army Massey was joined
at Tewkesbury by Major Buller and the disgruntled remnants of
Essex's disbanded cavalry.5 With Gloucester now relatively secure
Massey and Buller rode on to the Cotswold escarpment at Broadway,
towards the northern boundary of Oxfordshire. There they met with
Lieutenant General Cromwell who had been helping to contain the
Royalist capital's garrison as Fairfax approached from the South.6
(1) CJ, iv.11i5; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.210b; E 284(19): The True
Informer, no.4, May 10-17, p.30.
(2) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.384b; CJ, iv.145.
(3) BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.210; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.384b; CJ,
iv. 145-6.
(4) E 284(19): The True Informer, no.4, May 10-17, p.30.
(5) E 284(22): The Parliament Scout, no.2, May 13-20, p.8;
Corbet, p.147.
(6) E 284(23): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, no.100, May
13-20, p.805; E 284(22), p.8.
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Massey's natural concern for his principal garrison, however, led
him to retreat towards the line of the Severn.1
The Ccxmiittee of Both Kingdoms was still keen that Massey
should be active in the Gloucester area. It encouraged him to take
the strategically situated Royalist garrison on the Avon at
Evesham,2 which was vulnerable because many of its defenders had
been drawn off into the King's field arrny.3
On May 23 the ordinance confirming Massey as corrinander-in-
chief of the West was passed in the Coninons.4 He was to corirnand
the meagre existing forces of the five South western counties,
including Weldon's and Graves's New Model brigade, based at
Taunton,5 in addition to all other troops which Parliament might
send as reinforcements.6 The new corrmander's authority was a
little restricted: he was bound to obey instructions issuing from
the Parliament or the Coninittee of Both Kingdoms, and he was not
empowered to replace Governors without the consent of the Western
Coainittee.7 Massey was urged by both houses to take up his new
cofrinand with 'all convenient speed' .8
He was expected however to treat Fairfax as his superior
even within the boundaries of his association.9 This provision
hardly seemed to compromise Massey's new found authority within
the five counties, since Sir Thomas had more pressing business
(1) BL, Egerton Mss.3514, f.22; E 284(23), p.805.
(2) SP, 21/8, f.266.
(3) Ibid; SP, 21/20, f.251; Hutton, pp.173,178.
(4) CJ, iv.152-3; U, vii.389,393.
(5) SP, 21/8, f.230; SP, 21/20, f.189.






elsewhere, and would probably be entangled with it for some time.
The new Major General's powers were compared to those of his
nominal superior. Hopes were expressed that he might soon be able
to reduce most of the King's western garrisons.1
Meanwnile, on 26 May, Massey stormed the town of Evesham.2
Its capture imperilled Royalist coarnunications between Oxford and
Worcester and provided for the exiled Parliamentary County
Coninittee a Worcestershire base from which to operate.3 The
Connittee of Both Kingdoms was quick to congratulate Massey for
implementing its suggestion with such spectacular success. But it
was also concerned about the security of the Eastern Association
now that the Royal army was on the march. It ordered Massey to
Burford, to which Fairfax had just been recalled from the West.4
Before leaving for Oxfordshire, Massey returned for the last
time to Gloucester, to settle his principal garrisori.5 There was
some discontent there because some of the garrison were 'generally
desirous' to accompany their old cociiander westwards.6 On the 29th
the civic representatives of the city penned yet another protest
but this time they addressed it to the Coninon Council of the city
of London. In it Uike, Brewster, Wise, Webb, Singleton and other
(1) BL, Egerton Ms.3514, f.61.
(2) Corbet, p.147; E 286(14) A True Relation...of the Taking...
of Evesham, May 31; Walker, p.126.
(3) Bodi. Nalson Ms.5(109), f.248; BL, Harleian Ms.166, f.166;
BL, Pdd.Ms.31,116, f.212b; BL, Add.Ms.37,343, f.386; BL,
Egerton Ms.786, f.35; Corbet, p.l48; Clarendon, iv.38;
Walker, p.l26.
(4) SP, 21/20, f.288.
(5) E 286(20) The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, no.102, May 27-
June 3, p.820.




Gloucesterst-iire worthies exclaimed that their hearts were sore
with 'grief for the removal of Colonel Massey from us whose
endeavours amongst us God bath so wonderfully prospered'.l
By early June the Coninittee of Both Kingdoms had changed its
priorities once more, and it became anxious that Massey should
return iirinediately to the West.2 The ex-Governor was allowed to
take his newly constituted horse regiment, now incorporating
Buller's troopers, to assist him in his new responsibilities.3 The
imediate reason for the change of plan was was the increasingly
sorry plight of Weldon's New tbdel brigade at Taunton.4 The Major
General of the West, like Fairfax after the storming of Leicester,
was suddenly free to dispose of his forces as he thought fit.5 But
it is clear that Massey thought the forces available in Gloucester
insufficient to make any impression against Goring's army. Above
all, he lacked the numerous foot and dragoons essential to engage
Goring on equal terms.6 Massey therefore pleaded for more
reinforcements, and for the authority to recruit more nen.7
On 7 June the Coninons admitted several London aldermen from
the Guildhall, who brought to the house's attention a letter sent
them by the Gloucester corporation, expressing apprehension at
Massey's departure.8 But the delegation was merely assured that
(1) Bodi. Nalson Mss.4(4), f.1O.
(2) SF, 21/8, f.298; CJ, iv.159.
(3) Ibid, f.298-9; CJ, iv.159.
(4) BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.214b; CJ, iv.159.
(5) SF, 21/8, f.306; SP, 21/20, f.332.
(6) E 288(2): The Weekly Account, Week 23, June 4-11, June 4.
(7) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.387b.
(8) CJ, iv.168; BL, Add.Mss.18,780, f.31.
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Gloucester's security and future military Government had been
secured. 1 The same day the city of London was asked to supply
troops for Massey's expedition to Taunton.2 The Parliamentary
leadership did not seriously consider complying with the
Gloucester corporation's request. Massey's own determination to
leave his old coninand had seen to that.3
The extent of support, both in the city and county, for
Massey's continued presence at Gloucester reflected the respect in
which he was generally held.4 Corbet declared that the anti-Massey
petition was only supported by a small faction on the County
Coniiittee.5 This is confirmed elsewhere and by Massey himself. The
Gloucester corporation complained to the Comons of the 'sinister
ends' of this clique.6 Massey's most uncompromising opponents
such as Bromwich, Shepard, Pury and Edward Stephens, although
champions of local civilian rule against military Government, were
also vociferous members of the emerging Parliamentary Independent
faction at Westminster. Aware of his political and religious
indifference, they constantly attempted to undermine Massey's
authority.
So Massey's unexpectedly long and eventful tenure at
Gloucester came to an end. His experiences there had opened a
rift with the more extreme Parliamentarians which future events
in the West were to widen. Massey's estrangement from the men of
extreme principle was perhaps inevitable. His own stance had never
been governed by firm convictions on the great political questions
of sovereignty between King and Parliament.
(1) Corbet, p.151; C.J, iv.167; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.387.
(2) CJ, iv.168.
(3) Corbet, pp.151-2.
(4) Ibid; Washbourne, p.107.
(5) Corbet, p.151.
(6) E 286(11): The Scottish Dove, no.84, May 23-30, p.66O;
Bodi., Nalson Mss.5 (107), f.243.
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ThE WESTERN BRIGADE, JUNE 1645-OGfl)BER 1646.
In the spring of 1645, the Parliament reappraised the forces
to be allocated to the western theatre of operations. Here, its
provincial forces were least satisfactorily organised. The result
was the Western Brigade.
As Governor of Gloucester, Massey had always opposed the
very idea of New Modelling. He foresaw that the creation of a
single army would lead to the centralisation of the Parliament's
war effort. As a result, isolated provincial forces, such as his
own brigade at Gloucester, would be yet more susceptible than
before to the problems of ill-provision which had exacerbated its
recent sufferings .1
The great bulk of Massey's newly acquired cavalry had
already been deployed in the West without him. Cooke's, Popham's,
Fitz-James 's and the Plymouth regiments had been placed under the
temporary corrinand of Colonel Graves, of the New Model, around
Taunton.2 After the fall of Evesham the new Major General of the
West did not ininediately join these troops, as some had hoped.3 He
was determined to secure the necessary financial support for his
military establishment. Samuel Dike hoped that he would 'do like
the wise builder, cast up the charge of your fabric before you
undertake it'.4 But Massey was also concerned that only horse
regiments had so far been assigned to him. He would need foot and
dragoons if he was to make any headway against Goring.5
(1) SP, 21/17, ff.130-34.
(2) Sprigge, p.16.
(3) E 286(20), p.820.
(4) BL, Egerton Ms.3514, f.79.




Despite assurances of financial support from the Corrmons
Massey travelled to London on his own initiative.1 He took
lodgings at the sign of the George in King Street, Westminster,
and from here issued an unusual broadsheet, inviting all officers
prepared to serve under him to present themselves at the George
for interview.2
London at this time was full of reformado officers
displaced from the armies of Essex, Wailer and Manchester. Fairfax
had sent to the Corrinittee of Both Kingdoms a list of officers he
did not intend to employ, and the list was forwarded to the
Corrinittee of the West so that it could choose from it officers to
serve under Massey.3 Those listed, therefore, had all been
recently refused positions in the New Model. Many may have felt
deeply huniliated by such treatment, and as a result, harboured a
grudge against the new army. Whole troops of unemployed
reformados were raised.4 Massey must have shared the doubts of his
newly recruited officers, especially when he realised how
inadequate was his new military establishment.
It is probable that while he was in London, Massey made a
special effort to recruit reforinados and officers with West
country connections. Former officers of Wailer's army would have
been especially useful. There were a great many of them with
little else to do.5
(1) CJ, iv.165; E 262(4): A Perfect Diurnall, no.97, June 2-9,
pp. 768-9,773.
(2) E 289(13): Untitled Broadsheet, June 26.
(3) Bodi., Tanner Mss.60, f.73.
(4) E 288(32): The Exchange Intelligencer, no.5, June 11-18,
pp.34-5.
(5) SP, 21/8, ff.11-12.
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Eventually, on 19 June, Massey left London to embark upon
his western carnpaign.1 Once underway his advance was extremely
rapid. By 25 June, he had arrived at Broad Chalke just South West
of Salisbury. The next day he met with Colonel Popham's forces
from Romsey on the downs near Cranborne. Massey then proceeded
towards Blandford in Dorset.2
On the 26th, the Corrnittee of Both Kingdoms informed Fairfax
that Massey was marching westwards with 2,200 horse and dragoons.
It also hinted that if Sir Thomas thought fit to march westward
in Massey's support the Parliament would not disapprove.3 Massey
must nave been aware of the comprehensive nature of the New
Model's triumph at Naseby. He may only have embarked upon his
western campaign in the hope of substantial reinforcements from
Fairf ax. Massey wrote to the Comander in chief of the New Model,
with the information that his forces were insufficient to relieve
Taunton.4 Such a letter must have profoundly influenced Fairfax in
the direction of sending reinforcements, and may well have been
designed to do so.5
This suggests that the independence of Massey's coninand was
already compromised. It was clearly specified in the ordinance
creating Massey Major General of the West, that if Sir Thomas and
his forces attached themselves to the Western Association he was
to treat Fairfax as his superior off icer.6 Fairfax was not
granted direct coninand of the Western Brigade, bit could coninand
it indirectly, through Massey, because of his higher rank. This
ambiguous and unsatisfactory	 arrangement was especially
(1) E 288(46): The True Informer, no.9, June 14-21, p.61.
(2) Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, f.301.
(3) SP, 21/21, ff.36-7.
(4) OPH, xiii.517.





troublesome because Massey nad become accustomed to military
independence at Gloucester, where interference from leading
Parliamentary Generals was rare and usually short lived, lie was
'naturally jealous of honour', noted Corbet.1
Unlike the Western Brigade, the New Model was certainly
allocated state resources from a monthly contribution derived from
all the counties under the Parliament's undisputed control. Money
was shipped from Portsmouth to Lyrne for Sir Thomas's army though
none was sent from the Parliament's central treasuries to Massey.2
The western regiments were expected to raise revenue within their
own association, but the New Model, for the moment, was being
regularly paid out of the nationally raised revenues which had
been specifically set aside for it.3 Fairfax himself called upon
the authorities in London to supply Massey with adequate amounts
of money so that his troopers could also pay for their quarters
amongst the country people.4
The link-up between Massey's and Fairfax's forces East of
Blandford in early July made possible the relief of Taunton.5
Massey's horse and dragoons seem to have been regarded by the
Parliamentarian leaders as reinforcements for Fairfax rather than
vita versa.6 As the Major General of the West soon noted, New
Model troops were paid more regularly than his own. Fearing the
discontent that this could cause Massey called for an end to such
anomalies .7
(1) Corbet, p.96.
(2) SP, 21/21, ff.57-8.
(3) M.A.Kishlansky, The Rise of the New Model Army (1979), pp.67-
8.
(4) OPH, xiv.12.
(5) BL, Add.Mss.18,780, f.63; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.396; Bodi.,
Firth Mss.C8, f.301; Bodl., Nalson Mss.4(8), f.18.
(6) BL, Add.Mss.31,116,	 f.217; E 292(3): The Moderate
Intelligencer, June 26-July 3, July 1.
(7) BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.234.
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The Western Brigade was reinforced by horse and dragoons
from the New Model and with this mixed force Massey inflicted a
decisive defeat on a large detaclinent of Coring's horse at Isle
Moor.1 This paved the way for an easy victory at Langport for
Fairfax's forces on the following day.2 Massey suspected, once
more, that his regiment's contribution to the campaign in the West
was not being properly acknowledged in London .3
The imediate problem confronting Fairfax and Massey after
Langport was the seizure of the Royalist stronghold of
Bridgwater.4 Massey was accused of not doing his best to bring
about the reduction of that town.5 But Massey had actually been
ordered by Fairfax himself to stand down from offensive action.6
Nevertheless, such rumours of his incompetence soon gained
credence in London and found their way into Whitelocke's
memorials.7 One news-sheet hinted at poisoned relations between
the Parliamentarian high coninands. 'Colonel Massey, for his better
accomodation &c made Governor of Bridgwater. And to speak the
truth he had need to be accomodated, and Colonel Cooke ... but no
more of that'.8
The Royalists were only too well aware of such divisions. In
a letter to Lord Digby Anthony Langs ton claimed to have seen a
captured dispatch, addressed to a close friend by the Major
(1) Sprigge, pp.70-i; Bodl., Firth Mss.C8, f.301b; Clarendon,
iv.62; Rushworth, vi.55.
(2) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 251(1931), f.44; Warburton, iii.137;
BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.239b; Vicars, pp.68-9.
(3) Rushworth, vii.766; D.Holles, Memoirs of Denzil Lord Holles,
(1696), p.70.
(4) R.Bell, ed. Memorials of the Civil War: Comprising the
Correspondence of the Fairfax Family (1849), i.239.
(5) E 293(34): A Further Relation From Bridgwater; E 262(33): A
Perfect Diurnall, no.104, July 21-28, p.828.
(6) Sprigge, p.79; Rushworth, vi.57.
(7) BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.408.
(8) E 295(7): The Moderate Intelligencer, July 31-Aug 7.
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General of the West, in which Massey complained that he was 'ill-
used that he was at Bridgwater, that he had but 2,000 horse and
few foot, that he was offered any conditions that he would be of
the Independent faction, which he professeth to oppose' .1 It seems
that political arid religious differences had combined with tension
between rival military jurisdictions, to estrange further
relations between the two forces officers.
After the fall of Bridgwater, the New Model marched
eastward, taking the key Royalist garrisons of Sherborne, Bath and
Bristol. Massey's brigade was successfully deployed in Somerset to
prevent Goring breaking out of the western peninsula.2 These
successes did not, however, ameliorate Massey's sense of ill-usage
at the hands of his own side. On 9 August, from Lyme Regis, he
wrote to the Parliament about his troubled state of mind, calling
for a 'speedy determination' of his rights concerning the Winter
properties in the Forest of Dean.3 But Massey also told of the
'great evil of the unequal payments of the soldiers'.4 Above all,
he was frustrated at the lack of military action now the New Model
had been wittvirawri to the East.
The Western Brigade's strength had already been reduced to
some 2,000 horse.5 Massey complained that he was not 'found so
useful' by 'the great army ... though western parts do need us'.6
He had been forced to recognise the relative weakness of his
brigade, and its dependence upon an army whose strategic
priorities were very different from his own. If the Western
Brigade was financially worse off than the New Model, it had an
advantage over Fairfax in that its officer corps consisted of
(1) SP, 16/510, f.230.
(2) Bell, i.248; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, ff.409-10; E 262(37): A
Perfect Diurnall, no.105, July 28-Aug 4, pp.834,836.
(3) Bodi., Nalson Mss.4(25), 1.52.
(4) Ibid.
(5) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.5.
(6) Bodl., Nalson Mss.4(25), f.52.
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men well known and well respected locally. It seems that the
Popnam brothers, especially Alexander, were active in building
close links between the brigade and the local club rnovements.1
Massey, meanwhile, was quartered near the borders of West
Somerset and East Devon, a terrain of enclosed fields unsuitable
for his mounted brigade. He felt keenly his lack of foot and
dragoons.2 According to Humphrey Willis, the leader of the mid-
Somerset club men, Massey frankly admitted that the assistance he
received from such civilian auxiliaries was invaluable.3 He was
certainly wary of the still formidable military power of the
Royalists in the peninsulas. On 30 August, Massey reported from
Bridgwater to Speaker Lenthall, an ominous concentration of
Goring's troops in East Devon around Exeter. He complained that
his various proposals for preventing such a dangerous situation
had been inadvisedly 'rejected'.4 This was part of a larger
pattern in which the region's needs imediate were being neglected
by the New Model. The Comons was soon informed of Massey's
forthright views.5
In his efforts to secure reinforcements from Fairfax, Massey
cleverly manipulated London's popular press.6 He must soon have
realised that his anxieties were still not being taken seriously
at Westminster, and therefore issued a public plea to the Coninons
(1) SP, 16/511, f.39; SP, 21/22, f.31.
(2) Bad].., Nalson Mss.4(78), f.164.
(3) E 345(3): The Power of the Conuiittee of ... Somerset, July
18.
(4) HMC, 13 Report (1-2), p.262.
(5) CJ, iv.261; BL, Harleian Mss.166, f.257.




'that by a timely order to the General that he may not be wholly
engaged with the army in other parts but may advance westward if
the honourable house shall think fit'.l Such a public appeal for a
revised strategy could hardly have pleased Fairfax or his staff.
After the fall of Bristol, Sir Thomas did dispatch some
reinforcements to Massey,2 though this did not placate him. Massey
declared that his desire for a speedy end to the war could not be
achieved 'so long as we suffer a marching army to act its own
desires without impeachrnent'.3 Massey may well have suspected that
he and tlis men had been exposed for so long to the danger of
annihilation by a Royalist counter attack because of the
political, religious and personal differences between himself and
the coninand of the New Model. Waller had had similar suspicions
when similarly endangered during the spring of 1645.4
Massey's achievement had been great, if unspectacular. He
had prevented the advance of Goring towards Bristol with a horse
brigade less than a quarter of the strength of the western
Royalists. He had also cultivated close and fruitful relations
with the various club movements in Devon and Somerset. Assisted by
divisions among the western Royalists, he had been able to
consolidate his position in the borderlands of those counties.
While Sir Thomas began to invest Exeter, Massey was
dispatched North to take the town of Tiverton.5 The Major
General's cavalry and Weldon's New Model foot were fortunate
(1) Bodl., Nalson Mss.4(78), f.164.
(2) E 302(9): The True Informer, Sept 14-20, Sept 19; E 301(7):
The Weekly Account, Sept 11-17, Sept 13.
(3) Bodi., Nalson Mss.4(78), f.164.
(4) Sir.W.Waller, Vindication of the Character and Conduct of Sir
William Wailer, Knight, Written by Himself (1797), p.18.
(5) E 306(1): The Taking of Tiverton...; OPH, xiv.91;




in their successful seizure of Tiverton castle.1 But, as usual, in
London, Fairfax and his army received all the glory.2
Both sides began to settle down into their winter quarters.
But soon, a new crisis of confidence broke out within the
Parliamentarian high ccxrrnand. In mid-November Massey wrote from
Tiverton to a friend in London, regretting that his 'Ixisiness' in
the capital was 'much retarded', and that he had not 'obtained
that happy issue' which he had been led to expect.3 In a mood of
growing of hopelessness and isolation, Massey eventually left for
London.
The proximate cause of his departure was the issue of the
Governorship of Bristol. This was offered to Major General
Skippon, Fairfax's coniiiander of foot, as a reward for his role in
the capture of Bristol, which had been effected entirely by New
Model troops.4 In the euphoria of victory it was overlooked that
the city was technically under Massey's conmand.5 This was only
realised after Skippon had taken up his new coninand.6 Massey,
therefore, had suddenly been robbed of the most prestigious
Governorship in the West, and had not even been consulted about
its fate. But perhaps what angered him most was the fact that
Skippon was also to be granted an independent military and
financial establishment within the Western Associatiori.7
(1) Bodi., Nalson Mss.4(131), f.271; Sprigge, p.155; OPH,
xiv.91-2; Rushworth, vi.94-5; Vicars, p.69.
(2) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.239; BL, Add.Mss.18,780, f.148b.
(3) E 311(12): A Copy of a Letter From Major General Massey.
(4) CJ, iv.319.
(5) A&0, i.489.




This arrangement, designed to enable Skippon to finance his
new garrison, was to syphon off resources badly needed for
Massey's brigade. But it seems that attempts were made in the
Lords to secure for Massey the Governorship of Bristol, even
before his arrival in the capital,1 though the ordinance
confirming Skippon as Governor was passed while he was still bound
for London. 2 By mid-December Massey had reached the capital,
although there were some doubts as to his whereabouts.3 Popular
newspapers openly supported the stated objective of his visit - to
secure the supply of his forces.4
Massey could also count on allies in the Lords, who objected
to the way that his rights with regard to the city of Bristol had
been pushed aside.5 In the following weeks the pro-Massey lobby in
the Lords devised an ambitious plan for the virtual reconstruction
of the Western Brigade. Doubtless Massey was consulted about these
proposals, which involved such a large scale expansion as to
convert the brigade into an army, a counterweight to the New
Model. Five new infantry regiments, each 1,200 strong were to be
raised, and other plans were made for the recruitment of dragoons
and the formation of a powerful artillery train.6 There were many
who had become apprehensive about the indispensability of the New
Model within the Parliamentarian war effort.7 Massey's continued
advocacy of decentralisation (as at Gloucester), fitted well with
the politics of the Presbyterian faction which was becoming
increasingly dubious about the New Model's Independent sympathies.
(1) E 311(10): The True Informer, Nov 30-Dec 6, Dec 2.
(2) A&0, i.811; U, viii.23.
(3) ORN, iv. 352: Mercurius Academius, Dec 22-7, 1645; E
311(30): The Kingdoms Scout, Dec 9-16.






In the capital, Massey did not lack personal friends and
contacts upon whom he could call for assistance. Two of his
brothers, Robert and Jonathan, were citizens of London.1 Both were
merchants, with links to the city's civic and comercial
institutions.2 On 20 January 1646, the leather sellers of the
city invited Massey to a ceremonial dinner, at which they
admitted him to full membership of their company.3 The bestowal of
such an honour upon the former runaway apprentice told of Massey's
continuing popularity in London, where his defence of Gloucester
had been seen as the capital's salvation in 1643. And it was the
London trained bands which had made possible the relief of his
garrison. This mutual bond of obligation was to be vitaUy
important in the future.
Despite Massey's early cultivation of various city interests
there was not the remotest chance of the new western military
establishment being approved by the Coninons. The Royalists had all
but been cleared from the peninsula/.4 This created an opportunity
for the various Parliamentary forces to be deployed elsewhere. The
remaining military presence in the West were required only for
security purposes and could be reduced.5 Hence the Comons
referred the expansionist plans for the brigade back to the
Corrinittee of the West.6 The Lower House was able to point to
provisions relating to the raising of new regiments for the
Western Brigade in which the Lords had impinged upon their
exclusive, and jealously guarded, right to table bills
(1) Ormerod, ii.399; BL, Stow Mss.190, f.31; E 23(18), p.5.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Gentlemans Magazine, (1833) Pt.2, ciii.304-5.
(4) Sprigge, pp.226-30; BL, Add.tlss.31,116, ff.258b,259-60; BL,
Add.Mss.37,344, f.44.
(5) Lady.E.Drake, The Family and Heirs of Sir Francis Drake
(1911), i.350.
(6) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.258b.
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concerning the raising of revenue.1 Massey was unable to win the
breadth of support in the Cocrnons necessary to advance the troop
and revenue raising proposals; his allies did not extend beyond a
small group in the Lords and some members of the Cocmrruittee of the
West.2 His failure to win the majority on the latter may have had
to do with the stance of its chairman, Edmund Prideaux NP.
Prideaux was an inflexible member of the emerging Independent
faction, by now closely associated with the New Model.3 Anyway,
the efforts of Massey and his supporters to create a new framework
for the Western Brigade had received a severe, and as it proved,
permanent set back.
Meanwhile Massey's ramshackle collection of horse regiments
had come under the overall control of Fairfax's high coninand, and
now functioned as an auxiliary cavalry brigade assigned to the New
Model. Even the flagging Royalist propaganda machine noted
Massey's continuing absence from his forces and their diminishing
strength.4 No doubt he had intended to return to the West at the
beginning of the new campaigning season. But Massey's London
activities necessitated a more protracted absence. The lack of his
energy, prestige and self importance accelerated the decline of
the brigade's strength and its capacity to assert its independence
from the New Model. Thus, it was said of Colonel Cooke, Massey's
(1) CJ, iv.467; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.43.
(2) E 506(15): A Perfect Diurnall, no.136, March 2-9, p.lO93;
BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.43.
(3) D.Underdown, Prides Purge (1985), p.69; Keeler, pp.315-6.
(4) URN, iv.437, Mercurius Academicus, Feb 23-8, 1646.
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second in conrnand, that he 'always readily and punctually observed
riis orders' from Fairfax.1 Massey's prolonged absence inspired the
popular press to rename his brigade 'Colonel Cooke's' .2 But the
Major General of the West chose to remain in London, at St
Lawrence's lane.3
In the meantime Massey's troopers became increasingly
undisciplined. Rumours of impending payments from London for the
brigade's regiments had proved unfounded.4 Exasperated, some
troopers began to demonstrate their contempt for Fairfax's
authority. On 21 March Parliament ordered the Coinittee of the
West to investigate an incident in which soldiers of Colonel Fitz-
James's regiment 'robbed and offered other great outrages and
violence to, diverse persons in the company of Mr Peters, who had
the Generals passport for their quiet and safe passage' .5 In early
March 1646 Fitz-James described frankly to Massey the
deteriorating condition of the brigade. 'Your ragged, poor, yet
faithful officers and soldiers expect you', he wrote 'they must
have either your own self, or money speedily, or their hearts will
break. Truly sir I never saw such dejected spirits in my life' .6
(1) Sprigge, p.l94.
(2) E 322(25): The True Informer, Feb 7-14; E 322(36): A Diary,
or an Exact Journal, Feb 12-18.
(3) BL, Microfilm 330, Ainwick Mss.547, f.35.
(4) Ibid, f.26b.
(5) CJ, iv.483.
(6) BL, Microfilm 330, Ainwick Mss.547, ff.20-20b.
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In London a day of thanksgiving was announced for the
Parliament's decisive triunph in the West. The city corporation
soon became involved in its organisation.1 It was duly held on 2
April, when the two houses, the Scottish Coaiissioners, the Lord
Mayor, and the Coninon Council attended service at Christ Qiurch.
Afterwards they attended a banquet at Grocers' Hall. Massey was a
prominent guest at these proceedings in his capacity as Major
General of the West.2
Despite Massey's continuing presence in the capital the
political climate had turned against his brigade. The Connons
asked the Coninittee of the West 'whether any forces, and if any
what forces for the field are fit to be kept in the West'.3 The
House was also careful to stress that the western military
establishment had to be reassessed with 'regard to the public
charge'.4 It was inevitable, given the absence of any Royalist
field army which might justify a large military establishment,
that Parliament would seek reductions.5 On 24 April it was agreed
in the Cournons that 'upon the reducement of the western counties
a standing body, consisting of horse or foot, shall not be
kept in the Western Association'.6 Massey's troops, months in
arrears, were to receive only six weeks pay in settlement.
It was now easy for Massey to interpret the Coninons earlier
refusal to vote an adequate supply for his brigade as a part of an
Independent plan first to deny it the means to subsist and then
to do away with it altogether. The financial terms were derisory.
(1) CLRO, Cottinon Council Journal 40, f.175b.
(2) DrWL, Juxon Mss.24*50, f.70; BL, Add.Nlss.31,116, f.263; BL,
Add.Mss.37,344, ff.45b-46.
(3) CJ, iv.467.
(4) Ibid; E 506(15): A Perfect Diurnall, no.136, March 2-9,
p.1093.





But having outflanked the Presbyterian attempt to expand the
brigade, the Independent faction was unwilling to sacrifice the
initiative by conceding larger payments, which would prolong the
existence of a force whose leadership was hostile to them. The
growing need to cut military expenditure helped lend credibility
to this position.
Maanwhile, Massey's brigade had been marched towards Oxford
to help in its encirclernent.1 It seems, however, that the
Royalists, though their position was deteriorating, were able to
inflict some sharp reverses on his forces.2 Such defeats and the
continuing shortage of pay must have sapped the morale of
Massey's men. When, after Oxford had come to terms, Fairfax
ordered the western regiments to Worcester to help blockade that
city, they mutinied and refused to go. One news-sheet reported
'Major General Massey's men will not go out of their association
until their Major General comes to them'.3 Such behaviour shows
that rank and file discipline had crumbled rapidly in the last
months.
It seems that the brigade then set off for home territory; a
string of disorders in Somerset, Dorset, and especially Wiltshire
were attributed to its troops. Fairfax had to dispatch New Model
regiments to Worcester instead.4 The New Model high comiand was
coming to see Massey's brigade as a liability; its sullen and
mutinous attitude was setting a bad example to the rest of the
army.
(1) BL, Add.Mss.18,979, f.225; Bell, i.289; Rushworth, vi.266; E
332(3): The Moderate Intelligencer, April 2-9, April 2.
(2) E 337(18): The Moderate Intelligencer, May 7-14, May 7; E
337(22) Perfect Occurrences, May 9-15, May 9.
(3) E 337(18), May 7.




By early May, the disbandment of the Western Brigade was
being openly discussed in the Comons.1 Massey, who had been
resident in thndon for six months, must have been frustrated with
1-us own political impotence and consequent failure to secure
supplies and support for his brigade. Ekiring this period he began
to become involved in the in-fighting between Presbyterians and
Independents at Westminster, and he may have related such
political and theological differences to the crisis in his
relations with the New Model and to a lesser extent in his
troubled relations with the Gloucester Coninittee.
Massey 's opponents continued to report unfavourably upon his
behaviour to the Parliament. On 1 May, the Coninons was informed
that Massey had tried to persuade members of his mother's family,
the Grosvenors, to delay compounding for the deliquency because
easier terms would soon be available. This accusation was taken so
seriously that the house appointed some of their nunber to
investigate it and 'other nriours of like nature' .2
At about this time, Massey decided to seek election to the
Comons. Theoretically, such a move would, under the terms of the
Self Denying Ordinance, debar him from holding simultaneously any
military conrnand, so its seems reasonable to believe that he had
already concluded that the Western Brigade could not be saved
from disbandment. It is difficult to see why he would otherwise
relinquish a Major Generalship.
Massey's opportunity to enter the political arena in an
official capacity caine with the recruiter election at the small
Wiltshire market town of Wootton Bassett. He owed his seat to the
influence in this pocket borough of the Poole and Hungerford
(1) BL, Add.Ms.37,344, f.50.
(2) BL, Add.Ms.1O,114, f.14b.
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families. Another long established patron in the county was the
volatile Earl of Pembroke.1 All had cause to be thankful to
Massey. During the course of the war such leading civilians came
to be bound up by many mutual favours to top military figures such
as Massey. The Pooles and [-lungerfords had vested interests in
Gloucestershire as well as Wiltshire. Their social and political
influence was most pervasive within a triangle bounded by
Cirencester, Malrnesbury arid Marlborough.2 In Wootton Bassett, at
its centre, the electors reliably returned Parliamentary
candidates nominated by their aristocratic and gentile overlords.3
Massey was elected as NP for Wootton Bassett on 18 June,4
and took his seat in the Coiinons on 9 July.5 Speaker Lenthall was
ordered by the house to thank Massey for his 'great and faithful
service done to this Parliament ... and the whole Kingdom' .6 By
this time, however, the disbandment of his brigade had been under
discussion at Westminster for three months, amidst an ever louder
chorus of complaints at its behaviour. The Corrinons was keen to
persuade Fairfax of the need for disbandment.7 The problem of
indiscipline was well described by one newsheet: 'Major General
(1) D.Underdown, 'Party Recruitment in the Recruiter Elections
1645-48', E{R (1968), p.243; D.Brunton and D.H.Pennington,
Members of the Long Parliament, (1954), p.1.36; Harrison,
pp.14-15; U, vii.19-20.
(2) J.Waylen, Devizes, p.138; J.Waylen, Marlborough, p.157;
Keeler, pp.309-10; D.Brunton and D.H.Pennington, pp.136,138-
39; Williams, Parliamentary History of Gloucester, pp.156-7.
(3) DdJnderdown, ER (1968), p.243.
(4) B.D.Henning, ed., The Coriinons 1660-90 (1983), iii.29.
(5) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.57b; E 511(20): A Perfect Diurnall,
no.154, July 6-13, p.1236.
(6) Cl, iv.610.
(7) E 341(16): The Moderate Intelligencer, June 18-25, June 19.
-201-
Chapter 7
Massey's forces have little to do, nor little to spend'.l
Whitelocke was forced to admit that 'idleness causeth the isolency
of soldiers'.2
There wrere various suggestions as to how the disbandment
should be organised. Parliament wanted the Coninittees of Ireland
and of the West to 'confer together and consider how those
soldiers might be reduced and sent into Ireland' .3 But Fairfax was
reluctant to proceed, because no money had been sent to pay off
Massey's regiments.4 No doubt Fairfax feared the consequences of
attempting to disband the brigade without even a reduction of its
huge arrears: he was well aware of the nunerous outrages already
coninitted by Massey's men.5 Deprived of supply by legal means,
they had 'become their own takers'.6
The forces of law and order did what they could. Massey's
officers held several courts martial in Dorset. Soldiers found
guilty of various crimes were surrendered to the civilian courts
for sentencing and punishment. In late July both officers and
troopers were tried at the local assizes for murder and highway
robbery.7 Other crimes included horse-stealing and conspiracy to
pervert the course of justice. Some, convicted of sacriligeous
language, had their tongues bored.8
(1) E 342(11): The Scottish Dove, June 24-July 1.
(2) BL, kld.Mss.37,344, f.55.
(3) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.274b.
(4) Bodi., Tanner Mss.59(1), f.330.
(5) Ibid.
(6) E 342(11): The Scottish Dove, June 24-July 1.
(7) E 349(18): Truth Discovered From the West..., Aug 8;





Massey was aware of the importance of Fairfax in the process
of his brigade's disbandment. He wrote to the General, expressing
the hope that he could influence Parliament to provide a 'despatch
of some suitable satisfaction and pay for their past service'.l
But the temperamental Massey also enclosed a copy of the
Parliamentary ordinance which had made him Major General of the
West and told Fairfax that his corrinission had yet to be retracted
by the Comnons.2 Clearly he had come to resent the growing
ascendancy of the New Model.
Fairfax forwarded Massey' s correspondence to the Coninons,
which now, on 15 June, resolved that the Coninittee of Ireland
could choose what part of Massey's forces to send across St
Georges Channel. The remainder, however, were to be disbanded.3
1\,o days later the Lords voted down the ConiTlons motion. Rather
impractically, the upper house resolved that an extra 1,500 horse
and 5,000 foot should be raised to undertake the Irish service.4
At this time, the Coninons was determined to disband its
provincial forces, even if its arrears could be only in 'some
measure satisfied' .5 This flowed not only from a desire to save
money, but also from the political balance of forces. With the
coming of peace the Parliamentary coalition created by the war
began to fall apart.6 In an increasingly unstable situation,
Presbyterians and Independents jockeyed for position in the
(1) Bodl., Tanner Mss.59(1), f.292.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid, f.330; CS, iv.577.
(4) U, viii.380.
(5) CJ, iv.577.




Some radical Independents feared that an alliance between
the King, Scots, Presbyterians and the city of London would
exclude them from shaping the coming national settlement in
politics and religion.2 Through the disbandment of provincial land
forces, they sought to increase the dependence of Parliament upon
the New Model which was becoming more sympathetic to them and
their religious belief s.3 Denzil Holles, the emerging Prebyterian
leader, lamented the way in which war heroes like Massey were
treated through the selective reduction of the Parliament's
various brigades and regiments.4
To some Prebyterians in Parliament, Massey's anti-
Independent sentiments were a key reason to try to keep his
brigade in existence.5 Even in July 1646 the Parliament still had
more men under arms in its provincial brigades and garrisons than
in Fairfax's New Model. And there were other corrvnanders, such as
Major General Poyntz of the Northern Brigade, who like Massey, was
sympathetic to the Presbyterian concept of post-war England.6
At the end of July, there occurred a crucial clash between
the two Parliamentary factions over the future composition of the
military establishment in England. Some Presbyterians suggested
that 5,000 New Model soldiers should be sent to Ireland in place
of Massey's regirnents.7 This proposal was only defeated by one
vote in the Corwnons.8 Fears about Scottish intentions were
compounded by their capture of the King, and convinced many MP' s
(1) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, ff.53-3b; OPH, xv.5; Kishlansky, p.lO7.
(2) DrWL, Juxon Mss.24*50, f.87.
(3) R.Baxter, Reliquiae Baxterianae (1696), p.59.
(4) Holles, p.45.
(5) J.Morrill, P&P, (1972), p.54.
(6) Ibid, pp.49-S0.
(7) BL, Add.Mss.10,114, f.16b; Kishlansky, pp.114-S.
(8) CJ, iv.631-2; BL, Add.Mss.10,114, f.16b.
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that Fairfax's army should be kept together until some settlement
was reached.1 It is significant that behind the initiative so
narrowly defeated in the Coninons was the influence of Denzil
Flolles and Sir Philip Stapleton, the principal leaders of the
Presbyterian faction.2 The Independents saw their proposal as an
attempt to break the coherence and unity of the New Model and
disband it piecemeal. They were bound to resist this: the New
Model was fast becoming a bastion of Independency outside
Parliament .3
The failure of the Presbyterians to carry the Coninons meant
that Irish expedition would now be composed of various provincial
forces, rather than the proposed six New Model regiments. Edmund
Ludlow observed that the 'Corrrnonwealth party taking advantage of
the aruients used in the house for the relief of Ireland, and
ease of the people of England, procured an order for the
disbanding of Colonel Massey's brigade'.4 This order was another
blow in the factional battle. Each sides primary aim was to
preserve the strength and cohesion of military units and
corrinanders broadly sympathetic to its own point of view. The use
of force to settle political and religious disputes within the
Parliamentarian camp seemed increasingly possible.5 As early as
June 1646 certain Presbyterians in London were afraid that the New
Model would appear before the capital in support of the political
claims of its Independent allies at Westminster.6
(1) BL, Add.Ms.31,116, ff.279-79b; Ludlow, i.141.
(2) BL, Add.Ms.1O,114, f.16b; DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, f.85.
(3) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, f.85; Ludlow, i.141; Carte, vi.351-2.
(4) Ludlow, i.141.
(5) D.Underdown, Pride's Purge, pp.73-4; J.Morrill, P&P, (1972),
p.72.
(6) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, f.83.
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The Independents were probably assisted by the outrageous
behaviour of Massey's men in the West. The majority of moderate
members, who may have supported the Presbyterian bid to retain the
Western Brigade, must have been horrified by the various reports
concerning such behaviour, and now voted to be rid of Massey's
regiments, by one means or another, as quickly as possib].e.1 If
the Independents' reluctance to vote adequate revenues for the
brigade had been designed to make its long term future untenable
their policy had ultimately worked. Holles accused them of
employing such unscrupulous tactics against the Earl of Essex and
his arrny.2
As early as mid-July the Cofilnittees of the West and of
Ireland had met to decide the fate of Massey's troops after
disbandment. The Irish Coninittee was informed that the western
horse still contained some 2,500 men. Colonel Cooke promised to
supply more accurate figures, both of the total and of those who
were prepared to volunteer for Ireland.3 In Angust the Parliament
designated Bristol and Liverpool as rendezvous and embarkation
points for the brigade. It was, optimistically, hoped that
significant niinbers of cavalry would be ready to embark by 20
August and shipping was made ready.4 But the defiant attitude of
Massey's men was soon to bring about a dramatic change in these
plans, and prefigured the more serious army mutinies among
Fairfax's men eight months later. The New Model was to learn, as
had the Western Brigade, that the Parliament could not force a
large military contingent across the Irish sea if its rank and
file were determined not to go.
(1) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.55.
(2) Holles, p.22.
(3) SP, 63/261, f.166b.
(4) E 350(5): The Scottish Dove, Aug 5-12.
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The demoralised condition of Massey's 'forlorn brigade'
continued into August, his officers doing their utmost to defend
its tarnished reputation.1 Colonel Fitz-James believed that a
deliberate campaign of misinformation was being orchestrated in
London to disaffect and antagonise Massey's regiments yet
further.2
One officer saw the 'scandalous reports' circulated in
London as a means of discrediting the regiment, to 'make them
odious both in the city and country' .3 He reported the troopers
awareness of the factional and political strife which their
brigade, and its conditions of service, had been caught up in.4
The six weeks pay offered were a 'poor pitance for fourteen months
hard service'.5 He was also sure that 'none in this Kingdom ever
received so hard a measure as we have done' .6 Finally he claimed
that the troops were content for the present to be 'kept alive
with such fare as the country grudgingly affords them'.7
Massey began to act as a unofficial recruiter election
campaign manager for the Presbyterians, in the counties where he
possessed prestige and influence. He wrote to prominent
Herefordshire citizens recoainending Colonel Edward Harley as a
knight of the shire and his brother, Major Robert Harley, as the
member for the city of Hereford itself.8 The Harley family were
supporters of the Holles and Stapleton group in the Ccxrinons, they
had also been close associates of Massey during 1644-45. In a
letter to Edward Harley, Massey disclosed his hopes for an
(1) BL, Microfilm 330, Ainwick Mss.547, f.42.
(2) Ibid, ff.42-42b.









agreement between the King and the Parliamentary coiimissioners at
Newcastle.1 1-us concept of a desirable peace settlement was thus
broadly in line with Holles's aims. If the King, Scots and
Presbyterians could settle their differences the Independents
could be effectively excluded from any share of power.2
Massey also informed Edward Harley that certain factions at
Westminster were trying to prevent any agreement with the King and
the Scots. 'But the more faithful to the Kingdom' he wrote, 'hope
still the contrary and diligent men in the house to set things
straight. God direct us to that way which may make most for his
glory and his poor Kingdoms good'.3 It is clear that Massey's
initial indifference to the Parliamentarian cause, his disillusion
with radicalism and centralisation, both at Gloucester, and in
relation to the New Model and the Western Brigade, form a pattern
of which his anti-Independent stance in this period is a
continuation.
By this time, Fairfax too was eager that the Brigade be
disbanded. Certain of Massey's forces, which Fairfax had somehow
managed to get to Worcester ran amock upon the surrender of its
Royalist garrison.4 But Fairfax also received complaints from
other western parts, which he duly passed on to the Parliament.5
This prompted a debate in the Cormnons on 6 August. Massey entered
the chamber himself to defend his long suffering troopers.6 On 25
September Massey's arrears were discussed in the Coninons.7 It was
discovered that he was forced to spend £944-06-02d of his own
(1) BL, Loan 29/175, f.41.
(2) Holles, pp.59,64,6O-72; Kishlansky, pp.l4O-42.
(3) BL, Loan 29/175, f.41.
(4) Bodi. Tanner Mss.59(2), f.444.
(5) GJ, iv.638.
(6) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.279b; BL, Add.Mss.10,114, f.17.




money in sustaining his regiments during the western campaign
alone. The House introduced an ordinance reimbursing its Major
General, with interest, from the excise revenues.1 His substantial
arrears of pay, of course, remained unaltered.
In mid-September, with the death of the Earl of Essex, the
Presbyterians lost their highest coninander and acknowledged leader
in the Lords, and Massey a valuable patron and friend.2 Both Essex
and Massey, according to a recent rumour, were both involved in a
Presbyterian bid for undisputed power. The London Independent,
Thomas Juxon, related that, had the Earl lived a week longer, the
Lords would have attempted to appoint him comander of the New
Model in Fairfax's place. Massey's brigade and other cavalry
detachments sympathetic to the Presbyterian cause, backed by the
Presbyterian London city fathers, would then declare for Essex. In
the face of this coalition, the Army and Parliamentary
Independents would be forced into a negotiated settlement with the
King.3 However ill-founded such gossip, it is clear that Massey
was already becoming identified with an extreme wing of the
Presbyterian faction, prepared to resort to force. He was
certainly to the fore of counter revolutionary initiatives in
1647.
Parliament was anxious, given the mutinous record of
Massey's regiments, to enlist the authority of Fairfax in securing
their peaceful disbandrnent.4 The Coninittee of the West appointed
special coninissioners to help the General in this task,
(1) CJ, iv.675-76; U, viii.507,512; BL, Add.Mss.1O,114, f.19b.
(2) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, ff.88b-89; OPH, xv.97-98; Snow,
pp.487-88.
(3) Ibid, f.92.
(4) E 356(10): The Scottish Dove, Sept 30-Oct 8.
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including Massey himself and Alexander Popham.1 Sir Thomas was
persuaded to dispatch Henry Ireton with two regiments of New Model
horse to assist in the disbandment.2 The coniiiissioners naturally
feared that the meagre offer of six weeks pay and the
recomendation of the Irish service would create trouble.3 A
column of waggons containing £25,000 in minted coin had to be
fitted out ready for the journey westward.4 Massey left Lundon and
met Fairfax and the other coninissioners at Cornlxiry, the Generals
head quarters, in Oxfordshire.5 They then entered Wiltshire, where
the brigade was to be disbanded.6 Devizes was finally selected as
the regiments' rendezvous.7
Colonel Fitz-Jarnes, like many other of Massey's officers,
was bitter at his own treatment and that of his men. He described
his troopers as having been drawn up in the field to 'receive
their doom' .8 Sprigge attributed the fact that violence was
avoided to the 'carefulness and prudence of Major General Massey,
Colonel Cooke and the rest of the off icers'.9 Edmund Ludlow,
present in his capacity as one of the Parliamentary coninissioners,
tried unavailingly to reconinend the Irish service.10 Ireland's
reputation for dealing ill with English soldiers dated back to the
reign of Elizabeth I. Ludlow found a 'general dislike of the said
(1) C.J, iv.681.
(2) Ludlow, 1.141-42.
(3) Ibid; E 258(11) The Scottish Dove, Oct 14-21.
(4) SP, 28/302, pt.4, f.599.
(5) E 513(15): A Perfect Diurnall, no.169, Oct 19-26, pp.l351-
52.
(6) SF, 28/302, pt.4, f.599; E 513(15), p.1352.
(7) E 513(15), p.l352; BL, Pdd.Mss.37,344, f.68.
(8) BL, Microfilm 330, Ainwick Mss.547, f.52.
(9) Sprigge, pp.314-15.
(10) Bodl., Tanner Mss.59(2), f.573.
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conditions and no possibility of reducing them to that
employment'.l The New Model troopers witnessed, and no doubt
noted, this defiance.
In this highly charged atmosphere, some elements within the
ranks 'endeavoured to stir up the brigade to a mu' .2 But most
soldiers seem to have been happy enough to give up soldiering, and
to avoid the Irish service. Massey, Ludlow and Fairfax all made
speeches to the assembled regiments asking that the Parliament's
order and terms for the disbandment be promptly obeyed.3 Sir
Thomas praised unstintingly Massey and the majority of his
officers who did 'their duty very cheerfully in ordering their men
to yield obedience'.4 But so few of the 2,500 men remaining
volunteered for Ireland that not a single full troop of horse
could be raised from them.5
Political and factional in-fighting over the brigade was
still not at an end. The Lords, infuriated that the Coarnons had
forced through the disbandment, resolved on 14 (tober that the
Coninons' instructions concerning the brigade would have to be
'fought out'.6 They ordered Fairfax not to disband Massey's
regiments without the consent of 'both' houses of Parliament.7 But
the Corrinons audaciously countermanded this order and required
Fairfax and Massey to proceed as instructed. Fairfax seems to
(1) Bodi., Tanner Mss.59(2), f.566.
(2) Ludlow, i.142.
(3) E 513(21): Perfect Occurrences, week 44, Oct 23-30, Oct 23.
(4) Bodi., Tanner Mss.59(2), f.573.






have to ignored the Lords order, and proceeded to disband the
regiments, though he defended this by claiming to have started the
process before the instruction forbidding it arrived at Devizes.1
The Presbyterians had so far been outmanoeuvred, having
signally failed to control the process of reducing the military
forces in England. They lacked the necessary support and
organisation to dominate the Conmons, and the upper house had
proved incapable of shaping the military establishment by itself.
Consequently, the New Model remained intact, and provincial forces
were disbanded.2
Massey left Devizes quickly, intending to attend the
magnificent state funeral of the Earl of Essex on 22 October,
though he mistook the date of the ceremony, and arrived a day
late.3 At about this time, some Independents began to advocate the
re-creation of the once Presbyterian-led Western Brigade, with a
new officer corps chosen by its rank and file,4 but this
politically inspired suggestion was not implemented.
Massey's experience as coninander of the Western Association
was crucial to the development of his later career. The struggle
to '. secure the future of his brigade was enmeshed with political
faction-fighting; in waging it, Massey found himself catapulted




(3) E 358(21): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, Oct 22-29, Oct
22.
(4) E 362(8): Propositions for the Western Association, Nov 14.
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PRESBYTERIAN LEADER, NOVBIBER 1646-AUGUsT 1647.
Massey's political career was built on the foundations of
his achievements as a soldier. His entry into the political arena
bad originally been intended to defend the interests of his
Western Brigade. Its disbandment was a source of Massey's
continuing resentment at the dominance of the New Model army,
which also reduced sharply his own prospects for employment. For
the next ten months, Massey's primary objective was to secure a
new military coninand, but this was to involve him in high
political drama and intrigue.
Most informed observers blamed the Independent faction for
the disbandment of the Western Brigade. Bellievre, the French
ambassador, reported to his master that the Independents had paid
off Massey's forces, but that they had nevertheless maintained
themselves for 'four or five months in spite of them, which the
Presbyterians considered to be of their persuasion'.l Holles and
others saw Massey's effective dismissal from active service as
part of a far wider purge of coninanders who were sympathetic to
the Presbyterian cause.2
The Earl of Essex's death disrupted tentative efforts to
begin negotiations between the moderate Presbyterian leaders
(1) J.G.Fotheringham, ed. Montereul Correspondence 1645-48,
Scottish Historical Society (1898), i.317.
(2) Holles, p.l75; Bamfield, p.39.
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and certain Royalists.1 Both Independents and Presbyterians
thought Essex's death was the main reason why the latter failed to
consolidate their hold on power in 1647.2
Massey's reforrnados did not disappear after their
disbandment at Devizes, but arrived in thndon determined to pursue
their grievances, presenting a petition to the Coninons in late
November. They wished to serve overseas but hoped to secure the
remainder of their arrears before leaving.3 Massey himself
confirmed various of his officer's war records so that they could
present their accounts for settlement.4 Their pressure for rapid
action may have prodded the Corrinons to recomend to the Coninittee
of Accounts on 1 December that Massey's reduced officer corps
should be given priority over other petitioners.5 Their previous
petition for redress showed how well organised the Western
Brigade's officers remained even after the dispersal of their
regiments.
As an 4P Massey was soon nominated to sit on various sub-
coninittees of the house.6 On 10 December he was appointed to a
sub-coninittee charged with examining how the arrears of the 'whole
soldiery employed by the Parliament' could be satisfied.7 It is
not known whether Massey was active on this sub-conirtittee, but its
members included some of the most prominent members of the house.
On new year's eve Massey's name was added to another Coninons sub-
coninittee, appointed to investigate lay preaching and to determine
(1) Bamfield, p.l5.
(2) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, f.120; Baillie, i.412,416.
(3) E 365(1): Perfect Occurrences, Nov 27-Dec 4.
(4) SP, 28/41, pt.2, ff.154,156.




how best it might be suppres.1 Presbyterians were especially
anxious to control unregulated sermons and other religious
practices. But known Independents like Cromwell and Fury were also
nominated in the interests of balance.2
By early 1647 Massey was trying to put his financial affairs
in order, so that he could subnit an account of his long overdue
arrears.3 The list of Parliamentary sub-corrinittees to which he was
appointed grew yet longer, suggesting that he actively sought
involvement in day to day political decision making at
tklestminster.4
In the new year, Westminster politics were dominated by the
rivalry of the Presbyterian and Independent factions in the
Coniiions. Holles's success in negotiating the peaceful withdrawal
of the Scots had established a political ascendancy in the Corrnions
for the Presbyterians.5 Independent opposition through
conventional Parliamentary channels was now futile, and the
faction began to boycott the Coninons.6 As at Westminster, the
political tide amongst the elite of the city flowed strongly in
the direction of Presbyterianism.7 Indeed, the city fathers were




(3) SP, 16/515, pt.1, ff.37-38.
(4) CJ, v.47.
(5) Kishlansky, pp.140-41.
(6) Holles, pp.69-72; P.Crawford, Denzil, First Lord Holles
1598-1680 (1979), p.l4O; tiontereul,
	 i.390;
Ludlow, i.135-6; Kishlansky, pp.lO8-09.
(7) R.Brenner, 'The Civil War Politics of Lndons Merchant
Corrinunity', P&P (1973), pp.85-88.
(8) Bodi., Clarendon SF, 29/(2420), f.72.
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The progress achieved by Massey's senior officers in
securing their arrears was not shared by most of their junior
colleagues. In mid-January a large crowd of them, some accompanied
by their wives, demonstrated in *1estminster Hall. They were so
'insolent and injurious in language, that a comotion was
feared'.l By early February it was agreed that £1,000 should be
set aside to pay Massey's reduced off icers.2 This was scarcely
adequate, and it was also stressed that it represented a one-off
payment, evidently designed to avoid further disturbances at
Westminster.3 Some 700 of Massey's former troops had again
demonstrated outside the Comons chamber in a 'tumultuous manner'.
The house warned that if this recurred they would be 'exemplarily
punished' .4 But the treatment of Massey's reformados suggests that
their demonstrations had been particularly vocal and well
organised.
What part Massey played in the lobbying campaign is open to
speculation. But he did experience grave difficulties in getting
his own arrears settled. Many of his papers had been lost and the
informal system of payments at Gloucester did not lend itself to
accurate accounting.5 Massey's sensitive ego was also offended by
the strict auditing procedures employed by the Cortwittee of
Accounts. He complained that never had an officer of his 'quality'
been obliged to render such a detailed account of his income
and expenditure.6 Massey estimated that £7,735-09-10d was
(1) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 291(2420), f.72.
(2) CJ, v.75.
(3) CJ, v.75; Kishlansky, p.l52.
(4) BL, Add.Ms.31,116, f.300b.
(5) SP, 16/515, pt.1, f.37; GRO, t4F 285, Barwick tIs.f.2.
(6) SP, 16/515, pt.1, f.38.
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still owed him in arrears, which was probably generous: some of
the financial presumptions on which this figure was based were
very vague.1 Hostile con!nentators claimed he had enriched himself
during the war by at*.ising his position as Governor of Gloucester.2
But similar accusations were levelled at many other connanders.
Now that the Scots had peacefully evacuated the North, and
the Irish situation was growing more urgent, the debate over the
New Model could no longer be postponed. It was eventually agreed
to retain part of it as a security force for England, and to send
the remainder to subdue the Catholic revolt in Ireland.3 The
Independents did their best to oppose these measures, but such was
Holles's dominance in the Coniiions that they were passed with large
majorities.4 On 5 March Fairfax was confirmed, by a very narrow
margin in the Coninons, as supreme coninander of the Parliament's
land forces in England.5 The day before, the Lords had refused to
continue the national assessment scheme which had financed the New
Model since 1645.6 It was generally believed that the peaceful
disbandment or splitting up of the Army was inevitable.
On 13 March Massey acted as a teller in a division in the
Comons for the first time. He and Wailer defeated a bid on behalf
of the remaining town Governors which would have enabled them to
retain their conmands of the few garrisons that continued to
(1) SP, 16/515, pt.1, ff.37-8.
(2) CP, ii.159.
(3) CJ, v.90-i; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.79b; BL, Add.Nlss.31,116,
f.302d; Wailer, p.L+2; Ludlow, i.147.
(4) Montereul, ii.18; Clarendon, iv.218.





exist in England.1 As a result, those Governors to whom the
Presbyterians objected could be removed. Others, such as Poyntz,
who enjoyed Holles's confidence, found themselves allocated new
reponsibilities, such as the coninarid of Clifford's tower at York.2
The Derby House Ccxrrnittee, which administered all relief
bound for Ireland, was now dominated by Holies and his
Presbyterian lieutenants. It was decided that a delegation from
the Ccxrndttee, which included Wailer and Sir John Clotworthy,
should travel to Saffron Walden to consult with Fairfax about the
forces that were to be sent to Ireland.3 They soon discovered a
general reluctance to undertake such service.4 The experience of
the Western Brigade had taught the Parliament nothing.
Some have seen the Parliament's treatment of the New Model
as being unnecessarily tactless.5 Others have argued that the army
was treated as fairly as possible in the military and financial
circunstances.6 It is true that Fairfax's regiments were being
treated no differently from other, now expendable military units.
The Western Brigade and other provincial forces had disbanded
peaceably, partly under the threat of forcible action by
detachments of the New Model.7 The latter, however, could not
easily be divided against itself, and Parliament had no other
substantial forces to police the disbandment of Fairfax's
regiments.
Massey continued to reside in thndon. The events surrounding
the demise of the Western Brigade had convinced him of the
(1) CJ, v.111.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Si?, 21/23, ff.155-6.
(4) Waller, pp.44-47; U, ix.112-3; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.81b; E
515(5): A Perfect Diurnall, no.192, March 22-29, pp.1528-9.
(5) A.Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen (1987), p.30.
(6) Kishlansky, pp.156-8.
(7) Si?, 21/23, ff.119,121.
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futility of military contnand without political influence: he was
by now closely associated with the group around Holles. Massey had
apparently continued to stay at St. Lawrence's Lane throughout
1646, and may still have been resident there.1 He had brought from
the 1est, and presumably retained, some few servants and his
personal secretary.2
Massey seems to have lived in some style. He ran up 'large
expenses', maintaining 'many servants and horses'.3 This does not
appear to have diminished his resentment at what he considered
Parliament's lack of understanding and generosity in the matter of
his arrears.4 It is probable that the only full length portrait of
Massey by Lely was painted during this stay in London.5 Massey
would have been around forty three years old in 1647. Lely's
painting portrays a professional soldier in early middle age,
conscious of his prestige and personal influence.
His membership of a large number of Conmons sub-coninittees
suggests that Massey was a fairly regular attender of the lower
house.6 The fact that he acted as a teller in Comons votes
alongside such men as 1aller and Holles in the spring and suniner
of 1647 told of his growing prominence in Presbyterian circles.7
But it is unlikely that Massey tried to cultivate a new career in
politics: he sought political patronage in the hope of
(1) BL, MF 330, Ainwick Mss.547, ff.34b,35.
(2) Gentlemans Magazine, ciii, (1833), pt.2, pp.304-5.
(3) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.30.






re-launching his military career.
On 1 April, a proposal that Wailer should comand the
expeditionary force to Ireland was comfortably defeated in the
Coniiions.1 Sir William had made it clear that he did not relish
such a challenging responsibility.2 A suggestion that Massey
should accompany him as Lieutenant General of the horse was not
put to the vote.3 Next day the veteran New Model coaviiander of
foot, Philip Skippon, was chosen to lead the Irish expedition.4 It
was hoped that this popular soldier would make the service more
acceptable to Fairfax's rank and file.5 Far more controversial was
Massey's appointment as Skippon's Lieutenant General of horse and
effective second in conmand. He had had no previous connection
with the army and had indeed been highly critical of it. But he
was also widely known to be a strong supporter of Holles and the
Presbyterian faction.6 Holles must have been keen to replace the
radical Independent Cromwell as head of the New Model's cavalry.
Massey was one of the few young and able ex-comanders who was
both politically sympathetic, and eager to do further military
service.7
Massey's appointment was certainly opposed in the Conmons by
some leading Independents, including Henry Ireton, Cromwell's son-
in-law. Exchanges between Ireton and Holles became so heated that
the Presbyterian leader challenged his adversary to a duel. The
(1) CJ, v.131; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.82b; Rushworth, vi.444.
(2) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.306b.
(3) E 383(22): The Moderate Intelligencer, April 1-8, April 1.
(4) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.307; BL, Add.Mss.1O,114, f.22b.
(5) CJ, v.133; Rushworth, vi.446; Holles, p.82; Wailer, p.68;
thdlow, 1.147.
(6) Wailer, pp.84-5; Clarendon, iv.238; Woolrych, pp.39-40.
(7) Vicars, pp.69-70.
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house was forced to order both men to desist from such behaviour.1
Massey's nomination as Lieutenant General certainly raised him
from the relative obscurity in which he had languished since the
disbandment of his brigade.
On 7 April, Massey was added to the Conuittee of Ireland at
Derby House, Holles's Presbyterian cabinet, which was to manage
the interrelated tasks of reducing the New Model and reinforcing
the English forces in Ireland.2 This was the political complement
of his recent military promotion. At Massey's first meeting, it
was decided that another delegation should be sent to the army's
headquarters. Waller was chosen again, and Clotworthy was also
picked. Massey too was asked to go: this suggests that it was
seen as important that the new Lieutenant General familiarise
himself with his new coniand as soon as possible.3
On 13th the delegation set out for their crucial meeting
with the assembled ranks of the New Model's officer corps at
Saffron Walden.4 Massey's experience in the process of disbandment
was confined to his own brigade. Success in relation to the New
Model, to which he was a newcomer, depended on winning the respect
of Cromwell's officers, and convincing them that the Irish service
was important and worthwhile. On 14 April, Massey arrived with the
other coninissioners at Saffron Walden, and quickly discovered that
the agitation against the Irish expedition was being orchestrated
by many of the army's senior officers. The opposition seemed
concentrated amongst the cavalry regiments, who were campaigning
among the infantry for a boycott of the Irish service, designed
(1)BL, Add.Ms.1O,114, ff.22b; Clarendon, iv.238.
(2) SP, 21/26, f.34; CJ, v.135.
(3) Ibid.
(4) BL, Add.Ms.37,344, f.84; Rushworth, vi.454; 'Jaller, p.77.
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to maintain the army at its full strength till its grievances
relating to pay and inderrinity were met.1
Next day, the Derby House coninissioners met with a large
group of Army officers at Fairfax's lodgings. When informed that
Skippon had been chosen to lead them in Ireland, with Massey as
his deputy, some observed that Skippon had already asked to be
excused from such an unpopular comand.2 Wailer had been made
aware that a whispering campaign was being directed against
Massey. It was said that he was a 'profane man', unfit to exercise
coninand over men who were becoming increasingly steeped in
Independency and radical religious thought.3
But the ordinary troopers of the New Model also had more
practical objections to Massey's appointment. Two of the army's
cavalry regiments, Fairfax's and Ireton's, had helped to supervise
the disbandment of the Western Brigade seven months previously.
But they had identical grievances to Massey's men. They too
desired assurance that their arrears would be paid, and a total
indemnity for all the illegal acts they had conuiitted during the
war before their disbandment or transfer to other services.4
Massey was seen as an outsider with no record of defending such
rank and file interests.
Waller was also a Presbyterian, and defended Massey as a
'gentleman of a fair and unbiamable conversation' .5 The New Model
also objected against Massey that he was 'not of the faction'
(1)Waller, pp.78-9.






(ie the Independents) 'which they called the army'.l This was
later celebrated in verse;
'Ere they tread Irish ground for Cromwell they will cry
Skippon content them cannot nor Massey
The reason is they are not of their sect
Which makes the army wholly them reject' .2
Several officers demanded to be accompanied by their old
coffinanders: 'Fairfax and Cromwell and we all go'.3 This must have
been very unnerving for Massey because it showed that most
officers remained loyal their old Lieutenant General. Massey was
resented as a Presbyterian intruder, appointed to break up the
army's cavalry regiments on terms highly unfavourabie to them.
Disappointed by the reluctance of Cromwell's horse, Massey and the
other conissioners concentrated their efforts to recruit for the
Irish expedition upon the New Model infantry.4 Even here, some of
their efforts were ill judged,5 and Massey's involvement may have
confirmed the soldiers in their distrust.6
On 23 April, Massey and the other coninissioners arrived
back in London from what had been a humiliating debacle. They
hastened to report, the next day, to a meeting of the Derby House
Cocinittee, where it was decided that those few soldiers who agreed
to leave the New Model, should be granted money imediately so
(1) Wailer, p.84.
(2) E 399(36): Works of Darkness Brought to Light..., July 23.
(3) Rushworth, vi.458; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.84b.
(4) SP, 16/515, pt.1, f.89a; Rushworth, vi.463; E 515(9): A
Perfect Diurnall, no.195, April 19-26, p.1565.
(5) Rushworth, vi.463; E 515(9), p.l565; Woolrych, p.49.
(6) HPMF, Clarke Mss.41, f.11.
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that they could discharge their quarters.1 The disappointingly
short lists of army officers prepared to undertake the Irish
service were presented to the Comons.2 Only 681 troopers were
prepared to break ranks and put themselves at Massey's disposal.
This left 5,380 horse with the army. It had proved impossible to
draw off a complete troop from any regiment. The total number of
recruits from the New Model was less than a troop more than a
single one of its cavalry regiments.3
On 29 April, Derby House Corrinittee asked Massey to go down
to Goldsmiths Flail to borrow £4,000 so that the forces that were
ready to leave for Ireland could be transported irwnediately.4 This
illustrates the respect in which Massey was held in the city and
how the Comittee hoped to exploit it.
In the growing confrontation between the Presbyterian
dominated Parliament and the army, many soldiers began to identify
with the Independent faction. The strength of religious
Independency in Fairfax' s regiments may have been exaggerated, ixit
there can be no doubt that it was better regarded than
Presbyterianism.5 To some extent the convergence between the
increasingly mutinous army and the Independents was an alliance of
convenience.6 Independency found itself increasingly isolated in
the Conmons. In early May the house agreed to the thirty one names
selected by the Coninon Council of the city of London to make up
its new Militia Coninittee. A Parliamentary ordinance confirming
(1) SF, 21/26, f.49.
(2) Rushworth, vi.464-5; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.85.
(3) EIPMF, Clarke Ms.41, f.16.





them as such was passed on 4 May.l So extensive was the purge of
Independents that only ten members from the original Militia
Coninittee remained.2 The high Presbyterian composition of the new
Coninittee was much conmented upon by contemporaries.3 And the city
Government was becoming increasingly intolerant of Independents in
its midst.4
Massey continued to attend the Derby House Coninittee. There
he concerned himself with the raising of revenues so that more
forces could be dispatched to Ireland.5 But Massey only attended
meetings at which Hoiles and leading supporters such as Wailer
were present, and missed thinly attended sittings of the
Corivnittee, such as those on 12 and 13 May.6 This confirms his
status as an inner member of the Hoiles clique, an important man
with coumitments elsewhere, probably in the city.
It was at this time that the Presbyterian dominated Coninons
at last decided to try to dissolve the New Model, although no
agreement had been reached as to the terms of its disbandment.7
Perhaps it was hoped that Fairfax's regiments were too seriously
divided to resist a determined effort to disband them.
Massey, meanwhile, undertook to recruit a full regiment of
horse for Ireland.8 Perhaps this rather optimistic venture was
(1) A&0, 1.928; Sharpe, ii.241-2; CJ, v.160-i.
(2) BL, Add.Ms.10,114, f.24.
(3) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 291(2505), f.204; Clarendon, iv.241.
(4) DrWL, Juxon tls.24*50, ff.107b-8; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.309.
(5) SP, 21/26, ff.55,57.
(6) Ibid, f.57.
(7) CJ, v.176-77; BL, Add.Mss.1O,114, f.24; BL, Add.Mss.
31,116, f.310; Rushworth, vi.487; Wailer, pp.124-5; Bell,
i .342.
(8) CJ, v.176; Kishlansky, p.l74.
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designed to make amends for his dismal failure to recruit
sufficient numbers from Cromwell's regiments. Massey probably
intended to base this force upon the former officers of his own
regiments, many of whom were present in and around London.
A rumour reached the army that Massey had travelled down to
Gloucester to secure it against the New Model.1 These reports were
certainly false: on May 19 Massey was present at Derby House along
with the other leading Presbyterians.2 However the fact that the
New Model had seriously entertained and was apprehensive about,
such a report showed that it recognised Massey as one of its most
active and dangerous opponents. On 20 May, Massey joined with
Holles in a vote branding as 'insolent and seditious', a petition
sympathetic to the Independents.3 Army opinion increasingly
attacked the Presbyterian leaders as tyrants.4 On the 24th the
Derby House Cofrinittee decided that the Parliamentary votes
regarding the reduction of the New Model should now be
implemented.5
There was little doubt that the city would support the
Parliament in any political confrontation with the army. But its
readiness to defend itself from attack was highly suspect. Sir
Lewis Dyve, imprisoned in the Tower, noted growing fear and
confusion in the capital and increasing reluctance to become
involved in any violent action against the New Model.6
(1) HPMF, Clarke Ms.41, ff.132,133.
(2) SP, 21/26, ff.58,60-1; SP, 16/539, pt.3, f.53.
(3) CJ, v.179; BL, Add.Nlss.37,344, f.87b; BL, Add.Mss.31,116,
f.310; DrWL, Juxon Hss. 24*50, f.109.
(4) H1MF, Clarke Ms.41, f.133.
(5) SF, 21/26, f.62; Waller, pp.126-7.
(6) H.G.Tibbut, ed. The Tower of London Letter Book of Sir Lewis




Whitelocke suggested that many former officers had only
supported Holies from jealousy of the New Model's successful
record. But, as he also noted, its monopoly position denied to
them all hope of further military appointments.1 Such motives were
important in forming Massey's own coninitinent to the Presbyterians
and their policies.
On 27 May, Massey missed another meeting of the Derby
House Coninittee.2 The same day he was given leave by the Coirmons
'to go into the country' .3 This decision would have required the
permission of Massey's political sponsors. The purpose of his
journey is unknown, but it must have been of some importance.
Meanwhile the army's Council of War convened at Bury St Edmunds,
Fairfax's new head quarters, and defied the Parliament's call for
disbandment by massive majorities.4 The General informed Speaker
Lenthall of his regiment's near unaminous opposition, but
expressed the hope that the conflict could be peacefully resolved
if diplomatically handled.5
On the eve of the crisis, Massey was certainly in London at
Holles's side. On 30 May he attended a meeting of the Derby House
Coninittee,6 so the leave of absence from London granted on 27th
bad not resulted in any prolonged departure.7 Massey may not even
have left London at all. Perhaps the original plan was superceded
by the pace of events in the army, convincing Hoiles that Massey
was of more use in the capital. He was certainly present at Derby
(1) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.88b.
(2) SP, 21/26, ff.66-7.
(3) CJ, v.188.
(4) CP, i.108-11; Hoiles, p.94.
(5) Bodi., Tanner Mss.58(1), f.118; Rushworth, vi.499; BL,
Add.rlss.37,344, ff.89b-90; Wailer, pp.l28-9; U, ix.226.




House again on the 31st, when the Conirtittee ordered the New
Model's ordnance train, based at Oxford and Jallingford, to be
removed to the Tower of London.1 He was also a party to its
decision, next day, to recall the Parliamentary conirtissioners
because of the violent opposition created in the army to the
disbandment proposals.2
Holles began to suspect many of Fairfax's officers of
complicity in the unrest which accompanied this opposition.3 Army
resistance created confusion, fear and uncertainty amongst the
Holles group, which had temporarily lost the initiative.4 Some of
the bolder Presbyterians sought to sound out opinion, in the city
and at Westminster, on the merits of a forcible challenge to the
New Model. But little support could be found for such extreme
measures. 5
On 3 June, the Cocrinons began a series of spectacular climb
downs which demonstrated its demoralisation to all observers. Even
the Declaration of Dislike, penned by Holles on 30 March, was
struck from its journals.6 Whitelocke thought it was at this
point that the 'Parliament began to surrender themselves and their
power into the hands of their own army' .7 Royalist sentiments were
also beginning to manifest themselves more strongly in the city.
On the Prince of Wales's birthday, 30 May, 'his highnesses
colours were so much worn, as no more ribbons of those colours
(1) SP, 21/26, ff.72-3; CP, i.114-5.
(2) Ibid, f.74.
(3) Holles, pp.95-6.
(4) Waller, pp.l4l-2; Holles, p.108; CP, i.116.
(5) 1-IPMF, Clarke Ms.41, f.54.
(6) BL,	 Add.Ms.31,116,	 f.311b;	 BL,	 Add.tls.10,114,	 f.25;
Rushworth, vi.502; CJ, v.197,199; Holles, p.107.
(7) BL, Add.Nls.37,344, f.90.
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was to be bought in the exchange'.l The Parliament's promise to
pay all the New Model's arrears excited the resentment of
impoverished ex-officers who had served under Massey, Wailer or
Essex. At the start of June, violent demonstrations took place in
Westminster Hall, and reached the very doors of the Corinons.2
Soon after this the house was shocked by the news that a
detachient from the army had removed the King from Holmby.3
Leading Presbyterians did not hesitate to implicate senior army
officers such as Cromwell and Ireton in the planning of this
operation.4 Some officers who supported [-loiles now began to leave
the New Model. Massey, amongst others, wrote to Fairfax expressing
the hope that such an action would not prejudice their standing
with the arrny.5 On 4 June the new Militia Coainittee of the capital
'sat ... very close'.6 Earlier that morning Cromwell and other
prominent Independents left London for the army.7
The Presbyterians were quick to provide money for the
soldiers who had broken ranks with Fairfax's regiments. Holles,
Stapleton and Massey were central in organising the finance.8 The
Presbyterians were also anxious to enlist the support of the
numerous reformados in London. On the 6th the Conmons appointed a
Coninittee to meet them in the Court of Requests. Holles,
(1) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 291(2522), f.229.
(2) BL, Add.Mss.1O,114, f.25; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, ff.311b-12.
(3) Rushworth, vi.502-3; U, ix.236-7; BL, Add.Mss.37,344,
ff.90-90b; Bodi., Tanner Mss. 58(1), f.136; Holles, p.97.
(4) Wailer, pp.136-9; Holles, p.97.
(5) HPMF, Clarke Ms.41, f.55b.
(6) Rushworth, vi.504.
(7) A.Fraser, Cromwell (Xir Chief of Men (1973), p.195.
(8) SP, 16/539, pt.4 ff.55,58,60-1,64.
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Stapleton, and Massey were its principal members.1 After an
impassioned speech by [-Lolles the reformados vowed that they would
all 'live and die with the Parliament'.2
Later that day Massey travelled through the city streets in
his coach. Leaning out of the window, he called upon the citizens
to 'defend themselves against the mad men in the army', and
exclaimed to passers-by that 'Cromwell had betrayed them all and
was fled from London without license or order'.3 Clearly Massey
was active in the policy of confrontation with the New Model. But
success depended upon the corporation's Militia Comittee and its
trained band regiments.
Parliament was torn between the radical Independency of the
army and the conservative Presbyterianism of the city.4 On the 7th
Massey was appointed to a comittee formed to placate the
reforrnados, who were clamouring at Westminster for payment of at
least some of their arrears.5 The Parliament was being subjected
to ever greater pressures. But it soon became apparent that the
city authorities, at least, had come to favour an acconinodation
with the army.6 For their part, the coninanders of the New Model,
now massing at Cambridge, promised to restrain the troops - if the
city would cooperate. The Connion Council was warned not to
continue alligning itself with the Holles group.7
(1) E 391(12): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, June 1-8, June
6.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Bodi., Clarendon SP, 291(2528), f.236.
(4) Kishlansky, p.225.
(5) CJ, v.201; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.91b.
(6) cLRO, LCCJB, 40, f.218b; E 391(6): The Hunble Petition of
the Lord Mayor, June 8; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.91; U,
ix.252.
(7) SF, 26/515, pt.2, ff.24-24b; Wailer, p.124.
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During 11-12 June, 1-lolles and his allies tried to persuade
the Presbyterian dominated city corporation to put the city into a
'posture of defence'.l It was proposed to create a new Coimiiittee
of Safety, comprising delegates from Westminster and from the
London Militia Connittee.2 The new structure was designed,
ostensibly, to maintain law and order, but it is clear that its
real purpose was to mobilise the city against the New Model. This
objective won enthusiastic support amongst some city high
Presbyterians.3 Presumably, they, and their counterparts at
Westminster, hoped that outrage at the army's behaviour was
sufficiently widespread amongst the citizens to create a
groundswell of opinion in favour of forcible resistance. They
were to be greatly disappointed.4
The city's trained bands were ordered to muster on the
l2th.5 Many former officers re-enlisted for military service at
Derby House.6 Massey's involvement in these proceedings is not
known, though his conduct on the 6th and the prominent role in the
attempted counter revolution of July and August, suggest that he
must have played an important part.7 Few members of the trained
bands responded to the call. Soon the attempted rising was
collapsing through the lack of spontaneous support, which may
(1) CJ, v.207; Rushworth, vi.553; Sharpe, ii.244.
(2) Ibid; U, ix.258.
(3) Holles, pp.108-09; Waller, pp.148-9.
(4) Waller, p.149; Kishlansky, pp.239-40.
(5) I{PMF, Clarke Ms.41, ff.79; Rushworth, vi.556; Clarendon,
iv.277; BL, Add.Ms.37,344, ff.92-2b; Kishlansky, p.240.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Bodl.,Clarendon SP, 291(2528), f.236.
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well have reflected widespread confusion as to its purpose.1 The
measures of the 11th and 12th had been ordered by the capital's
ultra Presbyterian Militia Coriinittee, but the all powerful Coninon
Council had stood aloof.2 It soon became clear that the more
extreme Presbyterian elements both at Westminster and in the
Guildhall had tried to force the majority of the corporation into
an armed confrontation it did not wish to uridertake.3
Now the attempted coup had lost momentuli, the corporation
wrote a reassuring letter to the army at St Albans.4 The
authorities at the Guildhall were trying to avoid confrontation
between the Parliament and its army, and hoped to act as a
mediator between theni.5 Militarily, the Parliament was now
defenceless against the New Model and could not resist its
demands.6 Yet the Coninon Council had not perceived its vital
interests to be under sufficient threat from Fairfax's forces to
sanction a military confrontation with them.7
The Coninons continued to be threatened by large crowds of
(1) HPMF, Clarke Mss.41, f.79; Bodi., Clarendon SP, 291(2531),
f.241; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, ff.92-2b; Rushworth, vi.556;
Holles, pp.110-li; Clarendon, iv.227; Sharpe, ii.246-47.
(2) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, f.110; OPH, xv.439; Wooirych, p.14O.
(3) U, ix.256; Hoiles, p.110; Walier, pp.l49-5O.
(4) cLR0, LCCJB, 40, ff.221-21b; Rushworth, vi.556; Wailer,
p.151.
(5) E 392(21): The Answer of ... the Lord Mayor, June 14;





reforrnados, who singled out Independent members especially for
abuse and threats.1 Massey was appointed to a ccniiiittee charged
with the irnediate distribution of money to the unemployed
off icers.2 He was often made responsible for tasks involving
contact with the reformados in the capital, probably because so
many had previously served either with him, or with other
Presbyterian comanders, such as Essex or Wailer, with whom he had
enjoyed good relations.
Massey was still actively involved with the affairs of the
Derby House Corrrnittee, and concerned himself with the condition of
the forces bound for Ireland.3 He was one of those who saw to the
billeting of the small detachments that had left the New Model.4
In a move to exclude its principal political opponents from
the Cormons, the army brought a series of allegations against
eleven leading Presbyterian MP's, of whom Holles and Stapleton
were first and second on the list, and Massey was the seventh.5
The New Model was eager to depict Holles and his closest allies as
a subversive clique, trying deliberately to poison relations
between the army and the Parliarnent.6 On 15 June, coninissioners
from the Parliament were informed at St Albans that the army
expected the eleven members to cease to attend the Coninons
ininediately.7 In London, some political tracts began to urge
openly that the Parliament and city should raise a new military
force, if not as a means of confronting the New Model, at least
as a counter-balance to the army's much enhanced capacity to
(1) HPMF, Clarke Mss.41, f.84.
(2) CJ, v.210; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.313.
(3) SP, 21/26, f.79.
(4) SP, 16/539, pt.4, f.72.





enforce its will.1 The New Model leaders remained sceptical of
London's capacity to raise forces in its own defence or that of
the Parli.ament.2
On 16 June, the army's charges against the eleven members
were at last presented to the Cociinons.3 Massey was no doubt
targeted by the army because of his involvinent in the attempted
disbandment of the New Model's regiments. But Fairfax and his
officers were well aware that distinguished Presbyterian
coninanders such as Wailer and Massey represented an alternative
military leadership, and therefore a threat to their own position,
should politicians like Holles have their way.4
Each of the eleven members rose in turn to defend himself
from the allegations of treason and war mongering. Massey, as one
of the more recently elected members, spoke last. He made light of
his predicament, and that of his colleagues, in jovial soldierly
terms. In what must have been taken as an approving reference to
defiant statements just issued by his political mentors, Massey
exclaimed that 'although it did fall to his lot to bring up the
rear, yet it was a great encouragement to him that there was so
much venture in the van' .5
Despite the danger in which they were placed, Holles and his
circle continued to meet at Derby House,6 and to organise the
supply both of forces bound for Ireland and of those which had
left the New Model.7 Those eleven named by the army were able to
continue in this way, since the Coninons had refused to move
(1) E 392(22): Eight Queries Upon the Late Declaration, June 15.
(2) Holles, p.116.
(3) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.93; CJ, v.214-5.
(4) Woolrych, p.138.
(5) E 393(19): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, June 15-22,
June 16.
(6) SP, 21/26, f.80.
(7) Ibid, ff.81-2; CSPD, 1645-47, p.562.
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against them until more precise and substantial charges had been
brought.1 However, by late June, Massey's direct involvement with
the Derby House Cormiittee had ceased.2 The reason for this remains
unclear. Perhaps his efforts among the reforrnados and in the city
were now too time-consuming.
Wailer believed that in this period, the Parliament's
political ascendancy was fatally undermined by its own policies
towards the army. Its procrastination, and its efforts to humour
the New Model, he thought, increasingly revealed its weakness and
impotence. The army's contempt for its civilian masters grew, and
the Parliament's self respect diminished, in equal measure.3
Massey may well have shared these views, which were conon amongst
the leading Presbyterians.4
The army was certainly becoming more impatient, threatening
to remove the eleven members by force if they continued to attend
the Comiions.5 The New Model corrinanders believed that the
Presbyterian leadership was still conspiring to bring about a
second war in order regain its political ascendancy. Thus,
Fairfax's Council of War thought Holles, Stapleton, Wailer and
Massey were responsible for the gathering of numerous forces
around London and the reformado disorders at Westminster.6
On 25 June, the eleven members, aware of the army's growing
pressure on the Coninons, declared their intention to withdraw
(1) Holles, pp.116-l7.
(2) SP, 21/26, ff.82-99.
(3) Wailer, pp.152-3,164.
(4) Holles, pp.89-91.
(5) Bodi., Tanner Mss.58(1), f.252; BL, Add.Mss.31,116, ff.314b-
15; Wailer, pp.l66-7.




voluntarily,1 though the house declared that not enough evidence
had been presented to justify their permanent exclusion.2 The
Presbyterian press of London continued their vigorous defence.3
Holles and his colleagues must have realised that there was no
military means of resisting the army's demands.4 They asked leave
to retire to the provinces, and this sudden tractability greatly
surprised and even moved the house. 5 It may have been prompted by
the belief that an invasion of the capital by the army was
iminent.
With the departure of the eleven from Westminster the Derby
House Coninittee all but ceased to function though the Coninons felt
obliged to ask it to meet on the 28th.6 However diplomatic their
public utterances, the eleven members were privately outraged at
their treatment, and at the fact that they had been obliged to
abandon their responsibilities as ){P's.7 Massey believed he had
been unjustly compelled to absent himself from the Comons, and
that his good name had been tarnished by malicious allegations so
vague that it was impossible to answer them.8 The eleven sought to
turn such complaints to good effect by sutmitting to the
(1) BL, Add.Mss.31,116, f.315; E 395(5): The Moderate
Inteiligencer, June 24-July 1, June 25.
(2) Ibid; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.95; CJ, v.223; Rushworth,
vi.592; Wailer, p.169.
(3) E 394(1): IX Queries..., June 25.
(4) Woolrych, p.144.
(5) Bodl., Clarendon SF, 291(2538), f.249.
(6) CJ, v.225.
(7) Holles, p.141.
(8) GRO, HF 285, Barwick Mss.f.30.
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Coniions, a petition demanding a 'speedy trial'.l
The Parliament's recent payments to its disbanded officers
had compounded, rather than solved, the ref ormado problem in the
capital by encouraging many more impoverished officers to flock to
London in search of financial, redress. The authorities at the
Guildhall greatly feared that this stxlden influx could 'very much
endanger the peace and safety of the city'.2 There were other
potential sources of unrest. In the city, popular Presbyterianism
noisily demanded that the Parliament reach a religious and
political settlement with the King. The Corrinon Council expressed
the hope that it would not be long before Charles was restored to
his 'just rights and authority'.3
Reports reached the New Model that auxiliaries and horse
continued to be raised in the capital under the pretence of
policing the city's extensive lines of earthworks. According to
the army's informant, it was being openly said in London that
'Colonel Massey's former gallantry will acquit him before the
world, and Holles and Stapleton are men beyond your reach to deal
withall' .4 This is indirect evidence that Massey was already
involved in attempts to organise armed resistance against the New
Model. His leadership qualities tended to raise his prestige among
the Presbyterians in this tense period, especially since the war
records of Holles, Stapleton and many others were undistinguished.
(1) BL, kld.Mss.37,344, f.95b.
(2) CLRO, LCCJB, 40, f.231b; Rushworth, vi.597-8; E 396(15): The
Humble Petition of the Lord Mayor..., July 3.
(3) Rushworth, vi.599; E 396(15), July 3.
(4) HPMF, Clarke Mss.41, f.157.
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At last, on the afternoon of 6 July, the New Model's long
awaited evidence against the eleven members was presented to the
Conmons.1 Some of the accused had been notified in advance, and
were called into the chamber imediately after the army delegation
had left, though not all could be found.2 The army's sweeping
allegations were poorly substantiated, partly because it was hard
to penetrate the Presbyterians inner counsels.3 Massey and his
colleagues, it was charged, had plotted to restore the King on
their own and not the Parliament's terms.4 Massey himself was also
accused of arresting Ensign Nicholas, who had opposed the Irish
service in April.5 This allegation at least had a basis in fact.
The army charged, unconvincingly, that Holles, Stapleton,
Massey and others were instrunental in obstructing the relief of
Ireland. But the New Model was justified in its claims that the
Presbyterian leadership had deliberately misled the Parliament as
to the numbers of Fairfax's soldiers drawn off to undertake the
Irish servic.e.6 Massey was further accused of being implicated in
a rumoured plot of early June, in which three regiments of foot,
bound for Ireland, were recalled from Worcestershire to Reading.
From here, allegedly, it was planned to deploy them in the defence
of London against the New Model.7
(1) Wailer, p.174; U, xi.317.
(2) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.97.
(3) E 397(10): The Army's Post, July 1-8.
(4) E 397(13): A Continuation of Certain and Remarkable
Passages, July 2-9, July 6; E 397(17): A Particular Charge
or Impeachment, July 9; Woolrych, p.l38.
(5) Ibid.




Of more imediate importance than the trial were the
declining relations between the city authorities and the army. It
was reported that the Presbyterian dominated London Militia
ConTnittee was purging Independently inclined officers from its
trained band regiments. The New Model was informed of one such,
wide-ranging, purge of the Southwark regiment.1 This naturally
created much apprehension in the army,2 which called upon the city
authorities to reinstate the dismissed off icers.3
On 9 July, the Parliament ordered all reformados to leave
the capital by the l5th.4 This unusually decisive move may have
been provoked by an assault on Thomas Fury's home and family by a
violent group of soldiers.5 Whether any of Massey's former
officers were involved in this attack on the home of his old
antagonist at Gloucester is not known.
As these events unfolded, the Presbyterian press was
forthright in the defence of &Iward Massey. It recalled the events
of 1643, offering a comparison between his conduct and that of a
leading Independent. In that year, Nathaniel Fiennes had hastily
surrendered Bristol to the forces of Prince Rupert; at Gloucester,
in sharp contrast, Massey had defied the King for over a month.
His stand had proved the 'principal means of saving the
Parliament, city, Kingdom from utter ruin and conquest by the
cavaliers' .6
(1) HPMF, Clarke tlss.41, ff.161b-162; Kishlansky, p.257.
(2) Ibid, ff.165-66; Woolrych, p.13l.
(3) Ibid, ff.166-67; Kishlansky, p.257.
(4) CJ, v.237-38; A&O, i.986-87; CP, 1.157.
(5) E 518(3) A Perfect Diurnall, no.106, July 5-12, p.l6Ol; CJ,
v.239.
(6) E 397(8): A Declaration..., July 8.
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The embattled Presbyterian leadership could not, by now,
hope for military assistance from the provinces. Poyntz was well
disposed to Holles, but had been imprisoned by his own troops.
The northern regiments had then placed themselves wholly at the
disposal of Fairfax and the New Model agitators.1
On 10 July Massey's petition concerning his long withheld
arrears was heard in the Coninons. A report from the Coninittee of
Accounts, which related to the money owed to Massey, was
considered at the same tirne.2 It was decided that the sum of
£2,000 should be awarded to the former Major General of the West.3
Massey's absence on the occasion of this decision shows that he
still had powerful friends capable of promoting his interests in
the house.
A Parliamentary ordinance was passed empowering the Militia
Coffmittee to raise a regiment of horse for the more rapid
suppression of violent disorders.4 This was specifically aimed at
the problem of the reformados, should they fail to leave London
voluntarily by the day specified in the earlier ordinance.5 But it
was very easy to interpret it as, at least equally, a threat to
the New Model.6 Towards mid-July rival petitions sponsored by
Presbyterian and Independent city interests were presented at
Westminster.7 Even more alarming for the Parliament was the
emergence of Royalism in city politics. Another civic petition
called for the King's person to be defended, and for the
(1) E-1.Cary, ed. Memorials of the Great Civil War (1842),
i.293,300-1; CP, 1.163; E 518(6): A Perfect Diurnall,
no.107, July 12-19, p.1667.
(2) C.J, v.239; Rushworth, vi.612.
(3) Ibid; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.98.
(4) A&0, i.987-89; U, ix.325-26; E 397(22): An Ordinance, July
12.
(5) CJ, v.240; Rushworth, vi.611; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, ff.97b-98.
(6) Dyve, p.68.
(7) Rushworth, vi.614-15; BL, Add.Nlss.37,344, f.98.
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re-establisinent of his 'just power and greatness'.l City politics
was becoming increasingly confused and factious. 'Thus each party
might frame what matter they pleased into petitions', noted
Whitelocke, 'and have hands to them, and multitudes to present
them' .2
On the 15th a detailed defence of the eleven members began
to circulate in London's streets. This document was the precursor
of the answer to the charges against them presented by Holles and
others to the Comons.3 For the moment, appealing to public
opinion was clearly thought likely to achieve more than a debate
in the house. In this appeal, Massey and his fellow accused sought
to defend themselves from the army's wide ranging but vague
accusations.4 Massey was particularly indignant at the charge of
impeding the relief of Ireland. He recalled Cromwell's troopers
resistance to enlistment, at Saffron Walden,5 and later dismissed
all the charges as 'frivilous'.6
The army had become increasingly determined that the
dismissed Independent militia officers in London be restored to
their comands.7 Fairfax's senior coninanders thought the army's
negotiations with the houses could not continue until the London
militia had been returned to 'safe and confiding hands'.8
Meanwhile, the Presbyterians tried to install a sympathetic
Covernor at Bristol, though this failed,9 and several officers
(1) Rushworth, vi.618; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.98b.
(2) Ibid.
(3) E 398(17): A Full Vindication and Answer..., July 15.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Rushworth, vi. 766.
(6) CR0, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.30.
(7) HPMF, Clarke Mss.41, f.185.
(8) Bell, 1.369.
(9) CSPD, 1645-47, pp.563-64; Bell, 1.370-1.
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arrived at York from London shortly after Poyntz's overthrow, who
were, so the New Model was informed, 'all creatures of the
accused, especially Massey'.l
Most of the reformados had stubbornly stayed in London and
the Parliament was powerless to persuade them to leave.2 There
were new and dramatic manifestations of Royalist sentiment in the
city. This was perhaps a response to the double radical challenge
- of Independent politics in the army, and sectarian religion in
the capital. A central figure in the rebirth of London Royalism
was the Lord Mayor, Sir John Gayre, who had been very active
during the attempted coup of 12 June.3
On 19 July, Massey and the other Presbyterian leaders
attended the Coninons, to present their reply to the charges of the
army.4 But the house decided to postpone any decision on the
matter.5 This convinced Holles and his colleagues that the
Parliament was intimidated by the army, and would not stand by
them. Next day they sought permission to absent themselves from
Westminster for six months.6 Many of the eleven members must have
doubted whether they would ever be allowed to resume their
Parliamentary or military careers. Such doubts may well have
underlain Massey's request for his arrears to be settled before
his departure. On the occasion of the eleven members last
(1) CP, i.163.
(2) CJ, v.249.
(3) R.Brenner, 'The Civil War Politics of London's Merchant
Comunity', P&P, (1973), p.90; V.Pearl, London and the
Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution (1972), pp.301-02; HPMF,
Clarke Mss.41, f.79.
(4) CJ, v.250; Rushworth, vi.627; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.99.
(5) Ibid.
(6) CJ, v.251; Rushworth, vi.628; Woolrych, p.166.
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attendance at Parliament, a large crowd seems to have demonstrated
outside the chamber in their support.1
The Parliament was now totally dependent on the city militia
to protect it against the New Model.2 Colonel Webb, Massey's
former colleague in the West, was ordered to attend to the
security of the houses.3 On 17 June, Webb had also been appointed
'Major General of all the forces of the city of London',
presumably by the corporation's Militia Conrnittee.4 A close
colleague of Massey was therefore in charge of the London militia
during the purge of Independent officers from its ranks. Massey
himself may well have been involved. The army's insistence that
these officers be reinstated aroused more Presbyterian opposition
in the city than had its interference with the Parliament, since
it affected the corporation's own rights, of which it was more
jealous.5 A high Presbyterian petition at Skinnet's Hail, which
called for the capital's militia to be left as it was, soon began
to attract massive support.6
Despite this agitation, the Conmons favoured conciliating
the army, and on 22 July voted by a large margin to reinstate the
purged Independent militia officers.7 This move antagonised its
military protectors at the Guiidhall, provoking far more
(1) CJ, v.252; Rushworth, vi.628-29.
(2) Ibid.
(3) BL, Add.Mss.18,780, f.37b; BL, Add.Mss.37,343, f.388b; CJ,
v.252; Rushworth, vi.629.
(4) E 393(30): Mercurius Britanicus, June 17-24, June 17.
(5) Woolrych, pp.l69-7O; Wailer, p.l82.
(6) CLRO, LCCJB, 40.ff.235b-36; LI, ix.354; Sharpe, ii.252.
(7) CJ, v.254; Rushworth, vi.632.
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indignation than in early June.1 In one Presbyterian propaganda
tract, an imaginary New Model agitator proclaimed his respect and
admiration for the Presbyterian military leaders in the capital,
of whom Massey and Wailer were named as the most prominent.2
Clearly the city was being asked to believe that an armed
confrontation with the the New Model could be won, and should be
tried.
On the 24th the houses denounced the Skinner's Hall
petition, warning that those taking part in further resistance to
the proposed changes in the militia might be charged with high
treason, and therefore risked death.3 But not even by such dire
warnings could the Parliament stem the tide of resentment sweeping
through the city. The call for the King to be brought to London,
which had originated at Skinner's Hall, now 'went ... through the
city like a train of gunpowder'.4 The attempted Presbyterian coup
of late July and early August 1647 was, in one sense, a genuine
popular movement against the New Model's interference in city
affairs. But the excluded Presbyterian leaders were quick to
exploit it for their ow-n ends.5
Some of the eleven members, such as Wailer, denied all
responsibility for fomenting the unrest,6 though London
(1) Kishlansky, p.264.
(2) E 399(29): A Copy of a Letter..., July 22.
(3) A&0, i.991-2; CJ, v.257; Wailer, p.182.





Independents were convinced of their active complicity. Thomas
Juxon believed that the eleven began to spend more time in the
city upon their removal from the Coninons. He also accused them of
organising secret meetings with 'all sorts of persons: for to
countermine the army'.l There can be little doubt that it was the
city Presbyterians on the Conuion Council and Militia Coninittee who
played the leading role in the political coup,2 though the
Parliamentary Presbyterians must at least have been encouraged by
the rising tide of protest and followed it with keen interest.
On the 26th, the storm broke. Large crowds of ref ormados
and citizens marched on Westminster, demanding that the latest
militia ordinance be repealed.3 Many of the eleven members knew of
this demonstration in advance.4 Holles, Stapleton, Wailer and
Massey were at the Bell tavern in King street close to the
unfolding drama around the houses of Parliament. This was more
than a coincidence: all were clearly waiting upon events.5 The
undefended houses were duly invaded by the crowds, and forced to
reinstate the old Militia Corrrnittee and to call the King to London
so that a personal treaty might be agreed.6 Independent
sympathisers who witnessed these disorderly demonstrations were
(1) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, f.112.
(2) V.Pearl, 'London's Counter Revolution', in G.E.Aylmer, ed.
The Interregnum (1982), pp.51,55-6; BL, Add.Ms.37,344,
f.lOOb; Kishlansky, pp.264-5; Holles, p.145.
(3) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, ff.112b-13; Clarendon, iv.242.
(4) Walier, p.102; Barnfield, pp.31-2.
(5) Holles, pp.153-4; Wailer, pp.104-06; Pearl, 'London's
Counter Revolution', p.52.
(6) BL, Add.Mss.29,747, ff.15-15b; HPMF, Clarke Mss.41, f.97;
BL, Add.tlss.37,344, f.100; Wailer, pp.183-84; Holles, p.145.
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again convinced of the civic authorities complicity in them.1
According to Holles, Massey left his colleagues at the inn as soon
as the first news arrived of turbulent scenes around St Stephens
chapel.2 He may well have ventured down to the Palace yard to see
for himself what was going on.
Everything now depended on the army's response to these
dramatic events. The following day, a delegation of citizens
presented a petition to the Coninon Council, asking that basic
defensive measures be taken,3 including the appointment of a
coninander-in-chief for the militia. Massey's name was chosen
because of his 'valour and fidelity' as well as his obvious
military ability.4 But why did this genuine outburst of public
enthusiasm in favour of Massey take place? Occasional absences on
business aside, Massey had been a permanent resident of London
since late 1645. The London press had long sung his praises as a
patriotic and valiant coninander, in descriptions which had
sometimes verged on hero worship.5
The main basis of public esteem was the widely held belief
that his prolonged and successful defence of Gloucester in 1643
had saved London. But Massey's relationship with Holles, Stapleton
and other prominent Parliamentary Presbyterians, deliberately
cultivated in the capital throughout 1646 and early 1647,
naturally increased his popularity in the city. And he was seen to
be standing up to the New Model, the Independent party and their
(1) BL, Add.Mss.29,747, ff.15-15b; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, ff.100-
lOOb; CP, i.218.
(2) Holles, p.154.
(3) CLRO, LCCJB, 40.f.241.
(4) Ibid.
(5) E 7(17): The London Post, no.3, Aug 27, p.7.
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unwarrantable demands. Massey's war record, far more distinguished
than those of his political sponsors, had enabled him to attract
to London several able officers desirous of further military
service under him.1 Doubtless these individuals, like John Fitz-
James, would form the core of the new Presbyterian high coirinand
that Massey endeavoured to create in London.
When news arrived that the New Model was marching against
the capital, the city leaders began to raise forces for its
defence.2 Such was the corporation's affection for Skippon, that
the Cannon Council desired that he comand the city's defence
forces,3 even though he continued to reside with the New Model and
showed no inclination to desert it. The name of James, the
fourteen year old Duke of York, was also proposed, doubtless by
Royalists prepared to support the Presbyterian coup. The young
Duke would have merely been a figurehead, and it is doubtful if he
would have allowed himself to be so used unless ordered by his
father.4
On 30 July, Parliament reassembled without many of its
Independent and moderate members. The eleven excluded MPs were
called back into the chamber one by one. Massey was again seventh
in order of seniority.5 He and Waller were added to the Connittee
of Safety, created on June 11 during the first and abortive
Presbyterian coup,6 and now hastily reformed, in order to
(1) BL, MF 330, Alnwick Mss.547, ff.91-92b; SP, 28/47 pt.1,
f.28b.
(2) CLRO, LCCJB, 40.f.243; BL, Add.Mss.37,344, ff.100-OOb;
Rushworth, vi. 646.
(3) DrWL, Juxon Mss.24*50, f.114b.
(4) CSPV, 1647-52, p.10.
(5) CJ, v.260; Holles, p.l57; Rushworth, vi.652; Clarendon,
iv.243.
(6) Ibid; LI, vi.361; Woolrych, p.173.
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to coordinate the defence of the capital.1
During the afternoon of the 30th the Militia Cocrriittee of
the London corporation appointed Massey 'Corrinander General in
thief' of the existing and projected city forces.2 This choice
clearly reflected his popularity among the citizenry, and the
impracticability of appointing any of his rivals, who were
unwilling or unable to serve. But most of all, Massey's record,
and especially the famous defence of Gloucester, must have
strongly recomended him to the authorities at the Guildhall.3
Next day, Massey was confirmed in his position by both
houses of Parliament. The few remaining peers invited delegates
from the corporation into the chamber and thanked them for
appointing someone who was 'so able' to undertake such a heavy
responsibility.4 Later Massey was to recall with considerable
pride that he had been 'elected...by the Corrinon Council of the
famous city of London, to be their cormander in chief for defence
of the King and Parliament, the Kingdom and the city' .5 Massey now
assumed the mantle of military leader of the Presbyterian counter-
revolution.
(1) Wailer, p.186.
(2) cLRO, LCCJB, 40.f.244; GRO, ME' 285, Barwick Ms.f.33a.
(3) Rushworth, vi.646; E 518(12): A Perfect Diurnall, no.109,
July 26-Aug 2, p.1682.
(4) LI, ix.362.




Clearly, Massey's personal and political future depended on
the successful defence of London. If the New Model could be
beaten, he could expect to be made Parliamentary Coninander in
Chief. As such, he might have been able to play the role later
asst.niied by George Monck, in smoothing the path to a restoration of
the King. Massey, Waller and Poyntz, the latter having previously
been released by the New Model, began to enlist reformados into
auxiliary regiments for the defence of London. According to Juxon,
a hostile conrnentator, 'Massey took upon him the disposing of the
guards of the city and great threatenings [of] what to do'.l
Meanwhile, the New Model's remorseless advance towards the
capital continued.2 Both the Parliament and the corporation again
called upon it to release the King, so that negotiations between
Charles, and the Parliamentary and Scottish Ccxirnissioners could
begin.3 Royalists and Presbyterians could not cooperate
effectively against the New Model, since both wanted very
different things from the attemped coup.4 Each had cause to fear
the consequences of a total victory of the crown or the
Presbyterian faction over the New Model and the Independents.
On paper, the forces at Massey's disposal were formidable:
the trained band and auxiliary regiments, reformados, watermen and
apprentices together outnumbered easily the 18,000 men under
Fairfax's coimiiand.5 Neither were there major problems of supply or
finance. But it proved very difficult to rnobiiise these forces.
The Presbyterian leaders political objectives were ill-defined,
(1) DrWL, Juxon Ms.24*50, f.115.
(2) E 518(14), p.2O4; Rushworth, vi.647.
(3) cLRO, LCcJB, 40.ff.244b-46; BL, Add.tlss.37,344, f.101b;
Rushworth, vi.648-51; C.J, v.262; U, ix.364; Holies, p.l58.
(4) Dyve, p.73; Bodi., Clarendon SP, 30(1) (2565), f.24.
(5) Pearl, 'London's Counter Revolution', pp.53-4; Wailer,
pp.188-9; BL, Add.tlss.37,344, f.101b; Rushworth, vi.647;




and thus their prograrrrne of action was also unclear.1 As the New
Model closed in upon the capital, there was confusion,
indifference and lethargy in many quarters.2
By 1 August, there were mass resignations of officers from
trained band and auxiliary regiments.3 Soon the comtand structure
of the London militia was thrown into chaos.5 Parliament had not
repudiated New Model clearly, or dismissed Fairfax. Yet it had
sanctioned the rnobilisation of the civic forces against its own
army. It is little wonder that there was confusion as to the
houses intentions, or that even Presbyterian sympathisers were
filled with forboding and even despair.4 As the army moved closer,
the mood in the capital turned to fear and panic.6 The obvious
unity and resolve of the New Model during the crisis must have
surprised many.
Many Presbyterian leaders were unwilling to admit, and
sought to minimise, the embarrassingly rapid collapse of the
coup.7 Further, many of the documents generated by the
Presbyterian high coninand have not survived, and may well have
been destroyed iriinediately before the New Model's arrival in
London. The nemsis of Massey's coniuiand is therefore shrouded in
obscurity. But it is certain that he encountered increasingly
serious problems in raising sufficient forces. Whole trained band
regiments refused orders.8 Whatever the initial level of
(1) t1ontereul, ii.212; CJ, v.262; Pearl, 'London's Counter
Revolution', p.48.
(2) Dyve, pp.73-4; Montereul, ii.210-12; Baillie, iii.17;
Waller, pp.187-88.





(7) Holles, pp.l6O-l; Waller, p.366.
(8) DrWL, Juxon Mss.24*50, f.116.
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spontaneous enthusiasm, it began to evaporate once the
consequences of the events of July 26 became clear.
Soon, organised opposition to the coup and the plans to
defend the capital against the army began to emerge in London. A
delegation to the city, from the borough of Southwark made clear
that it wanted no part in the defence of London against the New
Model.1 Massey continued to brief the Lord mayor on its
remorseless advance upon London.2 On 2 August, the bearers of a
peace petition, together with the Southwark delegates, were
attacked by Poyntz and some reformados in the Guildhall yard.3
Massey may well have arrived during this mayhem, but it is
unlikely that he joined with Poyntz in what what was obviously a
disastrous political mistake.4 The bloodshed probably helped to
convince many Coarnon Councillors that the city was on the verge of
anarchy. Such a prospect placed the inininent arrival of the New
Model in an entirely new context.5 The pragrnatists in the
corporation now secured an abrupt change of line: accomodation
with the army became a priority.6
By now, it was clear that the unity essential to resist the
New Model had crunbied into faction, intrigue and demoralisation.7
This failure stenined mainly from political factors beyond Massey's
(1) BL, Add.tlss.37,344, f.102b; Rushworth, vii.741; HPNIF Clarke
Mss.41, f.162.
(2) E 400(39): The Kingdoms Weekly Intelligencer, July 27-Aug 3,
Aug 2.
(3) BL, Add.Mss.37,344, f.102b; Rushworth, vii.741; E 518(15): A
Perfect Sumery, no.3, Aug 2-9, p.19.
(4) DrWL, Juxon Mss.24*50, ff.117-17b.
(5) CLRO, LCCJB, 40.f.247.
(6) Holles, p.160; Baillie, iii.17; Montereul, ii.221; GRO, MF
285, Barwick Mss.f.33a.




control.1 They do not reflect on his military competence.
To the end Massey devoted himself to shoring up the city's
disintegrating defences.2 Only when the situation was hopeless did
he advise the corporation to 'conclude with the army'.3 But by
then he was aware that the city fathers had already opened direct
negotiations with the New Model coainanders. He may well have felt
badly let down by the Coninon Council, and later, together with
Poyntz, described the civic leaders as being 'like waves
beaten with every wind', taking or receiving 'counsels as they
fears do prompt them' .4 This disrespect was more than justified
by events. For Massey was abandoned by the very men he had tried
to defend. As Holles remarked, the corporation 'did not so much as
provide for Major General Massey, whom they had made their
coninander-in-chief; but ... bow'd under the burden, betray'd
themselves and all that had to do with them' 5
In the early morning of 4 August a detachment of the New
Model entered Southwark unopposed.6 Both Massey and Poyntz, as the
military leaders of the coup, feared falling into the hands of the
army, and hastened to leave the city for the continent.7
Massey, a proud man, must have felt not only betrayed but
also humiliated. His disillusion with the Independents at
Gloucester and in the West was now matched by resentment at his
treatment at the hands of the Presbyterian leadership in London.
The events of July-August 1647 accelerated his gradual recoil from
the Parliamentarian cause. His fall from influence was inmediate
and dramatic. The powerful military and political leader found
himself forced to exchange a highly prestigious position for a
ship bound for Holland and an impoverished future.
(1) Rushworth, vii.749; Woolrych, p.l68.
(2) E 518(16): A Perfect Diurnall, no.110, Aug 2-9, p.1689.
(3) DrJL, Juxon Mss.24*50, f.116.
(4) Rushworth, vii.766.
(5) Holles, p.l63.




MASSEY'S LATER CAREER, 1647-1674.
Massey was now reduced for a second time to the position in
which he had found himself at the outset of his wartime exploits -
that of penniless exile in Holland. Here he einbarked on a gradual
reconciliation with Royalism. The process was already under way.
Just before leaving London, he and Poyntz penned a political
justification of their attempt to defy the New Model.1 Given the
circumstances in which it was written it was an icrtnensely
complacent document. Massey's last minute escape, though
successful, was not without its dangers.2 It was ininediately
rumoured that he had fled to Scotland. Here the Covenanters were
indignant at the developments in England and were rumoured
(falsely) to be gathering an army.3 The idea of a connection
between Massey and the Scottish Presbyterians was not implausible,
though some of their divines blamed him for the collapse of the
coup in London.4
Massey, however, was en route for Amsterdam, where he
arrived safely on 9 August.5 He soon called upon the Queen of
Bohemia at the Hague, where it was reported that he spoke 'much
for ye King'.6 The transformation from Presbyterian to Royalist
was underway. Massey was returning to the loyalties which had
prompted his removal from Holland seven years before.
Upon the army' s entry into London Massey was lampooned in a
satirical broadsheet,7 though the Presbyterian press of London
(1) Rushworth, vii.765-66.
(2) CR0, MF 285; Barwick Mss.f.33.
(3) Baillie, iii.16; E 401(20): A Speedy Hue and Cry..., Aug 10;
Rushworth, vii. 788.
(4) Baillie, iii.16-17.
(5) E 404(28): The Moderate Intelligencer, Aug 19-26, Aug 19.




responded loyally, and Corbet's highly favourable account of his
Governorship at Gloucester was again reprinted.1 Even more
encouraging was a declaration of support from the majority of the
officers serving with the English forces in Ireland.2 It seems
that Massey had close personal friends serving in Ireland, which
may help explain Parliament's decision to appoint him Lieutenant
General of the army that was proposed to campaign there. In
October, he shrewdly renewed his connection with these officers by
correspondence.3 In late 1647, John Dorney, the town clerk of
Gloucester, composed a poem complimenting Massey's abilities, and
it is easy to imagine the former Governor being touched and
flattered.4 There were many to be found who remembered the exiled
Massey with respect and affection.
In late January 1648, the eleven members, including Massey
were excluded from the Comions, and it was also stated that they
would be impeached for high treason.5 Massey continued to exchange
letters with his officer friends in Ireland, voicing
dissatisfaction with the political situation.6 England was by now
on the brink of the Second Civil War, and some in the New Model
believed that Massey and other exiled Presbyterian leaders were
actively fomenting it in Scotland.7
When the Duke of York managed to escape from Parliamentary
custody in May 1648, Massey and Fitz-Jamnes were in the
(1) E 402(22): An Outcry Against the Speedy Hue and Cry..., Aug
18; E 402(23): Virtue and Valour Vindicated..., Aug 19; E
402(4): A True and Impartial Relation..., Aug 14.
(2) HMC, Egmont Mss.i (1905), p.461.
(3) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.3.
(4) GNQ, ii.436-37.
(5) Whitelocke, ii.266-7.
(6) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.8.
(7) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 30(2) (2735), f.310.
-254-
Chapter 9
welcoming party at Dort. A pleasant sail along the Dutch canals
followed.1 Meanwhile, in England, the New Model was preoccupied by
increasing provincial unrest. Friends of Massey and Wailer soon
began to urge them to return to England.2 Massey was also assured
by his correspondents in Ireland that they rejected the charges
levelled by political opponents against him and pledged themselves
to serve him loyally when conditions improved.3
Speculation about Massey's political affiliations obliged
him to publish a declaration in London on 13 July. In it he
claimed that the exiled Henrietta Maria and the Prince of Wales
had offered him the rank of Lieutenant General should he agree to
assist in their plan to restore King Qiarles. Massey was prepared
to pledge his loyalty to the Royal family, but felt obliged to
refuse the Royalist offer of co1mnand.4 The proposed invasion was
to involve the use of foreign troops, which he could not bring
himself to sanction. Massey's Royalism was not yet unconditional.
In surriner [648 the Presbyterian exiles, taking advantage of
the New Model's absence from London during the Second Civil War
began to return from Europe. Denzil Holles resumed his seat in the
Coninons on 14 August.5 In early August, Fitz-James confirmed that
Massey had already arrived back in London,6 though he did not
(1) Bodi., Clarendon SP, 31(2772), f.66b.
(2) GRO, ME 285, Barwick £lss.f.7.
(3) Ibid, f.6.
(4) E 452(20): The Declaration of Major General Massey..., July
13.
(5) Rushworth, vii.1225-6.
(6) BL, ME 330, Ainwick Mss.548, f.20.
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appear at Westminster until early September.1 Perhaps he had been
busy renewing his many contacts in the city.
Events were moving quickly. Parliament was increasingly
resolved on an agreenlent with the King at Newport. The New Model
was increasingly inclined to block it; and its political weight
was enormously increased by resounding military victories. A new
crisis of state was inevitable. By early December the army had
advanced on London, and prepared once more to impose its will on
the houses at Westminster. As soon as the troops entered the
capital, leading Presbyterians and known friends of Massey were
placed under observation.2
On 6 December, Massey and his Presbyterian colleagues, who
must have been aware that Westminster Palace yard was filled with
troops, decided to go to Parliament anyway, and were arrested in
what became known as Pride's Purge.3 This gesture was designed to
draw public attention to the methods by which the army was
prepared to implement its political progranme. The army recognised
that the military ability of Massey, Wailer and Browne made their
escape especially dangerous, and they were soon separated from the
rest and taken to the King's Head in the Strand. Here, on 12
December, they were able to draft a political declaration,
protesting that the army had no right to detain them, but
declaring their readiness to stand trial in a freely constituted
Parliament.4 This political declaration was soon printed and
circulated in the capital.5
(1) B.D.Henning, ed., The Comons 1660-90 (1983), iii.29; DNB,
xiii.3.
(2) HMC, 14 Report (1-2), p.165.
(3) Whitelocke,	 ii.467-8,470-1;	 CP,	 ii.67-8;	 Rushworth,
vii.1353-55; D.Underdown, Prides Purge, (1985), pp.143-4.
(4) BL, Add.Mss.61,989, f.97.
(5) E 476(33): A Declaration to the City of London..., Dec 18.
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By thristmas day only eighteen members were still
imprisoned, of whom five - Wailer, Massey, Clotworthy, Browrie and
Copley, the 'pillars of the Scottish interest' - were now detained
at St James's palace.1 Rumours began to circulate that some of
them might be executed by the army.2 The New Model sought to
undermine Massey's reputation by spreading rumours that as
Governor of Gloucester he had been fiscally corrupt.3 During his
confinement Massey wrote an impassioned plea to the Prince of
Wales, urging that only Scottish forces be employed in any
invasion of England. The argument was buttressed by scriptural
quotations, something of a departure from the rather secular
values of its author.4 As the English revolution moved towards its
climax, Massey had clearly shifted as far as Presbyterian
Royalism.
On the arrival of the captive tharles I at St James's on 18
January 1649, Massey took advantage of the excitement to effect
his escape,5 audaciously disguising himself as a woman and walking
past the guards.6 Those of his colleagues who remained awaited
long terms of imprisonment.7 The next day, the fugitive Massey
wrote a political vindication of his conduct. He made no effort to
disguise his disillusion with the Parliamentarian cause. He
defended his earlier coninitment to the Solemn League and Covenant
of 1643, but complained at the Parliament's failure to settle in
(1) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 34(2972), f.17.
(2) Ibid, ff.19b-20.
(3) CP, ii.1.57-9.
(4) Bodl., Clarendon SF, 34(2993), ff.68-8b.
(5) Whitelocke, ii.498; DNB, xiii.3; Underdown, Pride's Purge,
p.195.
(6) Bodl., Clarendon SP, 34(3003), f.86.
(7) Ibid; Underdown, Pride's Purge, p.195; Adair, pp.198-200.
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full his arrears. Massey confirmed that the Independents had
attempted to recruit him to their faction. But his arrest by the
army greatly injured his self esteem and he was also offended by
Independent inspired rumours designed to blacken his reputation.
Massey deprecated the violence which the army used against both
King and Parliament, and looked forward to returning both to their
former freedoms when the opportunity presented itself.1
Massey must have arrived back in Holland around the time of
charles I's execution. Soon after, he and Lord Loughborough were
granted an audience by the young charles II during which Massey
was treated with respect.2 By mid-1649 he was busy 'preparing
fireworks' for the new King's ships.3 Later in 1649, Massey began
to be involved in the negotiations between Charles II and the
Scots.4 He remained convinced that the Covenant with the Scottish
Presbyterian leaders was the most realistic means of restoring the
monarchy.5 Some Royalists found it hard to forgive Massey's record
of service for the Parliament, and cast doubt on his new loyalty
to the crown.6 The Parliament itself now denounced its former
Major General as an enemy, and took steps to confiscate the
estates it had voted him.7
By March 1650, Massey was one of the King's leading
negotiators with the Scots at Breda. There he worked closely with
(1) E 541(7): A Short Declaration by Colonel Massey..., Feb 9.
(2) BG, p.103.
(3) CSPD, 1649-50, p.155.
(4) Baillie, iii.100-1.
(5) GRO, MF 285; Barwick Mss.f.30.




two colleagues, Alderman James Bunce of London and Captain Titus,
both uncompromising Presbyterians.1 Later that month Massey led a
party of eighty English Royalist officers to Scotland. They landed
in the Orkneys, and announced in a declaration their loyalty to
the crown, the Covenant, and the Presbyterian form of church
Government. They denounced the effective rule of the army in
England as an aberration and vowed to destroy it.2 This
declaration was later printed, and copies were found as far South
as Monmouthshire.3
Massey's comidtrnent to the Covenant enabled him to win the
favour of the Scottish leaders, a rare achievement amongst English
coninanders.4 His prominence in the coup of 1647 may have convinced
them of his sincerity. Certain of Massey's friends were also very
close to the King at the time of his arrival in Scotland. Titus
became a member of Charles II's bed-chamber.5 A Parliamentarian
intelligence source described Massey, Bunce, Titus and Graves as
'the close treaters'. Their links with the city of London, through
such men as Alderman Bunce, were believed to be especially
strong.6 The King named Massey Lieutenant General of the small
English contingent in Scotland, and he accepted, pledging himself
to overthrow the military power of the New Model and help
establish a Royalist-Presbyterian settlement in England.7
(1) BL, gerton Mss.1,533, f.47. Alderman Bunce had been closely
involved in the attempted Presbyterian counter-revolution of
July-August 1647.
(2) E 597(4): The Declaration of Major General Massey..., March
29.
(3) Whitelocke, iii.3.
(4) GRO, ME' 285, Barwick Mss.f.30; DNB, xiii.3; Webb, The
Governors General, p.37.
(5) Walker, pp.177,202.
(6) S.R.Gardiner, ed., tharles II & Scotland in 1650, Scottish
Historical Society (1894), p.114.




Before the battle of Dunbar, it seems that the Scots were
anxious to avoid over-reliance on those English Royalists
accompanying Charles 11.1 The distrust was, in at least some
cases, mutual. In Holland, Massey had had dealings with a wide
variety of English exiles, including even disenchanted Levellers.2
After the comprehensive defeat of the Scottish army at Dunbar,
however, the Scottish Presbyterians were in a weaker position in
relation to their allies, who became more prominent in the
Royalist camp.3 In late December, Massey was recocrinended to take
comand of a regiment of English and Scots. By early 1651 he had
been appointed General Major of horse, and was soon in comand of
a reserve brigade of cavalry comprising four regiments.4 His hit
and run raiding earned some successes against Cromwell's forces,5
and some Scots came to value his services highly.6
In the sumner of 1651 Charles II and his supporters risked
all in an invasion of England. Massey and his brigade formed the
advance guard of the King's army as it progressed through
Lancashire and Cheshire.7 This was not an ideal choice, since
Massey lacked the diplomatic skills necessary to forge a working
alliance between the Scottish Presbyterians and the English
Royalists .8
(1) Walker, p.l94.
(2) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.14.
(3) Baillie, iii.107.
(4) Sir.J.Balfour, ed. Historical Works (1825), iv.221,226,238,
299.
(5) W.S.Douglas, Cromwell's Scotch Campaigns 1650-1 (1899),
pp.2&O-1 , 269-7O ; DNB, xiii.3.
(6) Baillie, iii.134,136,155.
(7) Cary, ii.334-6; DNB, xiii.3.
(8) D.Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy in England (1960), p.49.
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Massey seems to have passed through Worcester and with a
strong force, continued southwards as far as Tewkesbury, into what
was familiar territory.1 A few miles away, Parliamentarian
Gloucester fortified itself against its old Governor.2 Massey did
not remain in Tewkesbury, but withdrew to Upton on Seveni with a
strong contingent of Scots. Here, he took possession of the
bridge, the first crossing point below Worcester, but was wounded
in the head and arm in a skirmish with Colonel General Lambert's
forces.3 His injuries prevented his participation in the decisive
battle of Worcester a few days later, though it is very unlikely
that this materially affected the outcome.
Charles II and his closest supporters were able to escape.4
Massey, despite his tenacity and ability to Improvise, was
hampered by his injuries, and was soon compelled to surrender
himself to the Duchess of Stamford, whose husband had conpianded
him in 1642.5 It had already been rumoured that Massey was dead
from his wounds.6 Shortly after his surrender a satirical pamphlet
was published in which his demise was proclaimed and which
professed to relate his regret at having abandoned the
Parliamentary cause.7 Having recovered somewhat, Massey was moved
(1) Whitelocke, iii.340.
(2) Ibid, p.337; Cary, ii.335; GRO, H 2/2, ff.70,74-5,103.
(3) Bund, pp.23O-33; Whitelocke, iii.340;
	 Cary, 11.326-7;
Bodl., Clarendon SP, 42, f.151b; DNB, xiii.3.
(4) E 641(15): The Declaration of Major General Massey..., Sept
15, p.3.
(5) Whitelocke, iii.349-50; Cary, ii.376-77,381-2.
(6) Cary, ii.357-58.
(7) E 641(15), pp.1-3.
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to Warwick castle and then to the Tower. There was talk of him
being tried for treason.1 Some London Presbyterian ministers
tried to raise money for Massey's relief, earning the disapproval
of the Rtznp Parliament.2
Throughout early 1652 Massey was held a prisoner in the
Tower. Only interrogation sessions enlivened the monotony of daily
existence.3 But, in August, assisted by some of the warders, he
again managed to escape, accompanied by several other prisoners.4
Massey must have left the country almost iimiiediately, though the
Government continued for many months to search for him in
England.5
Sir Edward Hyde recognised Massey's coninitment to the
Royalist cause, but doubted his usefulness as a servant of the
crown.6 This could have been because of Massey's support for the
alliance with the Scots, which Hyde opposed.7 But Qiarles II's
principal advisor also found it hard to take Massey seriously: the
latter simulataneously professed his loyalty to the crown and
tried to justify his service to the Parliainent!8
Behind Massey's melancholic temperament there lay a strong
streak of self-righteousness. This was the principle means by
which he concealed his inherent opportunism. When he escaped
from the Tower he was described as having 'brown hair, a
(1) CCAM, iii.1364; CSPD, 1651, pp.422-3,425,443; CSPD, 1651-2,
p.49; E 649(1): The Queen of Denmark's Letter..., Dec 1; E
641(18): The Charge and Articles of High Treason..., Sept
16.
(2) Baxter, p.67.
(3) CSPD, 1651-2, pp.138,213; CCAM, iii.1364.
(4) GRO, ME' 285, Barwick Mss.f.30; E 674(26): A New Hue and Cry
After Major General Massey..., Sept 6; CSPD, 1651-2, p.387.
(5) CSPD, 1651-2, p.507.
(6) CCSP, ii.155.




middle stature, sanguine complexion'.l Hyde thought him 'a
wonderfully vain and weak man, but means exceeding well and
faithfully to the King, and would serve him without limitations,
which few of the rest of the Presbyterians would do'.2 But some
Royalists continued to doubt his loyalty: like other ex-
Parliamentarians, Massey found it difficult to live down his
past .3
The outbreak of the Anglo-Dutch war raised Royalist hopes of
Dutch cooperation in restoring the monarchy. Massey was to the
forefront of such designs.4 His health, which had for long been
very robust, was no longer reliable, perhaps as a result of the
wounds sustained at Upton. Still he was able to work closely with
Alderman Bunce, and reconiiended him to Charles II. By 1653, Massey
and Bunce were involved in various schemes to raise funds for
their exiled monarch.6 In a new association with the Marquess of
Ormonde, Massey also tried to turn to the King's advantage the
complexities of Baltic diplomacy.7 It seems however that Hyde, did
not consider Massey to be particularly adept as a Royal
diplomatic agent.8
During his period of convalescence in Holland, it seems that
Massey wrote his memoirs. These, however, were judged so
(1) E 674(26), pp.1-2.
(2) CCSP, ii.177.
(3) NP, ii.4.
(4) E 684(5): A Declaration of the Proceedings of Major General
Massey..., Dec 22, pp.3-4.
(5) Bodi., Clarendon SF, 45, ff.4; GRO, MF 285, Barwick
Mss.ff.22,24.
(6) CCSP, ii.169,172; CR0, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.23.




controversial that their publication was deemed to require
sanction by the King.1 Royal consent was apparently not
forthcoming, presumably because Massey had attempted to vindicate
his career as a Parliamentarian, and an invaluable source was thus
lost to history!
Massey continued to correspond with the King on many
subjects.2 He was perceived by Qiarles' closest confidants as a
lobbyist for the Presbyterian interest, and it is probable that
this soldier adventurer was out of his depth in the complicated
diplomacy of the exiled court.3 Ormonde continued to correspond
with Massey. In mid-1653, he and the King were enquiring after
Massey's health, which had deteriorated again.4 The increasing
poverty of the court affected all its members. Petty squabbles and
jealousies began to multiply, as Royalist fortunes declined and
the cause seemed lost.5 For Massey, as for other Royalists, exile
held some bitterly dark and depressing moments.6
In England, the government continued to take an interest in
Massey's activities throughout 1653-4. He was ruiioured to be
involved in gun running operations to Scotland. In early 1654 it
was even reported that he had landed there with other Royalist
leaders.7 Thurloe was also informed that Massey had been seen
(1) CCSP, ii.184.
(2) Bodi., Clarendon SP, 45, ff.265-6; CCSP, ii.198-9.
(3) , i.11.
(4) GRO, MF 285, Barwick Mss.f.16.
(5) CCSP, ii.220,279; GRO, MF 285, Barwick tlss.f.17.
(6) Webb, The Governors General, p.37.
(7) C.H.Firth, ed. Scottish Historical Society (1895), pp.288-
9,290; C.H.Firth, ed. Scotland and the Protectorate 1654-59,
Scottish Historical Society (1899), p.59.
-264-
Chapter 9
in Gloucestershire.1 None of these reports was true. Hyde
continued to be distrustful of Massey's Presbyterian contacts.2 By
mid-1654 Massey and Bunce were living at Breda, and engaged
themselves, so it seems, in circulating anti-Conionwealth
propaganda among the Dutch.3
In 1655, Massey attended a meeting in Cologne, called by the
King to discuss his diplomatic relations with the English
Protectorate.4 Such was Massey's disillusion with his poverty and
lack of prospects, that he tried to seek positions elsewhere -
notably with the King of Denmark and the Duke of Modena. Such
intiatives came to nothing.5 Perhaps he demanded too generous
terms of employment.
Massey continued to intrigue with exiled Levellers. Such
bizarre relationships were a recurrent feature of Royalist
conspiracies in Europe.6 Massey and Bunce were influential leaders
of the Presbyterian faction throughout the 1650's.7 Massey was
even reported to have acquired a personal following - 'his gang' -
with which in late 1655 he was reputed to be in the Hamburg area.8
By this time, it seems, he had almost completely recovered from
his injuries.9 The Protectorate followed the Republic in
(1) T.Birch, ed. Thurloe's State Papers (1742), iii.165,177.
(2) CCSP, ii.295,302.
(3) Thurloe's State Papers, ii.373-4.
(4) CCSP, iii.35.
(5) Thurloe's State Papers, i.695; iii.741; iv.103; CSPD, 1655,
p.220; CCSP, iii.67.
(6) NP, iii.76
(7) CSPD, 1654, pp.235,246.




regarding Massey as a dangerous arid active opponent.1 Re was soon
active in plans for a pro-Royalist rising in Gloucestershire.2
Long periods of military inactivity were making him restless, and
he even considered entering the service of the Elector of
Brandenburg.3
It seems that Massey maintained tenuous contacts with the
city of London during his exile, which his new masters hoped to
exploit.4 Massey was also prominent in plans to invade England
with Spanish forces from Flanders if the opportunity presented
itself .5 Clearly his reluctance to use foreign troops as the means
to restore the monarchy had by now evaporated. By late 1656 it was
rumoured that Massey had infuriated Sir Edward Hyde by undertaking
a secret journey to England.6 Massey wrote to Charles II
concerning the 'Spanish' invasion plans and pledged his loyalty
'to the last drop of his blood'.7
In early 1657, Captain Titus, one of Massey's closest
colleagues, reported that they were both ready to travel into
England to coordinate the activities of the Royalist 'Sealed
Knot'.8 Massey became closely associated with the plans for
uprisings in Gloucestershire.9 But once again Massey considered
alternative employment because his own and his monarch's prospects
seemed so bleak.10
(1) J.T.Rutt, ed. The Diary of Thomas Burton Esquire (1828),
i.cxxxviii; NP, iii.158,175-6; CSPD, 1655-56, pp.196-97.
(2) CSPD, 1655-56, p.49.
(3) Ibid, pp.50-l.
(4) Ibid, p.237.








In early 1658, Charles II decided that Massey should leavc
for England to help organise resistance to the Cromwellian regime
in Gloucesterstiire.1 In the May of that year the Council of State
ordered that Massey, Titus, and others, should be imprisoned and
interrogated if caught.2 Later in the year Massey was in Antwerp
corresponding with Hyde about the extent of Royalist preparations
in England.3
Cromwell's death brought renewed Royalist activity on both
sides of the Channel. Massey still contemplated service under a
foreign Prince, but he was soon busy in plans for a return to
England.4 In March 1659 Hyde had put Massey in charge of the
planned rising for Gloucestershire and Bristol.5 Later that month
Massey arrived secretly in London under an assumed name, and began
to report on the turbulent politics of the capital in the last
phase of the Protectorate under Richard Cromwell.6
Hyde was concerned that Massey should cooperate as closely
as possible with other Royal agents. The Gloucestershire rising
aroused great hopes.7 Massey sought to persuade old colleagues
like Alexander Popham to lend it their support. He continued to
reside in London and to gather intelligence despite the dangers
involved.8 In April 1659, Massey travelled to Gloucestershire,
where his pre-eminent role in fomenting the rising there was
resented by Royalist agents, who sometimes obstructed his
(1) CCSP, iv.12.




(6) BL, Egerton Mss.2,536, f.327.
(7) CCSP, iv.189,190-1,202.
(8) BL, Egerton Mss.2,536, ff.355-6.
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activities.1 Hyde tried hard to reconcile Massey and one of his
principal antagonists, Viscount Mordaunt. But, by mid-1659 both
Hyde and the King were growing impatient with the delay of the
Gloucestershire rising .2
Meanwhile, it seems that Massey was trying to stir up unrest
in the Forest of Dean, where there was already much discontent
over enclosures.3 Leading local gentlemen, such as Popham,
however, proved reluctant to participate.4 Even more ominous, the
new regime in London had good intelligence about the planned
rebellion, and those likely to take part in it.5 Massey seems to
have returned to the capital in July, probably to coordinate his
plans with other Royalist agents.6 However, it is clear that the
success of the western rising hinged entirely around Massey, who
was in charge of its execution.
In late July the two Thomas Purys, father and son both of
whom were old antagonists of Massey, took decisive pre-emptive
action against the incipient rebellion. Dispatching troops of
horse from Gloucester they managed to arrest Massey, a nunber of
his supporters, and 'all his fireworks and other engines of war' .7
Yet again, however, Massey managed to make a dramatic escape from
his captors, on a dark and blustery night on Nympsfield hill. He
sought sanctuary among the well known glades of the Forest of
Dean.8
(1) M.Coate, ed. The Letter Book of John Viscount Mordaunt 1658-
60, Camden Society (1945), p.13; CCSP, iv.189.
(2) CCSP, iv.218-9.
(3) B.Sharp, In Contempt of All Authority (1980), pp.254-S;
CCSP, iv.222,270,278; GNQ, v.162-3.
(4) Ibid, 218-9,259.
(5) CP, iv.28-9; CCSP, iv.226,273.
(6) CCSP, iv.291; Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy, p.262.
(7) Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy, p.263.




The capture of Massey's small assault party led to the
collapse of the projected western rising.1 For one and a half
months he disappeared completely, arousing the anxiety of his
confederates on the continent. Resourceful as ever, he arrived at
last in Rotterdarn, disguised as a sailor.2 Massey was not held
accountable for the failure. His corilnitment and boldness in 1659
compared favourably to the inactivity of other, longer established
supporters of the King.3
Massey had many contacts in Britain, and was the among the
first to recognise that the English Republic was slowly
disintegrating.4 By December there was already talk of his return
to Bristol. Massey's absence was sorely missed by his fellow
conspirators in London.5
Early in 1660 Qiarles II and Massey apparently met and the
King asked him to return to England. On arrival, he would have
considerable discretion in determining his course of action.6 By
March both Massey and Titus were in London, noting the rise of
anti-Republican sentiment in the city. They were uneasy about
appearing openly, fearing to loose the support which they were
winning over.7 Massey contemplated the spectacular gesture of
forcing an entry into the Parliament at Westminster, but quickly
rejected it in favour of a journey to Gloucester, where he could
hope to accomplish more.8 The city elders welcomed and were eager
to ingratiate themselves with him, despite his known Royalism.




(5) CSPD, 1659-60, p.28O; CCSP, iv.494.
(6) Mordaunt, pp.156-?; CCSP, iv.509.




Some of the garrison took exception to this treatment, however,
and Massey had to be rescued by the citizens.1 But the incident
snowed that even in the Parliamentarian bulwark of Gloucester
there was now strong sentiment in favour of an accomodation with
the crown.
Massey's visit led to his selection as a member for
Gloucester in the Convention Parliament, called to replace the
discredited Rump.2 General t'bnck was vital to that process, but
still had to appease Republican sentiments to some extent: on his
return to London, Massey was placed in custody.3 This experience
was short-lived. As the momentum towards Restoration gathered
pace, Massey was able to gain re-admittance to the Coirnons. By
late April he was trailing a pike with the city trained bands
during a military parade in Hyde park.4 It was Massey who, soon
after, moved that the Republican coat of arms be taken down from
above the Speaker's chair in the Coiinons.5
Massey became quite active in the Convention Parliament and
it was even discussed whether he should accompany the delegation
that was to escort the King back to England.6 It seems that he was
knighted at Canterbury on 27 May, two days after Charles II had
landed at Dov-er.7 After the Restoration, Massey's rather
specialist talents as a soldier and undercover agent were less in
demand. Now in his late fifties, he had largely outlived his






(6) Henning, The Cormons 1660-90, p.3O; CCSP, v.11.
(7) W.A.Shaw, ed. The Knights of England (1971), i.226.
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usefulness. Clearly, he hoped to benefit financially and
politically from the Restoration.1 But so did thousands of others.
Initially Massey had hopes of being granted the iron-works
in the Forest of Dean once more. But these were restored to their
original owners, the Winter family, whose Royalism had been much
more consistent.2 Finally, in consideration of his 'faithful
service' to the crown, he was awarded a grant of land on a fifty-
one year lease, at Abbey Leix in Queens County, Ireland, and with
it some measure of financial security.3 It is clear that Orrnonde
was instrumental in securing this, and that Massey was
insufficiently well connected to secure a more desirable estate in
England.4
Curiously, Massey was also appointed Governor of Jamaica,5
perhaps because many of his old officers had been exiled there by
Cromwell's regime because they were regarded as politically
unreliable.6 It seems that the appointment was designed to appease
them and that it was not intended that he should take it up. Lord
Windsor was soon installed.7
The Restoration saw a massive reduction in the military
establishnent in England. Massey hoped to prolong his military
career, and the King tried to help him as far as he was able.8
It seems that Massey later tried to raise a regiment of foot
(1) GRO, HF 285, Barwick Mss.f.30.
(2) CSPD, 1660-61, p.171; Hyett, TBGAS (1893-94), p.105.
(3) BL, Egerton Mss.2,551, f.84; BL, Egerton Mss.2,542, ff.447-
7b; CSPI, 1660-62, p.72.
(4) CCSP, v.305.
(5) E.S.De Beer, ed. The Diary of John Evelyn (1955), p.257.
(6) C.Firth and G.Davies, Regimental History of Cromwell's Army
(1940), ii.707; Webb, The Governor's General, pp.157-58.
(7) F.Cundall, The Governors of Jamaica in the Seventeenth
Century (1936), p.10.




himself, but such a task must have been well beyond him
financially.1 Still, £3,000 was voted him in Parliament, and was
issued in March 1661.2
Massey was duly elected to the Cavalier Parliament for
Gloucester in 1661.3 It seems that he lodged close to houses at
Westminster,4 and became engaged in the busy social life of the
capital.5 Massey began to take a close interest in Irish affairs.
tharles even enquired if there was a military coninand available
for him in that Kingdom, and on August 7 expressly instructed that
he be made a Privy Councillor for Ireland.6
Yet even now, Massey could not live down his Parliamentary
past. It was idly reported in early 1662 that he was involved in a
plot to assassinate the King and seize key strongholds in
England.7 Clarendon may have regarded Massey's past as an
embarrassment which it was convenient to export to Ireland.8
Massey's friendship with Ormonde seemed to deepen with time and he
was soon engaged in transporting his horses and other goods across
the Irish sea.9 It seems that Massey was in Ireland between 1663-
64 where he doubtless preoccupied himself with his estates at
Abbey Leix.10
Massey did some service during the second Anglo-Dutch war in
the prize office at Dover. He was critical of the Medway defences
(1) C.Dalton, ed. English Army Lists and Coninission Registers
1661-1714 (1892), i.66.
(2) CSPD, 1660-61, p.423; Calendar of Treasury Books, 1.231.
(3) DNB, xiii.3; Henning, The Coninons 1660-90, iii.30.
(4) GRO, ME' 285, Barwick Mss.ff.33-33b.
(5) R.C.Latham, ed. Samuel Pepys, ii.219.
(6) CSPI, 1660-62, pp.373,392.
(7) CSPD, 1661-62, pp.464-65.
(8) Henning, iii.30.





which the Dutch breached with such consumate ease.1 His presence
in Kent during tnis period can perhaps be explained by the fact
that his old colleague Silius Titus was Governor of Deal in 1666
and the Colonel of the eastern regiment of the Cinque ports
militia.2
Massey's religious beliefs continued to cause some confusion
among his contemporaries. Some thought he would clamp down on the
non-conformist coninunity in Dover. But others identified him with
the Presbyterians in the Conmons.3 Earlier, during the Civil War,
Massey's evident religious tolerance had caused some controversy
at Gloucester itself.4 Massey's Presbyterianism was probably more
political than religious in character. He may have kept company
with known Presbyterians mainly out of habit or obligation to old
associates.
In 1667 Massey attended a meeting of the Irish Privy Council
at Kilkenny castle.5 But it seems that he travelled regularly to
England to attend the court at Whitehall, on one occasion
carrying a letter for Ormonde in London.6 He certainly concerned
himself with Irish related legislation in the Coninons.7 He also
lobbyied the thrds of the Treasury on behalf of individuals who
had approached him to help secure pensions.8
Both Massey and Titus spent much of the late 1660s bisily
accumulating as much property as they could, from any available
(1) CSPD, 1665-66, p.225; Henning, iii.30; C.Robins, ed. The
Diary of John Miliwood (1938), p.220.
(2) C.Dalton, English Army Lists, p.66.
(3) D.R.Lacey, Dissent and Parliamentary Politics (1969),
pp.421-22.
(4) E 334(5): A Relation of That Great and Public Consternation
Had in_Gloucester..., April 24.
(5) CSPI, 1666-69, pp.449-50.
(6) Henning, iii.30-31; CSPI, 1666-69, p.462; Carte, v.60.
(7) Ibid; Robbins, ed. Milward Diary, p.lt5l.
(8) Calendar of Treasury Books, ii.305.
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source.1 In 1671 Massey even discovered an interest in naval
matters.2 A year later he congratulated Arthur Capel, Earl of
Essex, on his appointment as the new Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.3
Massey was certainly one of those active in warning Parliament
against the rise of Popery in Irish local Government and at
Whitehall.4 Clearly he was no passive courtier in the last years
of his life.
Massey was still active in Irish affairs at Westminster
during the beginning of 1674.5 But by the end of that year he was
dead.6 His burial at Abbey Leix suggests that he died suddenly
whilst visiting his estate.7 One of his brothers was appointed
executor of the will, which, under pressure from the many with
claims on his estate, was quickly proved at Dublin.8
Massey's varied career illustrates most clearly how an
individual can react with and influence events. He genuinely
wished to surrender Gloucester in 1643 and to defend London in
1647. His failure to do either had profound consequences both for
himself and for the Kingdom. The many ironies of his life must
have crowded around him in his old age.
Politically Massey remains something of an enigma. But
opportunism was the most important part of the picture. Massey was
a professional soldier who used the political instability of his
times to further his career. This led him to desert the
Royalists. His success at Gloucester and in the West was that of a
mercenary, though he fought perhaps less for money than for rank
and the status and responsibility it conferred. Massey's treatment
(1) Calendar of Treasury Books, iii(2), 822.
(2) BL, Add.Ms.38,849, f.63.
(3) BL, Stow Ms.200, f.35.
(4) Henning, iii.31; R.Hutton, Charles II (1989), p.300.
(5) Ibid.
(6) BL, Loan 29/83, Sir Edward Harley's Papers, no foliation.
(7) Ormerod, ii.399; DNB, xiii.3.
(8) BL, Loan 29/83 no foliation; F.A.Hyett, 'Notes on the
Portraits of Sir Edward Massey' TBGAS (1921), p.241.
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at the hands of the more vociferous Parliamentarians, some of whom
may nave understood the cynicism of his attachment to their cause,
served to weaken it further.
Massey's association with the Presbyterians was placed under
strain by the failure of the coup of July and August 1647. His
treatment by the army in 1648 further estranged him from the
fringes of the cause for which he had fought. There is no doubt
that Massey became a consistent Royalist but he kept close links
with his old Presbyterian comrades. Despite rumours to the
contrary, Charles II and Clarendon were convinced of his loyalty,
and his conduct from 1649 proved them right.
Militarily Massey was very capable indeed. Had he combined
political astuteness with martial talent he could have become one
of the major figures of the period. His failure was connected to a
lack of political motivation and understanding. Massey's evident
skill as a military engineer was demonstrated most spectacularly
by the defence of Gloucester, but also by many smaller actions
elsewhere. At Hereford, Westbury, Malmesbury, Beachley and
Evesham, Massey proved his capacity for conand and his ability to
minimise casualties. Massey mastered the techniques of garrison
warfare (during his time at Gloucester) more comprehensively than
the wider strategic operations with which he was entrusted. But
the fact that his conuand in the West was competent rather than
brilliant was primarily because he was granted such meagre
resources. The failure of his greatest military responsibility,
the defence of London, was not essentially a military but a
political failure. It can be laid at Massey's door only to the
extent that he was a member (and not the most senior) of the
Holles group.
Certainly Massey possessed physical courage. This is evident
not only from his record in innumerable skirmishes, battles and
sieges, but also in undercover operations after 1649. Indeed
Massey was both notoriously lucky, and impetuous enough to push
his luck. His only serious wounds were sustained at Upton and he
later became an adept ecapologist. However Massey's headstrong
temperament and intellect were not really compatible with the
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complicated diplomacy which the exiled royal court had to
particiapate in. After 1660 his talents were largely those of a
past age.
Massey's personality was essentially that of a petulant
loner. He could be proud, aloof and self-centred to the point of
remaining unmarried and childless. It seems that he cultivated
very few close friendships and that people tended to respect more
than like him. But Massey did demonstrate loyalty to those who
served him unquestioningly. Backhouse, Edward Harley, Titus and
Bunce knew him as a valiant and trustworthy comander and friend.
If Massey had lived by the sword he did not choose to be
ruled by it, nor against the odds did he die by it. The elements
of greatness within him were flawed by some very h.nnan failings.
Having fought for both sides Massey could perhaps afford to be
more acconinodating and forgiving than most. He experienced the
tragedy of the Civil Jar in all its enormity but always aimed to
minimise that tragedy.1
For Edward Massey, cynicism made the conflict a war without
an enemy. This was not because of any inherent tolerance and
understanding but because of the shallowness of his personal
motives throughout most of the Civil War. The instinctive Royalism
which made him return from Holland in 1640 only slowly came to
reassert itself as Massey's Parliamentary colleagues came to
appreciate his cynical and self-serving attachment to their cause.
Ultimately he slowly gravitated back towards the Royalist camp
because he had become antagonised against all shades of
Parliamentary opinion. Even after 1649 many Royalists, such as
Clarendon, although finding some admirable qualities in Massey,
found it very difficult to forgive him his past. Like so many
other Englishmen throughout the 1640's and 1650's the only real
cause that Massey believed in was his own. He transcended the
relevance and causes of the war by simply putting his own
priorities before all others. If his career is illustrative of
(1) BG, p.lOO; DNB, xiii.4.
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anything it is how such a self-centred individual can influence
great events even when his intentions are far removed from the
actual course of action that he ultimately decided to undertake.
Above all Massey is an object lesson in hiiaan nature and how
his very personal priorities could effect the outcome of far
nobler political and constitutional conceptions of law and
sovereignty. Civil Wars may often be about profound differences of
principle but the individuals who very often fight in them do not
always rise to the occasion either ideologically or personally.
The individual and human element in such conflicts should never be






Surviving letters written by Massey, or copies made of them. These
have been placed in chronological order.
BL, Add.Ms.18,979, f.133, February 11 1643, Massey to Colonel
Nathaniel Fiennes.
Bodi. Clarendon SP, 221(1708), f.93, spring 1643, Massey to
Colonel Fiennes.
Bodi. Nalson Ms. 11(272), ff.191-2, June 3 1643, Massey and others
to Speaker Lenthall.
Bodi. Tanner Ms. 62(2), f.197, July 29 1643, Massey to Speaker
Lenthall.
Bodl. Tanner Ms. 62(2), f.199, July 29 1643, Massey to Speaker
Lentnall.
Bodl. Nalson Ms. 3(42), f.82, October 6 1643, Massey to the Earl
of Essex.
BL, Egerton Ms. 785, f.7, March 11 (?) 1644, Massey to the Earl of
Essex.
BL, Loan 29/174, f.33, June 3 1644, pass written by Massey.
BL, Loan 29/174, f.35, June 3 1644, Massey to Thomas Harley.
BL, Loan 29/174, f.41, June 27 1644, pass written by Massey.
BL, Loan 29/174, f.44, July 6 1644, Massey to Colonel Edward
Harley.
SP, 21/16, ff.98-101, July 6 1644, Massey to the Coninittee of Both
Kingdoms.
SP, 21/16, f.127, July 16 1644, Massey to the Coninittee of Both
Kingdoms.
BL, Harleian Ms.166, ff.93-93b, July 20, Massey to Speaker
Len tha 11.
SP, 21/16, ff.148-52, August 4 1644, Massey to the Coninittee of
Both Kingdoms.
Bodi. Tanner Ms. 61, f.106, early August 1644, Massey to Speaker
Lenthall.
SP, 21/16, ff.208-11, September 1 1644, Massey to the Coimiittee of
Both Kingdoms.
SP, 21/16, ff.212-15, September 5 1644, Massey to the Coninittee of
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BL, Loan 29/174, f.64, September 5 1644, Massey to Colonel Thomas
Harley.
BL, Loan 29/174, f.66, September 6 1644, Massey to Colonel Edward
Harley.
BL, Loan 29/174, f.71, September 12 (?) 1644, Massey to Colonel
Edward Harley.
SF, 21/16, ff.242-47, September 17 1644, Massey to the Coninittee
of Both Kingdoms.
SF, 21/16, ff.267-69, September 21 1644, Massey to the Coniiiittee
of Both Kingdoms.
BL, Harleian Ms.166, f.132, September 30 1644, Massey to Speaker
Lenthall.
BL, Loan 29/174, f.79, October 6 1644, Massey to Colonel Edward
Harley.
SF, 21/17, ff.32-38, October 6 1644, Massey to the Coninittee of
Both Kingdoms.
SF, 21/17, ff.44-45, October 11 1644, Massey to the Conniittee of
Both Kingdoms.
SP, 21/17, ff.55-56, October 14 1644, Massey to the Comittee of
Both Kingdoms.
SP, 21/17, ff.68-71, October 18 1644, Massey to the Ccxrnnittee of
Both Kingdoms.
BL, Loan 29/174, f.81, October 23 1644, Massey to Colonel Edward
Harley.
BL, Loan 29/174, f.82, October 28 1644, Massey to Colonel Edward
Harley.
BL, Stowe Ms.190, f.49, October 31 1644, Massey to Sir Samuel
Luke.
BL, Stowe Ms.190, f.54, November 6 1644, Massey to Sir Samuel
Luke.
SP, 21/17, ff.118-21, November 11 1644, Massey to the Coarnittee of
Both Kingdoms.
SP, 21/17, ff.130-34, November 18 1644, Massey to the Comittee of
Both Kingdoms.
BL, Stowe Ms.190, f.87, December 3 1644, Massey to Sir Samuel
-280-
Luke.
SF, 21/17, ff.166-68, January 8 1645, Massey to the Coninittee of
Both Kingdoms.
SP, 21/17, ff.184-92, January 21 1645, Massey to the Coninittee of
Both Kingdoms.
SP, 21/17, ff.193-95, January 22 1645, Massey to the Coninittee of
Both Kingdoms.
SP, 21/17, ff.216-17, February 12 1645, Massey to the Coninittee of
Both Kingdoms.
BL, Stowe Ms.190, f.130, February 16 1645, Massey to Sir Samuel
Luke.
SF, 21/17, ff.223-25, February 16 1645, Massey to the Comittee of
Both Kingdoms.
BL, Loan 29/175, ff.28-9, February 23 1645, Massey to Colonel
Edward Harley.
BL, Stowe Ms.190, ff.156, February 23 1645, Massey to Sir Samuel
Luke.
BL, Loan 29/175, f.34, March 17 1645, Massey to Colonel Edward
Harley.
BL, Loan 27/175, f.35, March 22 1645, Massey to Colonel Edward
Harley.
BL, Egerton Ms.787, f.93, March 22 1645, Massey to Sir Samuel
Luke.
BL, Harleian Ms.166, ff.189-89b, April 9 1645, Massey to Sir
Thomas Fairfax.
Bodl. Tanner Ms.60(1), f.103, April 19 1645, Massey to (?) Speaker
Lenthall.
Bodl. Tanner Ms.60(1), ff.127-28b, April 25 1645, Massey to
Speaker Lenthall.
Bodl. Tanner Ms.60(1), ff.132-33, April 26 1645, Massey to Speaker
Lenthall.
Bodi. Firth Ms.C8, ff.301-02, July (?) 1645, Massey to (?)
Bodl. Nalson Ms.4(25) f.52, August 9 1645, Massey to Speaker
Len thall.
Bodl. Nalson Ms.4(78) f.164, September 12 1645, Massey to (7)
Speaker Lenthall.
Bodi. Tanner Ms.59(1) f.292, June 4 1646, Massey to Sir Thomas
Fairfax.
BL, Loan 29/175, f.41, August 8 1646, Massey to Colonel Edward
Harley.
SP, 16/515, Pt.1, ff.37-38b, February (?) 1647, Massey to the
Coniiittee of Accounts.
BL, Add.Ms.61,989, f.97, December 12 1648, Massey and the King's
Head Declaration.
Bodl. Clarendon SP, 341(2993), f.68, January 1 1649, Massey to the
Prince of Wales.
Bodi. Clarendon SF, 45.f.4, January 2 1653, Massey to Charles II.
Bodl. Clarendon SP, 45.ff.265-66, April 17 1653, Massey to Charles
II.
BL, Egerton Ms.2,536, f.327, March 5 1659, Massey to Secretary
Edward Nicholas.
BL, Egerton Ms.2,536, ff.355-55b, April 4 1659, Massey to
Secretary Edward Nicholas.
BL, Egerton Ms.2,536, ff.374-75b, April 22 1659, Massey to
Secretary Edward Nicholas.
BL, Egerton Ms.2,536, f.393, May 3 1659, Massey to Secretary
Edward Nicholas.
BL, Egerton Ms.2,536, ff.430-30b, June 23 1659, Massey to
Secretary Edward Nicholas.
GRO, Barwick Ms.f.30, 1660 (?), Massey's Declaration.
BL, Add.Ms.38,849, f.63, April 13 1671, Massey to the Navy
Coimissioners.
BL, Stowe Ms.200, f.35, May 4 1672, Massey to the Earl of Essex.
Surviving letters written to Massey, or copies made of them. These
have been placed in chronological order.
Bodl. Tanner Ms.62(1) f.209, August 1 1643, Speaker Lenthall to
Massey.
SP, 21/18, f.104, May 30 1644, Coninittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/18, ff.185-6, July 2 1644, Comittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/18, f.212, July 11 1644, Comittee of Both Kingdoms to
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SF, 21/18, f.244, July 30 1644, Cofrrnittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/18, f.268, August 10 1644, Coninittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
BL, Loan 29/174, f.49, August 11 1644, Earl of Brentford to
Massey.
SF, 21/19, f.5, September 2 1644, Coninittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/19, f.23, September 10 1644, Committee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/19, f.32, September 13 1644, Coninittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SP, 21/19, f.56, September 28 1644, Committee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/19, ff.105-06, October 24 1644, Conmittee of Both Kingdoms
to Massey.
SP, 21/19, f.121, November 8 1644, Committee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/19, f.125, November 11 1644, Committee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
BL, Loan 29/174, f.87, November 26 1644, Committee of Gloucester
to Massey.
BL, Stowe Ms.190, f.311, November 28 1644, Sir Samuel bike to
Colonel Massey.
SP, 21/19, ff.161-62, December 14 1644, Committee of Both Kingdoms
to Massey.
BL, Stowe Ms.190, f.240, December 30 1644, Sir Samuel Luke to
Massey.
SF, 21/19, f.188, January 15 1645, Committee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/19, ff.201-02, February 5 1645, Committee of Both Kingdoms
to Massey.
SF, 21/19, f.239, February 25 1645, Committee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/20, ff.46-47, March 18 1645, Coarnittee of Both Kingdoms
to Massey.
SF, 21/20, f.47, March 18 1645, Coninittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SP, 21/20, f.70, March 25 1645, Conrnittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
Bodi. Tanner Ms.60(1), f.59, April 4 1645, House of Comons to
Massey.
SP, 21/20, ff.94-95, April 8 1645, Coarnittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/20, f.103, April 10 1645, Coainittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/20, ff.134-35, April 19 1645, Coniiiittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/20, ff.142-43, April 20 1645, Coninittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SP, 21/20, f.161, April 23 1645, Cotrniittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
BL, Egerton Ms.3,514, f.87, May 3 1645, Sir Samuel bike to Massey.
BL, Egerton Ms.3,514, f.81, May 7 1645, Sir Samuel thke to (?)
Massey.
BL, Egerton Ms.3,514, ff.79-80, May 9 1645, Sir Samuel Luke to
Massey.
SF, 21/20, f.251, May 19 1645, Coninittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SP, 21/20, ff.258-59, May 19 1645, Coninittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SP, 21/20, ff.263-64, May 24 1645, Coninittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SP, 21/20, f.265, May 24 1645, Cocrinittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/20, ff.289-90, May 28 1645, Comittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/20, ff.303-304, May 29 1645, Coninittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/20, f.333, June 3 1645, Corwnittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.	
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SP, 21/20, f.341, June 4 1645, Comittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/20, f.365, June 10 1645, Conrnittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SF, 21/21, f.25, June 20 1645, Comnittee of Both Kingdoms. to
Massey.
SF, 21/21, f.27, June 20 1645, Coninittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SP, 21/21, f.39, June 27 1645, Conittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SP, 21/21, f.163, August 29 1645, Comitittee of Both Kingdoms to
Massey.
SP, 21/21, ff.192-93, September 8 1645, Coffinittee of Both Kingdoms
to Massey.
BL, MF 547, Ainwick Ms. no foliation, Oct 0) 1645, John Fitz-
James to Massey.
BL, MF 547, Alnwick Ms.ff.6-6b, Oct-Dec (?) 1645, John Fitz-James
to Massey.
BL, MF 547, Ainwick Ms.f.12, Oct-Dec (?) 1645, John Fitz-James to
Massey.
BL, MF 547, Ainwick Ms.ff.13b-14, Nov-Dec (?) 1645, John Fitz-
James to Massey.
BL, ME 547, Ainwick Ms.ff.20-20b, March 2 1646, John Fitz-James to
Massey.
BL, MF 547, Ainwick Ms.ff.34b-35, April 3 1646, John Fitz-James to
Massey.
CR0, Barwick Ms.f.3, October 26 1647, Thomas Long to Massey.
GRO, Barwick Ms.f.6, Early (?) 1648, Stanley Cower Etc to Massey.
GRO, Barwick Ms.f.8, February 4 1648, Mr Strange to Massey.
BL, Egerton Ms.f.47, March (7) 1650, tnstructions to Massey and
others from Charles II. 	 -
GRO, Barwick Ms.f.22, February 13 1653, Lord Wilmot to Massey.
GRO, Barwick Ms.f.23, February 15 1653, (7) to Massey.
GRO, Barwick Ms.f.16, June 6 1653, Ormonde to Massey.
CR0, Barwick Ms.f.18, June 17 1653, Ormonde to Massey.
CR0, Barwick Ms.f.17, November 29 1653, Ormonde to Massey.
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E-Iarleian Ms.1,535, Arms and Pedigrees of (lester Families. This
volume contains Massey's pedigree, f.208b.
Add.Ms.5,529, (lester Pedigrees 1630.
Egerton Ms.1,533, Autographs of King Charles I and [I.
Egerton Ms.2,536, Nicholas Papers.
Egerton Ms.2,551, Nicholas Papers. This volume contains details of
the grant of land to Massey at Abbey Leix, f.84.
Egerton Ms.2,542, Nicholas Papers. This volume has other details
of the grant of land to Massey in 1660, ff.447-47b.
Stowe Ms.200, Correspondence of Arthur Capel, Earl of Essex 1672-
79.
Add.Ms.38,849, Hodgkin Papers.
Loan 29/83, Portland Ms. Miscellaneous, no foliation. Notification
of Massey's death by December 5 1674.
Loan 29/172, Portland Ms. Letters of Lady Brillinia Harley, no
foliation.
Loan, 29/173, Portland Ms. Harley Papers 1640-42.
Loan, 29/174, Portland Ms. Harley Papers 1642-45.
Loan, 29/175, Portland Ms. Harley Papers 1645-47.
Loan, 29/176, Portland Ms. Harley Papers 1647-52.
Add.Nls.61,989, Miscellaneous Harley Letters and Papers.
Harleian Ms.6802, State Papers of Charles I.
Harleian Ms.6804, State Papers of Charles I.
Harleian Ms.6851, Papers Relating to the Civil War Etc.
Harleian Ms.6852, Papers Relating to the Civil War Etc.
Add. Ms .18,980, Rupert Correspondence, 1642-43.
Add.Ms.18,981, Rupert Correspondence, 1644.
Add.Ms.18,982, Rupert Correspondence, 1645-58. All of these
volumes contain numerous dispatches from the Royalist ccxrrnanders
which campaigned against Massey.
Egerton Ms.785, Letter Book of Sir Samuel Luke 1643-45 (1).
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Egerton Ms.786, Letter Book of Sir Samuel Luke 1643-45 (2).
Egerton Ms.787, Letter Book of Sir Samuel bike 1644-45 (3).
Stowe Ms.190, Letter Book of Sir Samuel Luke 1644-45.
Acid.Ms.21,506, Autographs of Eminent Persons 1586-1835.
Add.Ms.34,253, Civil War Papers 1640-41.
Add.Ms.19,399, Royal and Noble Autographs 1646-1768 (2).
Add.Ms.11,043, Scudasnore Papers 1600-1700 (3).
Add.Ms.29,747, Autograph Letters.
British Library Microfilm 330. This contains the Ainwick Ms.547
and 548. The Letter Books of John Fitz-James.
Add.Ms.17,062, Diary of Richard Symonds.
Harleian Ms.939, Diary of Richard Syrnonds.
Harleian Ms.911, .Diary of Richard Synonds.
Add.Ms.18,777, Walter Yonge's Journal, September 1642-March 1643.
Add.tls .18,778, Walter Yonge' s Journal, July-November 1643.
Add.Ms.18,779, Walter Yonge's Journal, November 1643-May 1644.
Add.tls.18,780, Walter Yonge's Journal, April-December 1645.
Add.Ms.10,114, John Flarrington's Diary, 1646-53.
Add.Ms.31,116, Lawrence Whitacre's Diary, October 1642-Jvly 1647.
Harleian Ms.164, Sir Simon D'Ewes Journal, February 1641-June
1643.
Harleian Ms.165, Sir Simon D'Ewes Journal, June-December 1643.
Flarleian Ms.166, Sir Simon D'Ewes Journal, February 164+-November
1645.
Add.Ms.37,343, Whitelocke's Annals, 1640-45.
Add.Ms.37,344, Whitelocke's Annals, 1645-49.
Public Record Office.
State Papers Domestic, King (lanes I.
SF, 16/448, March, 1640.
SF, 16/488, January, 1642.
SF, 16/489, February-March, 1642.
SP, 16/490, April-May, 1642.
SF, 16/491, June-August, 1642.
SP, 16/492, October-November, 1642.
SF, 16/493, December and undated, 1642.
SF, 16/497, January-August, 1643.
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SF, 16/498, September-December, 1643.
SP, 16/S0O, January-February, 1644.
SP, 16/501, March-May, 1644.
SF, 16/502, June-August, 1644.
SP, 16/503, Pt.1.
SF, 16/506, January-March, 1645.
SF, 16/510, July-September, 1645.
SP, 16/511, October-December, 1645.
SF, 16/513, Pt.2.
SP, 16/514, Pt's. 1 and 2.
SP, 16/515, Pt's. 1 and 2.
SF, 16/539, Pt's. 1, 2, 3 and 4. Part 2 contains warrts and
petitions signed by Massey. See f.216; f.217, f.218. Part 4
includes warrants signed by Massey in the suniner of 1647. See
f.53; f.55; f.58; f.60; ff.61-5; f.69; f.72.
Letter Books of the Coninittee of Both Kingdoms.
SP, 21/4.
SF, 21/7.
SF, 21/8. See ff.33-33b for the Coninittee of Both Kingdom's









Minute Book of the Comittee for Irish Affairs.
SP, 21/26. This volume contains details of the decisions taken by
the Irish Coninittee when Massey's presence was noted. See f.34;
f.37; f.39; f.40; ff.49-53; f.55; f.58; ff.60-61; ff.71-80.
State Papers for Ireland, Charles I.
SP, 63/261 (1646). See f.128b; ff.136-37; f.166b; for papers
relating to the transportation of Massey's brigade over to
Ireland.
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SP, 63/262 (1646). See f.84b, f.100; ff.115b-116; f.119; for
further documentation on the Western Brigade and Ireland.
Corinonwealth Exchequer Papers.
SP, 28/191. Collections for Distressed Protestants in Ireland.
SP, 28/129, Pt.5. Captain Blaney's Account Book. A rich source of
material relating to the financing of Massey's principal garrison
as well as many other aspects of his coninand.
SP, 28/154. Gloucester and 1-Iertford Accounts and Scedules. This
unfoliated collection of papers contains a list of the Gloucester
corporation's accounts for 1642-43.
SP, 28/228, Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Papers relating to Gloucester
and Gloucestershire. These volumes contain an impressive
collection of documentation relating to a wide variety of features
which help illustrate the nature and character of Massey's
coninand. They contain dozens of warrønts, petitions and other
documents actually signed by him.
SP, 28/229.. Papers of the County Coninittees of Hereford and
Gloucester. No foliation.
SP, 28/261, Pt's. 1 and 2. Papers of the Coninittee of Safety.
SP, 28/262, Pt's. 1 and 2. Papers of the Comittee of Safety.
SP, 28/263, Papers of the Coninittee of Safety.
SP, 28/264, Papers of the Coninittee of Safety.
SF, 28/175, Somerset Assessments. This volume contains the Account
Book of Brunton hundred.
SP, 28/251. Wales and the Associated Counties. This volume also
contains a txindle of papers which relate to the Conirtittee of the
West.
SP, 28/187. Westminster Hundred and Worcestershire, Pt's. 1, 2, 3,
and 4.
SP, 28/188. Papers Relating to Worcester. No foliation.
SP, 28/30. Army Warrents, May-June 1645. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
and 7.
SF, 28/31. Army Warrants, July-August 1645. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
and 6. Pt.5 contains some warrGnts signed by Massey for his
western brigade. See ff.620-6.
SP, 28/32. Army Warr.nts, September-October 1645. Pt's. 1, 2 and
-2O9-
3.
SP, 28/33. Army Warrants, November-December 1645. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4
and 5. Pt.3 contains Constance Farrer's statement of arrears. See
f.351.
SP, 28/36. Array Warrnts, January-February 1646. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4,
5 and 6.
SP, 28/37. Army Warrants, March-April 1646. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 1., 5
and 6. Pt.2 contains some warrents which relate to Gloucester in
1643. See ff.177-181; f.224.
SP, 28/38. Army Warrents, May-June 1646. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and
6.
SP, 28/39. Army Warrants, July-August 1646. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4 and
5. See Pt.5 f.474 for another Massey document.
SP, 28/40. Army Warrants, September-October 1646. Pt's. 1 and 2.
SP, 28/41. Army Warrents, November-December 1646. Pt's. 1, 2, 3,
4, 5 and 6.
SP, 28/42. Army Warr4nts, Miscellaneous 1646-47. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7 and 8. See Pt. 7, f.912 for Captain Blaney's accounts and
arrears.
SP, 28/43. Army Warrants, Miscellaneous 1646-47. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6 and 7.
SP, 28/44. Army Warrajits, January-February 1647. Pt's. 1 and 2.
SP, 28/46. Army Warrants, June 1647. Pt's. 1, 2, 3 and 4.
SP, 28/47. Army Warrants, July-August 1647. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4 and
5.
SP, 28/48. Army WarrQnts, September 1647. Pt's. 1, 2, 3 and 4.
SP, 28/302. Miscellaneous Papers, 1646. Pt's. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
See Pt. 4, f.599 for the transportation of disbandment money for
the Western Brigade.
SP, 28/303. Miscellaneous Papers, 1647. Pt's. 1, 2, 3 and 4.






























Tanner Ms.61 (1644-5). See f.41 for the Parliament's instructions
relating to the garrison of Gloucester.
Tanner Ms.60(1) (1645). See f.160 for Massey's coninission to
conrnand Parliament's forces in the West.
Tanner Ms.60(2) (1645-6).
Tanner Ms.59(1) (1646). See f.52; f.220; f.247; for the Coninittee
of Gloucester's correspondence to Speaker Lenthall.
Tanner Ms.59(2) (1646-7).
Tanner Ms.58(1) (1647). See f.59; f.68; f.172; for reports by the






Tanner Ms.303, Fitz4lilliam Coningsby's defence.
Clarendon State Papers.
Cl.SP, 22 March-November 1643.
Cl.SP, 23 November 1643-January 1644.
Cl.SP, 24 January 1644-June 1645.
Cl.SP, 25 June-October 1645.
Cl.SP, 26 October 1645-January 1646.
Cl.SP, 27 January-May 1646.
Cl.SP, 28 May-December 1646.
Cl.SP, 29 December 1646-July 1647.
Cl.SP, 30(1) July-November 1647.
Cl.SP, 30(2) December 1647-March 1648.
Cl.SP, 31 March-November 1648.
Cl.SP, 34 December 1648-January 1649.
C1.SP, 38 September-December 1649.
C1.SP, 39 January-March 1650.
Cl.SP, 42 April 1651-February 1652.
Cl.SP, 45 January-June 1653.




Nalson Ms.2 (1642). See f.138; f.148; f.175; f.197; f.198; ff.221;




Nalson Ms.11 (1643). See ff.188-89; ff.191-2; for dispatches of
military operations involving Massey.
Na].son Ms.12 (1645). See f.245; for a letter to the Comiittee of
Gloucester.
Rawlinson Manuscripts.
Rawlinson Ms.A 258. Papers Relating to Ireland 1645-47. This
volume contains letters relating to the disbandment of the
Western Brigade.	
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Rawlinson Ms.0 125. Copies of Letters to Western Royalists in
1645.
Rawlinson Ms.D 11. Charles I &.
Rawlinson tls.D 119. Forest of Dean.
Rawlinson Ms.D 395. Civil War Papers.
Rawlinson Ms.D 918. See ff.144-45b for leaves out of the minute
book of the Royalist Coninittee of Worcestershire.
Rawlinson Ms.D 925. Historical Notes. See ff.147-152 for other
pages of the Royalist Coninittee for Worcester.
Firth Ms.0 6. Victorian transcriptions of the Rupert
Correspondence. Some of the originals are now lost. All three
volumes contain many letters by the Royalist military comanders
against whom Massey fought.
Firth Ms.0 7.
Firth Ms.0 8.
Ms.Eng.Hist. C 53. Journal of Sir Samuel Luke 1643-44. This
collection of intelligence reports and letters casts much light on
the campaigning in Gloucestershire during the early months of
Massey's deputy Governorship.
Fairfax Ms.32, Fairfax Papers 1641-58.
Dugdale Ms.19, Register of Letters Patent 1643-46.
Harvester Press Microfilm.
Clarke Ms.41. Papers of the Council of the Army 1647.
Gloucestershire Record Office,.
D 115. Civil War Manuscripts. This volume contains many papers for
1643 which illustrate some little known aspects of the siege of
Gloucester.
D 2510. Volumes 1 and 2. The Papers of John Smith (1639-46).
D 2071. A3. thipping Sodbury Bailiffs Accounts (1641-42).
D 421 A/1/7. Royal Conuiission to Sir William Vavasour.
D 421 W1/8. Royal Coninission to Sir John Winter.
D 421 A/1/6. Royal Coriinission to Sir John Winter.
Transcriptions from original documents. TRS; 128; 130; 141; 145;
147; 167; 168.
Gloucestershire Record	 Office Microfilm 285. The Barwick
Manuscripts. See f.2 for Massey's Accounts.
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B 3/2 Corporation Minutes 1632-56.
H 2/2 Gloucester Corporation Letters 1619-56.
G3/SO4 Sessions Book 1638-47.
F 4/5 Chamberlians Accounts 1635-53.
G 10/2 Hundred Court 1641-53.
London Corporation Record Office.
Corporation of London Record Book 1640-49.
London Conmon Council Journal Book, voltine 40, 1640-49.
Doctor Willjams Library.
Thomas Juxon's Journal Ms.24*50.
Titled tracts from the Thomason collection in the British Library.
E 133(7) The Humble Petition of the Inhabitants of the County of
Gloucester, 1641.
E 133(6) A Letter Sent to a Worthy Member of the Coninons
Concerning the Lord thandos..., Aug 22 1642.
E 116(15) Sixteen Propositions Presented at the General Meeting of
the Gentry of the City of Gloucester..., 1642.
E 124(4) Exceeding Joyful News From the Earl of Stamford..., Oct
22 1642. A bogus propaganda tract.
E 127(28) True News Out of Herefordshire..., Nov 19 1642. Another
bogus account of spectacular victories achieved by Stamford.
E 83(7) True Discovery of the Practices of the Lord Chandos to
Betray the City of Gloucester, Dec 1642.
E 85(25) A True Relation of the Late Attempt Made upon the Town of
Cirencester in the County of Gloucester, Jan 7 1643.
E 85(33) A Letter to the Earl of Pembroke From Sir Edward Baynton
in Gloucester, Jan 22 1643.
E 90(7) A Relation of the Taking of Cirencester in the County of
Gloucester, Feb 2 1643.
E 90(4) A Warning Piece to All His Majestys Subjects..., 1643.
E 92(9) The Petition of the Inhabitants of Cirencester..., March 7
1643.
E 94(12) Letter From Waller to Essex..., March 28 1643.
E 94(30) The Copy of a Letter Sent From Bristol..., April 4 1643.
E 101(25) A Letter From an Officer in His Majestys Army to a
Gentleman in Gloucestershire.,., May 1643.
E 67(31) A Brief and Exact Relation of the Most Material and
Remarkable Passages That Happened in the Late Well Formed Siege
Before the City of Gloucester, 1643.
E 67(13) A True Relation of the Several Passages Which Have
Happened to Our Army Since it Advanced Towards Gloucester..., Sept
4 1643.
E 230(9) Good News From All Quarters of the Kingdom Particularly
From Gloucester, Sept 13 1643.
E 70(10) A True Relation of the Late Expedition of His Excellency,
Robert Earl of Essex For the Relief of Gloucester..., Oct 7 1643.
E 69(2) Relation of the late Battle Near Newbury..., Sept 26 1643.
E 69(10) The Several Actions of the King's Army Since His tiajestys
Removing it From Before Gloucester, Sept 27 1643.
E 69(15) A True and Exact Relation of the...Red and Blue
Regiments...Who Marched Forth For the Relief of the City of
Gloucester, Oct 2 1643.
E 45(12) A True Relation of a Wicked Plot Intended and Still Afoot
Against the City of Gloucester to Betray the Same Into the Hands
of the Cavaliers..., May 7 1644.
E 47(12) Ordinance of the Lords and Comions For Raising and
Maintaining of Horse and Foot For the Garrison of Gloucester...,
May 13 1644.
E 50(17) Eben-ezer, A Full and Exact Relation of the Several
Remarkable and Victorious Proceedings of the Ever Renowned Colonel
Massey, Governor of Gloucester From May 7 to May 25 1644..., June
41644.
E 271(1) I\qo Great Victories One Obtained by Colonel Massey at the
Storming of Sir John Winter's House..., March 1 1645. The title of
this tract is misleading, it really refers to the battle of
Launant.
E 274(1) Four Ordinances of the Lords and Coninons Assembled in
Parliament..., 13 March 1645. Legislation concerning Gloucester.
E 281(9) A Copy of Colonel Massey's Letter of All the Particulars
of the Great Fight Between Him and Prince Rupert at Ledbury..., 2
May 1645.
E 286(7) Two Ordinances of the Lords and Cannons Assembled in
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Parliament..., 29 May 1645. Legislation ref erring to Gloucester.
E 286(14) A True Relation of the Manner of the Taking of the Town
of Eveshain..., 26 May 1645.
E 345(3) The Power of the Coninittee of Somerset..., July 18 1645.
E 306(8) An Historical Relation of the Military Government of
Gloucester From the Beginning of the Civil War Between King and
Parliament to the Removal of Colonel Massey From the Government to
the Coffinand of the Western Forces, Oct 1645.
E 311(12) A Copy of a Letter From Major General Massey, Nov 1645.
E 316(4) Verses on the Siege of Gloucester and Colonel Massey, Dec
1645.
E 334(5) A Relation of That Great and Public Consternation [-lad in
Gloucester, July 1644, April 24 1646.
E 337(15) A Vindication of the Magistrates and Ministers of the
City of Gloucester..., 11 May 1646.
E 349(18) Truth Discovered From the West, Concerning the Carriage
of Major General Massey's Brigde There, Aug 8 1646.
E 358(7) Life of Essex, 1646.
E 362(8) Propositions For the Western Association With the Western
Intentions For Their Own Preservation, 14 Nov 1646.
E 396(7) The Petition of Members of the House of Coninons..., 2
July 1647.
E 397(17) A Particular tharge or Impeachment..., 9 July 1647.
E 398(3) A Brief Justification of the Eleven Accused Members, 15
July 1647.
E 398(17) A Full Vindication and Answer of the Eleven Accused
Members, 15 July 1647.
E 399(29) A Copy of a Letter Sent From One of the Agitators..., 22
July 1647.
E 399(30) The Humble Petition of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and
Coninons of the City of London..., 24 July 1647.
E 399(31) A Message From His Excellency Sir Thomas Fairfax..., 24
July 1647.
E 399(36) Works of Darkness Brought to Light, 23 July 1647.
E 400(2) An Ordinance of the Lords and Comons Assembled in
Parliament..., 23 July 1647.
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E 400(28) An Ordinance of the Lords and Comons in Parliament
Assembled..., 31 July 1647.
E 400(29) A Declaration of the Lord Mayor and Aldermen and Corrmons
of the City of London..., 31 July 1647.
	 -
E 400(32) A Declaration of William Lenthall..., 31 July 1647.
E 400(34) Several Orders and Votes of Both Houses of
Parliament..., 2 Aug 1647.
E 400(40) A Letter From the Army..., 3 Aug 1647.
E 401(12) The Declaration of General Massey and Colonel General
Poyntz..., 9 Aug 1647.
E 401(20) A Speedy Hue and Cry After General Massey..., 10 Aug
1647.
E 402(3) A New Remonstrance of the Eleven Impeached Members..., 14
Aug 1647.
E 402(4) A True and Impartial Relation of the Military Government
of the City of Gloucester..., 14 Aug 1647.
E 402(22) An Outcry Against the Speedy Hue and Cry, After General
Massey..., 18 Aug 1647.
E 402(23) Virtue and Valour Vindicated, or the Late Hue and Cry
Sent After General Massey..., 19 Aug 1647.
E 404(6) The Araignment and Impeachment of Major General
Massey..., 23 Aug 1647.
E 404(15) General Massey's Bartholomew-Fairings..., 24 Aug 1647.
E 452(20) The Declaration of Major General Massey Concerning
Coming Into England..., 13 July 1648.
E 476(33) A Declaration to the City and Kingdom From Major General
Massey..., 18 Dec 1648.
E 541(7) A Short Declaration by Colonel Edward Massey..., 2 Feb
1649.
E 597(4) The Declaration of Major General Massey and Eighty Other
English Officers..., 29 March 1650.
E 608(3) The Declaration and Speech of Colonel Massey: Concerning
the Inthroning of the King of Scots, 22 July 1650.
E 641(15) The Declaration of Major General Massey Upon His Death
Bed at Leicester, 15 Sept 1651.
E 641(18) The Charge and Articles of High Treason...Also the
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Parliament's Resolution Concerning Major General Massey, 16 Sept
1651. -
E 649(1) The Queen of Denmark's Letter...Together With the Removal
of Major General Massey..., Dec 1651.
E 674(26) A New Hue aDd Cry After Major General Massey..., 6 Sept
1652.
E 684(5) A Declaration of the Proceedings of Major General
Massey..., 22 Dec 1652.
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Royalist Oxford newsheets were consulted in the four volumes
edited by Robin Jeffs. These were published in London in 1971 by
the Cornmarket press under the title, The English Revolution,
Newsbooks 1, Oxford Royalist.. They contain all the copies of
Mercurius Aulicus along with Mercurius Rusticus and Mercurius
Academicus.
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